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fantasy and science fiction genres, which the success of 
Lucas’s film first illuminated. The digital relation takes 
over where Christianity left off grounding the fantasy 
genre. Digital fantasy in the SF movies The Martian and 
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I must thank the editors I contacted at the university presses 
of California, Columbia, Fordham, MIT, and Northwestern for 
the rude awakening. After over a year of pitching my work as 
required like a beginner in a time-killing process of application, 
I recalled that recently two good friends in the Humanities, who 
have followed my work forever but, coasts apart in their CVs and 
current affiliations, do not know one another, recommended 
punctum books as the best address for my work. Thank you, 
Richard Burt and Daniel Tiffany. 
One day I noticed that one of the punctum books editors 
had settled in Santa Barbara working closely with two of my 
close friends and former colleagues. Looking it up again online I 
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ing of repression and the prospect of a more integrated depar-
ture from my academic life that I thank Julie Carlson, Aranye 
Fradenburg Joy, Eileen A. Fradenburg Joy, and Vincent W.J. van 
Gerven Oei for making the happy end happen. 
Critique of Fantasy visits endopsychic genealogy and endo-
psychic allegory on a few of the title’s likely suspects but in large 
part on unsuspected trajectories. Two works by Ian McEwan 
offer bookends for framing the endopsychic claims I am staking. 
When Jonathan Lethem was at the American Academy in Berlin 
we began a series of exchanges accompanying his composition of 
A Gambler’s Anatomy, which came to an end when he crossed 
the finish line. At the same time, I was concluding my study of 
slasher and splatter movies, The Psycho Records, and introduced 
some of its themes into our final exchange. Among the “psy-
cho” influences that allowed him to get inside his protagonist’s 
“anatomy,” Lethem referred to McEwan’s The Innocent (1990). 
The nightmare topos of the difficulties attending disposal of 
the murder victim is what the protagonist must work through 
in his amateur hours of dissecting the corpse. Four years later 
McEwan published a novel for or, rather, about children, The 
Daydreamer. From age ten to twelve we follow Peter Fortune’s 
development through the developmental staging of his wish 
fantasies. He periodically enters daydream fantasy and departs 
from reality for a spell on the cusp of hallucination and delu-
sion. In other words, his daydreams partake of night-dream 
reality. Although he ends up allegedly reconciled with growing 
up, his episodes were psycho. The protagonist of The Innocent 
is the fantast and his ultimate fantasy is that by making the body 
of his murder victim disappear his courtship of the dead man’s 
wife can continue uninterrupted unto the happy end. But the 
fantasy isn’t fulfilled, and the woman for whom he did it all 
can’t have anything further to do with him. Whereas the 1994 
novel The Daydreamer exemplifies the pitfalls of the obvious 
when it comes to fantasy, The Innocent, by allegorizing the wish 
for reunification within the deep cuts of making the past disap-
pear, is a more nuanced sorting through of near-misses, which I 
am convinced both fantasy and critique demand. 
When it was my turn in the exchange with Lethem, I pro-
ceeded in record time. This meant that other readings I was 
engaged in at that moment, and which were earmarked for 
the present study, crept into my sallies. Otherwise, however, I 
left the bulk of the booklet, in particular my swift readings of 
Lethem’s oeuvre between science fiction and fantasy, out of this 
study, also because they depended on the context I shared with 
his authorship. The Blot: A Supplement (Anti-Oedipus Press, 
2016) contains in nuce many of the theoretical conclusions I 
reach at greater length in the present study. I recommend it as 
souvenir of the journey going into Critique of Fantasy. I thank 






Introduction; or, How Star Wars 
Became Our Oldest Cultural 
Memory 
I have touched down in the Star Wars franchise on several occa-
sions to illustrate a historical paradox I once dared name “Nazi 
Psychoanalysis.”1 Let me say right off that this study will not look 
more closely at the Star Wars movies.2 Instead, it will explore 
a terrain between the science fiction and fantasy genres that 
the success of George Lucas’s 1977 film illuminated and which 
remains to this day the cradle of blockbuster culture. 
Orbiting around the B-line I will continue to make in this 
introduction, examples abound of what might be termed the 
“Star Wars Effect.” Roland Emmerich, who was originally 
enrolled in film school in Germany to become a producer, 
switched his career goal to directing when he saw Star Wars. Did 
it take a German to recognize Lucas’s refurbishing of Allied pro-
paganda films? The Death Star, the unbeatable foe, is brought 
down by a makeshift alliance of unlikely victors, who win as 
losers, not as winners. That’s Lucas’s remix of the formula: to 
win as winner would be tantamount to filling the position the 
1 See Laurence A. Rickels, Nazi Psychoanalysis, 3 vols. (Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota Press, 2002).
2 My most sustained attempt to interpret the six Star Wars films can be 
found in I Think I Am: Philip K. Dick (Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota Press, 2010), 71–74. 
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Nazis forever occupy in the global culture industry. If losers 
continue to prevail against empires of evil as the good and the 
brave, then the Nazis keep on winning as unrepentant win-
ners. The 2020 pandemic incited US news anchors to cite from 
the famous broadcasts Churchill delivered during the Battle of 
Britain and encourage a population endangered by and as losers 
to rally around the prospect that they were now living Star Wars. 
Star Wars turned propaganda hype into archetype. Emmerich’s 
blockbuster Independence Day (1996) testified to the instruction 
he took down from Star Wars.
The success of Lucas’s movie encouraged the Bond franchise 
to hitch to its star the one Ian Fleming fiction that was exception-
ally and untenably close to World War Two: Moonraker (1955). 
At the end of the movie The Spy Who Loved Me (1977), the next 
Bond film to be coming soon was already announced to be For 
Your Eyes Only (1981), the first film to turn to the short stories 
for material and title. But Star Wars placed Moonraker back on 
the books-to-film shelf. The producers recognized a way around 
the novel’s direct hit of Nazi vengeance. In the 1979 movie, Sir 
Hugo Drax operates out of California from within a network 
of facilities for research and construction of space shuttle-like 
transportation next door to the French chateau he transferred to 
the American West stone by stone, like London Bridge. 
In the novel, Sir Hugo Drax is a celebrity in the UK by dint 
of great wealth and incredible generosity. Drax has donated to 
his adopted home the ultimate defense rocket, “the Moonraker,” 
which will restore British sovereignty in the Cold War context. 
That Drax all along planned to blast London with the lifetime-
long held-back miracle weapon is a reprisal made all the more 
blatant by the blind spot it occupies. For, Drax’s rocket scheme is 
such a foreign body – both as event in the book and, apparently, 
as book – that no one in Britain can recognize a Nazi victory 
rocket when only ten years after the war they see a big one being 
built atop the cliffs of Dover. 
In the movie, the Nazi/“not see” Death-Star element is the 
eugenics prejudice guiding the selection of sole survivors to be 
transported in the flotilla of space shuttles to the restart posi-
tion, the pure future of the species. But even the best laid plan is 
undone by Bond’s Allied propaganda pitch to Drax’s henchman, 
 introduction
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the giant named Jaws, who, suited up with his midget partner, 
thought he was going to get away with the purity brigade. The 
freakish victim takes his stand with Bond’s triumph against all 
odds.
Does Lucas’s admission or recollection of the influence of 
Joseph Campbell’s The Hero with a Thousand Faces contradict 
the setting of the Star Wars success story in these historical prop 
departments? No. Although Campbell first published the book 
in 1949, it was upon its revised reissue in 1968 that he, like his 
model Carl Jung, found a larger following in the United States. 
Campbell benefited, therefore, from the era of change tied to 
the antiwar movement in the States. After the spirit of rebellion 
had gone into decline, Lucas brought it back, albeit reshuffled 
along the inner/outer fronts of World War Two propaganda. 
The stampede of family approval followed. Shortly after the 
appearance of Lucas’s movie, new editions of Campbell’s book 
displayed Luke Skywalker (Mark Hammill) on the cover.
The Hero with a Thousand Faces had already served as the 
main bookend propping up the media’s mythologizing of 
President Kennedy’s term in office as “Camelot.” The former 
First Lady, in the meantime Jacqueline Onassis and Doubleday 
editor, arranged for the 1988 publication of The Power of Myth. 
The sequel to and summary of The Hero with a Thousand Faces 
was based on a transcript of Bill Moyers’s long conversation with 
Campbell, which was filmed for TV on Lucas’s Skywalker Ranch. 
Looking back upon this delegation (Campbell died shortly before 
the show aired), we could be inside a science fiction by Philip K. 
Dick, in particular The Simulacra (1964), which anticipated mass 
psychologization of primal scenes of a ruling middlebrowbeat 
and the consequent marketing of the reduction of myth and 
religion to the stages of grief – or, rather, of the hero’s progress.
Another upgrading backstory you will hear from Star Wars 
idolators – adepts of the history of their own making in the digi-
tal archive – concerns Lucas’s contact with Japanese art cinema. 
Since he had been unable to obtain the adaptation rights for the 
Flash Gordon franchise, in 1973 Lucas came up with a synopsis 
for a heroic space movie of his own, which reads like the plot 
line of Akira Kurosawa’s The Hidden Fortress (1958). However, 
whatever all-nighter pressure he was under to slap together that 
between a crypt and a datemark
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summary, it didn’t feature the franchise’s distinctive traits, such 
as “the force,” which only appeared in the final version. What 
remains from the cribbed synopsis are the two robots, who held 
the place of the bickering peasants. Too much information is the 
milieu of online outlines of interpretation. I found an afterim-
age of this unlikely lineage of influence in an interview with 
Andrei Tarkovsky’s son. When he was a kid, he wasn’t able to 
see Star Wars in the Soviet Union, so parental guidance told him 
the story and enacted it so he could watch it in his imagination. 
The next day his father showed him the movie that was avail-
able for screening: The Hidden Fortress.3 What I take from this 
anecdote is that censorship, which gets passed along, promotes 
half-knowledge. 
Star Wars introduces itself both in the timeless past of the 
fairy tale (“A long time ago”) and in the future of outer space 
(“in a galaxy far, far away”). This conflation of defining traits 
of the genres is a compromise formation in light of the hostile 
takeover bid informing J.R.R. Tolkien’s manifesto-essay “On 
Fairy-Stories.” The breakthrough success of Star Wars collected 
its momentum in the contest between the new or renewed genre 
of fantasy, which Tolkien began championing in the 1930s, and 
the other genre component of Lucas’s film, science fiction. The 
historical onset of the rivalry between fantasy and science fiction 
is crowded with literary examples. But as B-genres science fiction 
and fantasy were contemporaries of early cinema emerging out 
of the scientific and experimental study and recording of motion 
made visible. In an early work such as The Time Machine by 
H.G. Wells, the transport through time – the ununderstood crux 
of this literary experiment – was rendered through description 
of “special effects,” the cinematic-fantastic component in the 
narrative, which reflected new developments and forecast the 
movies to come. Critique of Fantasy follows the rebound of wish 
fantasy between literary description of the ununderstood and its 
cinematic counterpart (for example, visual and special effects).
3 Marina Galperina, “Andrey Tarkovsky Loved Star Wars So Much,” 




Tolkien introduced his new view of a genre (as old as human 
consciousness, he upholds, but in the meantime confined to 
childhood) with a view to addressing a more adult readership. 
Works of fantasy tended to be reserved for children: that’s how 
Tolkien’s The Hobbit (1937) first circulated. Tolkien concluded 
“On Fairy-Stories” while composing Lord of the Rings (1954–55), 
which he hoped to pitch to a more mature audience. The new 
young-adult genre Tolkien launched did not begin to make it 
outside its own subcultural niche market and become a full-
grown rival of science fiction on the adjacent shelves in the 
bookstore until the hypnotizing success of Star Wars. That it is 
hard to tag the genre content of Lucas’s franchise fits the contest 
to which it owes its projection. In Reign of Fire (2002), fire-
breathing dragons beset London in a future that sure looks like 
we’re back in the Battle of Britain. In the bunker’s scare – I mean, 
care – center, the kids are diverted by the puppet-play version of 
the Star Wars saga. The Darth Vader puppet pronounces: “I am 
your father,” while all around the transfixed children gawk and 
gasp. In this future world, the story counts as mythic fairy tale.
We could observe the Star Wars Effect skewering together the 
2015 return of three major franchises. SPECTRE is punctuated 
throughout by encrypted souvenirs of the films comprising the 
franchise chapter that opened in 2006 styling with a return to 
the 1960s. The integration of Germany at the front of the line of 
the ghost history of World War Two (even as the world turned 
the denial) packed the surprise appeal of the first season of Bond 
movies. In 2015, the first SPECTRE agent to report at the meeting 
– which is a remake of a scene in Thunderball (1965) that rein-
troduces Blofeld – speaks German and business as usual. Instead 
of the residual charging of the traumatic history of World War 
Two, however, a fantasy tale is introduced along the lines of 
Otto Rank’s transfer of the import of the Freudian poetics of 
daydreaming to his own account of the myth of the birth of the 
hero. Young Bond, the adoptive brother, came to monopolize 
the father’s love like the cuckoo deposited in the nest. Blofeld 
remains the crazed son crying out “cuckoo, cuckoo” whenever 
Bond is near. His criminality, which commences with the murder 
of the father, expresses one sibling’s envy of the orphan brother, 
the true heir and hero. 
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We touch here on the family romance which, quickly put, is a 
fantasy Freud identified during his season of theorizing wish ful-
fillment. In SPECTRE, the authenticity of inheritance is asserted 
outside bloodlines, preserving the romance through its spiritual 
reversal: the adopted heir is the hero. The family romance is the 
fantasy of the child currently being raised by nice but modest 
foster parents (including uncles and aunts). The eventual ascen-
dancy to hero status will disclose and reclaim the child’s more 
elevated inheritance.4 
By keeping it all in the family romance, the other films flash-
ing in the back of the minds of the viewer–experts watching 
SPECTRE rebound within the compact underworld of the last 
three films, to which the return of Blofeld from the first season 
of the franchise subjects Bond, the bond with the viewer. That 
the viewer-expert knows the franchise and brings to the new 
4 Rank made the family romance the rule of the heroic saga in Der 
Mythos von der Geburt des Helden (The Myth of the Birth of the 
Hero, 1914). It is by this introject in its makeup that Campbell’s book 
seems to spring eternal following the splash made by Luke Skywalker. 
“Typically,” Campbell says to Moyers in the TV special while flashing 
on images from Star Wars, “the hero is the orphaned son of royalty. 
Unaware of his true identity, he is consigned to a life of drudgery 
and exile.” Or again: “the child of destiny has to face a long period of 
obscurity.” These quotes did not make it into the book The Power of 
Myth, the selective transcript of the TV special. When Campbell goes 
on, still on TV, to identify this situation of the hero’s childhood with 
Rank’s Freudian thesis of the family romance and the myth of the 
hero’s birth, he draws instead on the post-Freudian work Rank pur-
sued focused on an origin of the hero in the womb, which becomes the 
foster placement he must jettison: “everyone is a hero in his birth. He 
has undergone a tremendous transformation from a little, you might 
say, water creature, living in a realm of amniotic fluid and so forth, then 
coming out, becoming an air-breathing mammal that ultimately will 
be self-standing and so forth, is an enormous transformation and it is 
a heroic act […]. It’s the primary hero, hero form, you might say.” The 
scenario skips the relational origin of life between mother and child. 
See “Ep. 1: Joseph Campbell and the Power of Myth – ‘The Hero’s 





screening all the information fitting a smaller screen, the portal 
to the digital archive, inflects each 2015 sequel with the return to 
an encrypted origin. 
In Jurassic World, the child protagonists fall into a crypt 
storing all that remains of the visitor center from the first film, 
(1993). Out of the debris they assemble a rescue vehicle. The past 
belongs to the history of the films, while the present allows the 
story’s “mythic” personalization by the viewers. Two brothers 
from competing eras of fantasy (the elder is a teen) shake their 
foster care and form an alliance to withstand on their own the 
derailment of the world (the separation of their true parents). 
The reproductive romance of the fantasy is split off into the DNA 
remixed in the labs to engineer the faux prehistoric animals. The 
secret raptor provenance is the hot spot of betrayal and allegiance 
in the heroic saga waged among the creatures. 5
At the close of Star Wars: The Force Awakens, the young 
heroine, who doesn’t yet know her true parents, embarks on a 
journey that crosses generations to draw benefit from the first 
film. The dark-side double and rival is the peer of the new viewer 
also in terms of his expertise and fandom, which he renews in 
secret recess with the skull and mask of Darth Vader, the grand 
or great father the family romance won for him. While the inter-
references in the other two sequels are each a spolia more by 
metonymy, the haunted helmet–skull is in fact a leftover of the 
original masked heavy-breathing psycho-POV retrofitted in 2015 
above the entry to the super-franchise, which imparts the family 
romance of heroism to all franchises that carry with them the 
digital know-how of their viewer fans.
5 While the specific Jurassic Park franchise is less vintage than the other 
two that came back for more in 2015, the adaptation and book reach 
back through the history of the fantasy and science fiction genres to 
earlier novels and their subsequent adaptations, which is not lost on 
the fans hunting for the “Easter eggs” of cross-reference in the digital 
archive. The title of Michael Crichton’s sequel novel cited one of the 
precursors: Arthur Conan Doyle’s The Lost World (1912). Jules Verne’s 
Journey to the Center of the Earth (1864) and Edgar Rice Burroughs’s 
The Land that Time Forgot (1916) are the bookends of Crichton’s 
posthumously published prequel, set in the late-nineteenth-century 
United States, Dragon’s Teeth (2017). 
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After Ridley Scott saw Star Wars he immediately shelved 
what he was planning, an adaptation of the medieval legend 
of “Tristan and Iseult,” and accepted instead the offer to direct 
Alien (1979). What wowed him in Lucas’s film was the new vista 
of special effects that the magic wand of fantasy was waving 
through, ultimately toward the anticipated innovations of digi-
tization. His next film was Blade Runner (1982), the adaptation 
of P.K. Dick’s Do Androids Dream of Electric Sheep? (1968), a 
movie that counts in its own right as history changing.6 The two 
films follow separate trajectories that Scott later combined in his 
Alien prequels, Prometheus (2012) and Alien: Covenant (2017), 
which frame his eclectic career with the mix of science fiction and 
fantasy, the main “effect” that Star Wars taught him.
Science fiction failed to predict the future, and yet fantasy did 
not so much succeed as draw the benefit from the resemblance of 
basic fantasying to the new digital relation. If the fantasy that is 
true is no longer the Gospel (which was Tolkien’s definition) but 
instead all that digitization holds in store, then fantasy becomes a 
genre without borders, the subsuming genre of “fiction.” 
The 1977 anticipation of the digital relation went into the 
continuation of the original Star Wars trilogy like a wish into its 
fulfillment. Lucas was intent on imparting digital perfectibility 
to his earlier special effects. But embellishing the same old films 
was not enough: their projection into the digital era required a 
greater frame of heroic saga or franchise, which he accomplished 
by a reversal that placed the beginning in the middle. Those first 
Star Wars films were revealed to be descendants of a heroic fran-
chise in which the fantasy of the digital relation was a wrap with 
the surprise of true origins. 
In addition to the topics foregrounded in psy-fi, notably, 
psychosis and mourning (or unmourning), adolescence is piv-
otal throughout my archaeology of the recent past. In Critique 
of Fantasy, it’s clear right from the start that the work cut out for 
a poetics of daydreaming is the rescue of teen innovation from 
6 In Germany: A Science Fiction (Fort Wayne: Anti-Oedipus Press, 
2014), I assigned Blade Runner to the avant-garde of the return of 
German science fiction after decades of repression with(in) the recent 
past of the Cold War.
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the turbulence of its throwaway prematurity. Freud drew the dis-
tinction between child’s play, which can be out in the open since 
the underlying fantasy – the wish to be big or grownup – doesn’t 
merit censure, and its substitute, the fantasying that takes over 
in adolescence and withdraws omnipotence into a stronghold 
that keeps private the wishes that are embarrassingly narcissistic, 
inartistic, and even antisocial. 
The mix of B-genres to which the present study attends in 
tracking the ascendancy of fantasy is as nebulous as the trium-
phant genre’s meaning or medium, which is fantasying. That our 
second nature as daydreamers is so slippery does not contradict 
that it is, according to Freud and Tolkien, the reason for art’s 
existence. I have specialized before in engaging the outer limits 
of understanding. Psychopathy? Nobody knows. Asking people 
what they think daydreaming is might be a party game. Our 
second nature is either disowned or not known. And yet, out of 
the interior cacophony of “like, like” and “unfriend, unfriend,” 
the reflux reflex of omnipotence, I am trying to discern, as did the 
psychoanalysts and philosophers before me, the evolution of the 
social relation that is art. 
You can think anything, but once you enter upon the genre 
of thought that is wish-fantasy, the emerging daydream scenario 
is at once singular (in context) and apparently limited to a finite 
list of variations and types. While it seems that by now anything 
goes in A- and B-culture and the old precept that the solo wish 
fantasy is inadmissible no longer applies, the ways in which pri-
mary narcissism keeps on being altered and restaged for the social 
relation have become “diacritical,” reliant on the biggest show in 
town: the public narcissism of small differences.
Freud upended the innocent/guilty impasse between fantasy 
altered by the stick and carrot of unattainable beauty and unten-
able, unsavory private daydreaming through a line of contrast 
that unfolds in time. In his poetics of the daydream, Freud sup-
plied the notion of a datemark that belongs to the moment in 
the present that triggered the fantasying and indelibly stamped 
it. The constitutive arc in every daydream, which takes off from 
an idealized past and jump-cuts to the future of wish fulfillment 
so as to elide the present, is a bridge that will fall down. Fantasy is 
historicization waiting to happen, the mortal recoil of its flight. 
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The evolving genre of science fiction also lies in wait; by its sal-
vos of right or wrong extrapolation, it is ever grounded in the 
present tense, in its ongoing tensions and encrypted contents. In 
Origin of the German Mourning Play,7 Walter Benjamin derived 
modern allegory from the untenability of Christianity’s purchase 
on the future. I am arguing, in the case of science fiction, along 
these lines: when a weighty forecast (that can’t wait to exercise 
controlling interest) falls short, allegory takes over. 
Somewhere over the digital relation, Ridley Scott’s The 
Martian (2015) is a good example of a movie that looks like sci-
ence fiction as often as it acts like and refers to fantasy. I give this 
example up front to underscore that it’s not only the evidence of 
medievalist props that I am following out into the borderland 
between the two genres. The Martian is the fantasy saga of the 
hero’s return, but the treasure he brings back to the community, 
the conclusion that the film adaptation adds to Andy Weir’s 
2011 novel, is problem-solving, a lesson that the protagonist 
Mark Watson teaches in the end, which is more commensurate 
with digital knowledge than Christian fantasy. Earlier the hero 
waved the digital mirror before our eyes. Yes, he sits before some 
functioning console and starts logging a record of his solo time 
on Mars. We are his digital mirror, which Mark rolls over from 
recording to simultaneity-contact through a series of reenact-
ments of a concise history of writing and telecommunication 
from the vantage point of the digital. Simply, but subtly, the 
science fiction of successful space transport falls short for the 
protagonists with whom we identify, who prevail against all odds 
by improvising outside chances out of low-tech materials, the 
ruins of the old story of success, namely, classical science fiction. 
By lagging behind, science fiction nevertheless inscribes upon the 
props of its failed forecasts a legible caption to the relationship 
to simultaneity, which in The Martian tells the story or history 
of the new millennial prospect of the one-world exploration of 
outer space that’s looped through the integration of China.
Gravity (2013) is another hybrid model that only looks like 
politically minded science fiction, a warning shout about space 
7 This is my translation of the German title of Benjamin’s study 
Ursprung des deutschen Trauerspiels (Berlin: E. Rowohlt, 1928).
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ecology in the near future. The continued dependence of our 
media of simultaneity on the lower regions of space colonization 
(the satellites of the Cold War) reaps catastrophe. The allegorical 
apparatus between space exploration and the digital relation, 
the fantasy that is true, falls into place. Gravity gave a special-
effects-enhanced sense of being in space. The director, Alfonso 
Cuarón, was already a veteran of fantasy’s visual and special 
effects through his 2004 movie Harry Potter and the Prisoner 
of Azkaban, which spent three years in postproduction before 
making it to the screen. The same digital effects company was 
entrusted with Gravity. 
The outer space Gravity explores is a fantasy space imagined 
in keeping with Kant’s identification of the netherworld as the 
main impetus for fantasying. The protagonist, with a little help 
from her friendly ghost, assumes the adult profile of mourning. 
Loving the dead, letting them go on, but also letting them go, 
allows the mother in space to secure a saving Chinese reentry 
capsule and escape the Cold War science fiction of psychoticizing 
loneliness and fragmentation. When she crawls out of the water 
onto land and stands upright, she’s back inside her embodiment.
Space is a junkyard, a chain-reaction of destruction just wait-
ing to happen. Then the Russians detonate one of their satellites, 
and the debris races faster than a speeding bullet, taking out all 
satellites along its orbit and eclipsing digital communication on 
Earth. Right before the catastrophe hits, Ryan is up there fix-
ing a satellite: too little repair too late. It cannot have been long 
ago that she lost her four-year-old daughter. How did she pass 
inspection? Her co-astronaut, Matt, is too old to have passed 
muster. The episode in space is a ruinscape inhabited by ghosts 
and their melancholic correspondents. 
Before Matt pries himself loose from her resolute grasp and 
then comes back officially as a ghost, Ryan tells him that when 
she’s not at work she drives around for hours listening to any 
radio music at all, just no talking. (Even though she says she 
could get used to the silence of space, we constantly hear stat-
icky radio transmission noise.) Ryan was out driving when she 
learned that her daughter had slipped at school, hit her head, and 
was dead. In his posthumous persona Matt is the ghost of the 
opening season of mourning: “Do you want to go back or stay 
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here? I get it – it’s nice here.” It’s nice that there’s no one to lose, 
which also means that there is no one to mourn her. He’s gone 
again but she sends a message after him, sending him off, too, 
after all. The message is addressed to the loss she tried to lose driv-
ing around training center USA. Her daughter is restored to an 
object relation in mourning. Ryan opens one of the instruction 
manuals that apparently can be found in every escape pod on 
the shelf just above the console, which, like a volume of encyclo-
pedic knowledge from the Enlightenment with which pioneers 
explored the new world, takes her back for a restart no longer 
manically fixated upon outer space colonization.
That science fiction can go into reverse and sustain within its 
ruins the allegorical legibility of deregulated fantasy finds support 
through the commentaries on a new metaphysics of the “new 
world” and its genre that Gotthard Günther pursued begin-
ning in the 1940s while in exile in the States. The German phi-
losopher, who specialized in dismantling via Hegel Aristotelian 
bivalent logic, discovered in the US both American science fiction 
and cybernetics. His reflections on the new metaphysics of the 
new-world genre are a mainstay of this genealogy with B-genres. 
While Günther doesn’t address wish fantasying directly in his 
metaphysics, he does recognize in the posthumously published 
study Die amerikanische Apokalypse (The American Apocalypse) 
that the new mythic fairy tale of American science fiction is 
still provisional, reliant more on daydreaming contact with the 
remote future, which he quickly distinguishes from what is 
merely fantastic (“Fantasterei”).8 Günther is addressing instead 
8 Gotthard Günther, Die amerikanische Apokalypse, ed. Kurt 
Klagenfurt (Klagenfurt: Profil, 2000), 115. Only one segment was 
published in Günther’s lifetime: Die Entdeckung Amerikas und die 
Sache mit der Weltraum Literatur, the monograph that introduced his 
1952 series of editions of works of American science fiction. We will be 
visiting the body of Günther’s introductions and commentaries from 
this edition together with the posthumously published The American 
Apocalypse throughout this study. 
  I drew on Günther’s work in I Think I Am: Philip K. Dick and 
again in Germany: A Science Fiction focusing on the articles he wrote 
in English for Campbell’s magazine Astounding Stories (on the sci-fi 
conceits of alien contact, artificial intelligence, and time jumps and 
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the “anticipations” that reflect “a slowly awakening speculative 
consciousness, which begins to set itself goals in its daydreams.” 
“These American daydreams of a new epoch of human history 
are so remarkable and so informative regarding what is as yet 
quite unknown about the nature of humanity in the new world 
that it would be a definite loss not to know more about them.”9 
The two genres science fiction and fantasy are imbricated 
in their attachment to a poetics of flights of waking fantasy. 
Critique of Fantasy reads Tolkien’s 1947 essay “On Fairy-
Stories”10 together with its precursor, Freud’s 1907 “Der Dichter 
und das Phantasieren” (“The Poet and Daydreaming”).11 Not 
until Tolkien defined the genre of fantasy could it enter the 
offices of the “law of genre.” Fantasy is a mental faculty that 
Freud and Tolkien boldly claimed as the source of artistic pro-
duction. Before the advent of a poetics of daydreaming, schools 
of philosophy had long been engaged in corralling fantasy, the 
wayward kin of the imagination. Freud passed the hot property 
of philosophical ethics along in his 1907 essay, when he addressed 
omnipotent wish fantasy as the resource of the aspirations and 
resolutions of art, which, however, the artwork can never look 
back at or acknowledge. By grounding his genre in the one fan-
tasy that is true, the Gospel, Tolkien obviated and made obvious 
the ethical mandate of fantasy’s restraining order.
The prospect of deregulated wishing is as old as the philo-
sophical ethics that would contain it. Within the orbit of the 
compulsion to find a corrective in ethics for excessive fantasy-
ing, there also emerged a philosophical reception of the realm 
of shadows. By deploying wish or will as cursor in evaluating 
occult or paranormal states, this philosophical reception directly 
inspired the psychoanalysis of omnipotent thought and fantasy. 
The onset of the philosophy of haunting coincided with an 
time travel). I won’t be repeating this specific focus in Critique of 
Fantasy. 
9 Günther, Die amerikanische Apokalypse, 114.
10 An earlier version of the essay was delivered as Andrew Lang Lecture in 
1938.
11 This is how I will be modifying throughout this study the official 
English translations of the title of Freud’s brief essay. 
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efflorescence of clairvoyance and related states of waking dream-
ing in the historical setting of animal magnetism. Although the 
psycho-poetics of the daydream, in contrast to its philosophical 
prehistory, doesn’t address the ghost themes of modern Western 
occultism, these are the themes that prove hard to keep out and 
indeed, as the study shows, repeatedly overtake it. 
The majority share of close reading encounters with the 
contestants that meet the genre requirements, as well as with the 
hybrids that cross the boundaries, goes into the second volume, 
The Contest between B-Genres. To organize the collateral mass of 
materials piled high in the borderlands, I rely on two readymades 
in the facing corners of the ring, C.S. Lewis’s “Space Trilogy” and 
the roster of American science fictions that Günther selected 
and glossed for the German readership in 1952. While Lewis 
constructs science fiction as the dark force behind every histori-
cal nihilism, Günther and his authors demolish the metaphysical 
mainstays of the regional civilizations that hailed from the East 
and banish from the New World and its genre the plain text of 
Old-World metaphysics, namely the fairy-story, on which the 
fantasy genre relies. 
The third volume, The Block of Fame, explores the American 
cult of greatness in light of the early wish for it. The failure in 
success skews the walk into an obstacle course of writer’s block, 
plagiarism, and the wish to be refused (Edmund Bergler). Here 
I sign in with the “constellation” Adorno developed to outlast 
the culture industry’s depravation and theft of the poetics of 
fantasying. As it rises up in Adorno’s essay “Schubert” (1928), the 
constellation is a form of thought that throughout Critique of 
Fantasy organizes my readings in the underworld of fantasying, 
waking dream states, and media. All the component trajectories 
of the study are consequently at work in every part, and each part 
brings back the trajectories and ratchets up a new focus and rela-
tion among them. 
Critique of Fantasy returns to a discarded origin of Freud’s 
thought. What international psychoanalysis calls desire, Freud 
addressed in the original language, which wishes rather than 
desires, with the only term available: “Wunsch,” the cognate 
of “wish.” The etymology extends through waystations of this 
study: delusion (“Wahn”), struggling to win, and, finally, the 
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word in the name “Venus” (the fantasy planet around which 
Lewis’s “Space Trilogy” orbits). The reinscription of desire 
within the syntax of wishing makes way for mourning.
This first volume explores the new psychonomies of mourn-
ing arising in the borderlands of the dueling B-genres. The new 
world enmity between the fantasy of vampirism and the science 
fiction of zombieism introduces a forum for addressing novel 
forms of grief. Their repercussions might be adduced in reading 
the Disney chapter of the Star Wars franchise. A new generation 
of antagonists and fans must breach the cryogenic stoppage of 
history that brings back the original forebears, even or especially 
those already dead off screen. But before contemplating a new 
mourning, the volume studies in its opening stretch all the 
interpretations of wish fantasy that, however mismatched, join 
together in supporting a poetics (and aesthetics) of the day-
dream. Although it is indeed an unlikely coupling given Freud’s 
Enlightenment-proud secular modernism, when the father of 
psychoanalysis opens the relay he is joined by Tolkien, the other 
premier daydream believer. 
Tolkien was a philologist and, like his cohort C.S. Lewis, a 
medievalist. By both guilds he adhered to a view of continuous 
tradition forwarding the Middle Ages across oceans of time con-
densed within the history of language. Tolkien and Lewis sought 
a commensurate outlet for their hobbyist literary inclinations by 
dislodging science fiction’s monopoly among the new popular 
genres. Notwithstanding the rightful reclamation of certain 
works by Lewis, Tolkien, and Charles Williams as some kind of 
literature, overall the output of the academic club to which the 
three belonged – the Inklings! – represents the provincial drag 
on what was at the time the expat destiny of English-language 
letters. My relationship to the canon will remain cursory (with 
the exception of Lewis’s “Space Trilogy,” since it fully enters the 
borderland between science fiction and fantasy). 
I will also be considering the import of German Romanticism, 
which helped sustain the illusion that Tolkien’s fantasy genre was 
the direct descendant of a continuous UK medievalist tradition. 
While it is not a dominant trajectory in what follows, I bring it 
up to sign my name in the setting of the book’s composition. 
During my six years teaching at the Academy of Fine Arts in 
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Karlsruhe, I opened with a class dedicated to my renewed inter-
est in science fiction, which became my 2014 study Germany: 
A Science Fiction. It deposited a seed of auto-stimulation in the 
students with an art career ahead of them. But my largest fol-
lowing came to the lecture hall several years later when I offered 
a course on the topic of fantasy. It was a happy coincidence that 
I was interested in taking my former dismissal of the genre to 
the next level of ambivalence and reflecting more deeply on its 
manifest ascendancy. It turned out that so many of the Karlsruhe 
students, especially those in training to teach art in German high 
school, were fantasy adherents. I remember once after screening 
a student film in class that I commented on a cultural difference, 
I thought, suggested by certain details of “low-class” life in the 
setting of a recognizable fairy-tale garden. The fairy-tale fantasy 
central to this German student film, I offered, would be replaced 
in its counterpart in the States by the milieu that Americans asso-
ciate with trailer parks. The guest artist visiting my class, who was 
German, immediately commented: “The fairy-tale garden is the 
German trailer park.” This, then, is the bottom line and secret 




The Ethics, Poetics, and Practical 
Metaphysics of Waking Dreaming
Be Careful What You Wish For
That the death wish, the one wish guaranteed in time to come 
true, is the trespass that will bite you in the ass counts as a 
topos of horror cinema and psychoanalysis. Bringing back the 
dead rakes the ambivalence coals across the Christian hearth of 
demonization. In Pet Sematary (1989), the dead reanimated 
within an animist–heathen setting are demonic. At the close of 
the sequel to 30 Days of Night (2007), Dark Days (2010), the 
widow reanimates her husband, apparently forgetting that he 
died a vampire (really a borderline zombie). Chomp! I can think 
of two instances in Freud’s writing: first, a typical dream in The 
Interpretation of Dreams. A boy dreamer is visited at night by his 
deceased father, who’s back because he doesn’t know that he’s 
dead. But another knowledge is in hiding and operative: what 
the dad doesn’t know is that his son wished him dead. Second, 
in his analysis of the psychic reality of Dostoevsky’s epileptic sei-
zures, Freud adopts the superego position and commands: you 
wanted a dead father, now be the dead father.1 
It is possible to view the fairy tale as schooling the will to 
be a beacon of the good awash in wishing. While Tolkien was 
1 Both Freud examples are central to my Aberrations of Mourning: 
Writing on German Crypts (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 
1988).
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mixing a new literary genre out of Germanic ingredients in the 
UK, in California, Germany’s West Coast, Walt Disney released 
the premier fantasy film, Snow White and the Seven Dwarfs 
(1937). Daydream fantasy not only underlies every making that 
makes a wish, or rather makes a wish presentable, but – and 
this Disney pursued as its saving trace – it also lights up the test 
pattern of development, the earliest grid of good, bad, evil, and 
good enough (explored by Friedrich Nietzsche, Melanie Klein, 
and D.W. Winnicott). According to Freud in “The Poet and 
Daydreaming,” the heroism of the ego in B-literature is set on 
fairy-tale morality: “the other characters in the story are sharply 
divided into good and bad, in defiance of the variety of human 
characters that are to be observed in real life. The ‘good’ ones 
are the helpers, while the ‘bad’ ones are the enemies and rivals of 
the ego which has become the hero of the story.”2 The ego of the 
reader or listener attends this schooling.
In The Power of Myth, Joseph Campbell concludes that Star 
Wars qualifies as mythic fairy tale by the eddying of its edification: 
“I’ve heard youngsters use some of George Lucas’ terms – ‘the 
Force’ and ‘the dark side.’ So it must be hitting somewhere. It’s a 
good sound teaching, I would say.”3 Early on in the Disney film, 
when the princess sings about wish fulfillment at the wishing 
well, it is the prop that spells out the imperative of philosophi-
cal ethics, namely, that by our private nature as daydreamers it 
is incumbent upon us, ultimately, to learn to wish well. This is 
not the moral of every work of fantasy. One look at Wagner’s 
Siegfried turns up the contrast with the Disney revalorization. 
Snow White, who doesn’t kill her dwarf, reclaims the projec-
tions of good and evil for a new relationship to her self-loving 
daydreaming.
2 Sigmund Freud, “Creative Writers and Day-dreaming,” in The 
Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund 
Freud, Vol. IX (1906–1908): Jensen’s “Gradiva” and Other Works, ed. 
and trans. James Strachey with Anna Freud (London: The Hogarth 
Press, 1964), 150.
3 Joseph Campbell with Bill Moyers, The Power of Myth, ed. Betty Sue 
Flowers (New York: Anchor Books, 1991), 177.
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Johann Peter Hebel, who went to Karlsruhe to go to school 
and then got stuck there, composed “Drei Wünsche” (“Three 
Wishes,” 1811), his remaking of fairytale material into a comedy 
of perils attending wish fulfillment. The mountain fairy presents 
a couple the gift of guaranteed fulfillment of three wishes, which 
will commence at the end of the week. Until Friday, then, they 
rehearse wishing. But once the free offer takes effect, each act of 
wishing must count in real time as fulfilled, for which the couple 
was not prepared. It crosses the mind of the hungry wife that 
she’d like a sausage: she says so, too, and there it is. Her husband, 
angered over the waste of a good wish, wishes out loud that the 
sausage should hang from her nose. When Freud refers to this 
punitive wish fulfillment in “The Uncanny,” he judges that 
it is “very striking but not in the least uncanny.”4 It is another 
example of how a fairytale that otherwise “recalls repressed 
desires and surmounted modes of thinking belonging to the pre-
history of the individual and of the race,” thereby fulfilling one 
of the conditions of the uncanny, falls outside the horror genre 
Freud was demarcating.5 This fairy tale of wish fantasy entered 
Freud’s science in tandem with its visualization in the first film 
shorts that showed fulfillment, often the brief superimposition 
of some dream babe upon the wife, who returns in the POV of 
her husband angered by the wish that crossed his mind.
Wish number three in Hebel’s “Three Wishes,” the husband’s 
second wish, delivers his wife of the outgrowth. Story over and 
the couple is back at the starting gate without gain or pain for 
their wishes. The narrator suggests that husband and wife might 
have practiced better for optimal wishing. The first wish should 
have been for Verstand, a more rational understanding. It’s hard 
to keep back the wishes crossing one’s mind at the speed of 
thought. Nevertheless, “Drei Wünsche” shows a self-correcting 
momentum in the course of the couple’s wishes: the first is a 
4 Sigmund Freud, “The Uncanny,” in The Standard Edition of the 
Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, Vol. XVII (1917–1919): 
An Infantile Neurosis and Other Works, ed. and trans. James Strachey 
with Anna Freud (London: The Hogarth Press, 1955), 246. Freud 
doesn’t mention his fairy-tale source for this wish scenario. 
5 Ibid., 245.
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self-serving appetitive wish; the second lies in the vicinity of the 
death wish, which brings up the arrears of wishing, the good and 
evil consequences; the third wish is the good one, which flexes 
the hope that reparation can still be made. Wishing undergoes 
development from selfishness to responsibility.
In “On Fairy-Stories,” Tolkien tried to pry his fantasy genre 
loose from subordination to classroom childhood and the philo-
sophical schooling of wishing and willing. He also sought to lay 
claim to the fantasy source of fiction by decrying its mismanage-
ment in science fiction. But he cedes overtaking both tendencies 
in the field and admits approximation at the new borders he 
demarcates. By not excluding childhood reading but including 
the adolescence of fantasying, he corrects the jump-cut in fairy-
tales from childhood to young adulthood. In “On Fairy-Stories,” 
Tolkien sees the true tale correct the fall of those teens given to 
asocial fantasying: “[I]t is one of the lessons of fairy-stories […] 
that on callow, lumpish, and selfish youth peril, sorrow, and 
the shadow of death can bestow dignity, and even sometimes 
wisdom.”6 
To say what he means by tales of the fairy realm, Tolkien 
checks off a list of what he doesn’t mean. Because they put on ani-
mal clothing for the satire of human affairs, “Beast-fables” count 
a near miss with the interspecial-creaturely cast of other worlds 
(21–22). Fairy-stories are also not “travellers’ tales” like Gulliver’s 
Travels or the yarns of Baron Munchausen, which “report many 
marvels, but they are marvels to be seen in this mortal world in 
some region of our own time and space, distance alone conceals 
them” (19). Another kind of travel fable, like Wells’s The Time 
Machine, comes close. In the relay of contrast hurdles Tolkien 
sets up for his new genre to run through and prove its true defini-
tion, the boundary he draws up against science fiction pulls back 
in the instance of H.G. Wells’s time travel tale and allows one 
border crossing. The Eloi and the Morlocks inhabit an “abyss 
of time so deep as to work an enchantment upon them.” But 
6 J.R.R. Tolkien, “On Fairy-Stories,” in Tree and Leaf / Smith of 
Wootton Major / The Homecoming of Beorhtnoth (London: Unwin 
Books, 1975), 47. Subsequent page references are given in the text.
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what weakens the effect is “the preposterous and incredible Time 
Machine itself” (20). 
According to Tolkien, a true fairy-story satisfies a yearning to 
survey the depths of space and time (the trajectory that science 
fiction was monopolizing) or to hold communion with other 
living things (not necessarily in outer space but preferably in 
terrestrial utopias of interspecial relationship). But removing the 
machine age does not go far enough. Tolkien also rules out “any 
story that uses the machinery of Dream, the dreaming of actual 
human sleep, to explain the apparent occurrence of its marvels” 
(ibid.). It is by dint of “their dream-frame and dream-transitions” 
that “Lewis Carroll’s Alice stories […] are not fairy-stories” (21). 
Tolkien flies in the face of a tendency that runs deep to view art 
and the night dream under the same aegis. Heightened by this 
contrast Tolkien makes the daring affirmation that mere day-
dreaming is the resource or analogue for a creative process that 
for him is as big as Christianity. 
Even while dismissing the time machine, Tolkien had to admit 
that Wells’s story satisfied one of the “primordial human desires” 
by virtue of fantasy’s fundamental operation, in which magic or 
machine is not an end itself. By dint of his high praise for the 
enchantment worked by the competition, Tolkien this one time 
concluded: “the borders of the fairy-story are inevitably dubi-
ous” (20). The topos of the permeability of the border, which is 
allowed even while the boundary line is drawn, is salient, as we 
will see, in the fiction and nonfiction on fantasying. It tempers 
varying distinctions between daydream and night dream, con-
scious and unconscious wishes, and fantasy and science fiction.
What is essential to the genre that Tolkien in this essay 
christens “Fantasy” (49) is “the power of making immediately 
effective by the will the visions of ‘fantasy’” (28). “Fairy-story” 
needs to be replaced because the genre he seeks to renew is not 
restricted to believing in fairies, but encompasses instead the 
realm of Faërie (17), which is as old as the history of language and 
the human race (26). Fantasy or fantasying comes closer to sig-
nifying this realm, but must be differentiated within the thicket 
of its synonyms and near-synonyms. Daydreaming can reflect 
the willpower Tolkien flexes and hit its stride near the entrance 
to philosophy as reverie. At another juncture, where lying and 
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fiction meet and cross over, ethics must make good not only on 
the will but even and especially on the wish. What Tolkien adds 
right after replacing fairy with the visions of fantasy shows that 
we are in the murky environs of waking wish fantasy: “Not all 
are beautiful or even wholesome, not at any rate the fantasies of 
fallen Man” (28). 
Fallen man is of course the teenager, the pioneer of private 
fantasying. In Tolkien’s account, the teen takes the fall for stain-
ing “the elves […] with his own stain” (ibid.). The elf belongs to 
the fairytale of adolescence stuffed inside childhood, the curbed 
sex appeal of supernatural cuteness. One strain of fallen man’s 
stain would be, then, the aging of the cute. In a steady fallen 
state, the adolescent just grows older, losing the bloom of prom-
ise, gaining only on an adaptation to his antisocial tendencies. 
There remains, however, the deeper wish to escape from this 
grown-up adjustment to a flatline of fallen fantasies. Tolkien 
draws the horizon line of science fiction across the space and pace 
of this fallen adaptation: “Why should we not escape from […] 
the Morlockian horror of factories? They are condemned even 
by the writers of that most escapist form of all literature, stories 
of Science fiction” (64). 
While authors of fantasy will into existence other worlds, ulti-
mately the secondary world of secondary belief and sub-creation 
(40–41, 44), the “prophets” of science fiction “often foretell (and 
many seem to yearn for) a world like one big glass-roofed railway-
station.” The will to fulfill the wish for other worlds doesn’t go 
beyond the journey in time and space. The world town is left 
to run on empty: “and the ideals of their idealists hardly reach 
farther than the splendid notion of building more towns of the 
same sort on other planets” (64–65). 
Around the time of the composition of The Hobbit, Tolkien 
and Lewis commenced exchanging their views on the shortcom-
ings of science fiction and how they might remedy them. Tolkien 
would write a time-travel tale and Lewis a fable set in outer 
space, thus recovering between them the two trajectories of H.G. 
Wells’s entry in the new genre he established for modern English 
letters. Tolkien’s effort left behind only a fragment, in which the 
wish to dwell in the prehistory of The Lord of the Rings, which 
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Tolkien was working to complete, was fulfilled and forgotten.7 
Unable to carry out his end of their mission, Tolkien deputized 
Lewis as their fantasy author on rival turf. Lewis, in turn, ren-
dered Ransom, the protagonist of his “Space Trilogy,” Tolkien’s 
portrait. Tolkien did, however, write “On Fairy-Stories,” which 
was the manifesto of the contest Lewis alone waged in fiction.
No Strings Attached
Ernst Bloch opens Das Prinzip Hoffnung (The Principle of Hope, 
1954) with an explicit invocation of our daydreaming. That’s 
where our utopian hopes will be too. But right away a battery of 
provisos follows in which he spells out a compulsory education 
policy for fantasying: 
Everybody’s life is pervaded by daydreams: one part of this is 
just stale, even enervating escapism, even booty for swindlers, 
but another part is provocative, is not content just to accept 
the bad which exists, does not accept renunciation. This other 
part has hoping at its core, and is teachable. It can be extri-
cated from the unrealized daydream and from its sly misuse, 
can be activated undimmed.”8 
And Bloch foresees political momentum graduating from the 
schooling of daydream: “Then let the daydreams grow really 
7 Tolkien’s unfinished contribution, “The Lost Road,” opens and shuts 
with the first two parts of the first chapter (with various fragments 
scattered around them). Although father and son are in the twentieth 
century, they are also enfolded within the deep space of language his-
tory, which for the son, who dreams up ancient unknown languages, 
becomes a vocation. An elf friend appears to the son, who is in the 
meantime a philologist bereft of his father, and offers fulfillment of 
the “long-hidden” and “half-spoken” “desire to go back” in time. 
They travel to Númenor, which flourished and declined during the 
Second Age of Middle-Earth. See J.R.R. Tolkien, The Lost Road and 
Other Writings, ed. Christopher Tolkien (Boston: Houghton Mifflin 
Company, 1987), 42.
8 Ernst Bloch, The Principle of Hope, vol. 1, trans. Neville Plaice, 
Stephen Plaice, and Paul Knight (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1995), 3.
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fuller, that is, clearer, less random, more familiar, more clearly 
understood and more mediated within the course of things.9
The modern philosophical schooling of wish or will begins 
with Thomas Aquinas, who enfolded the return of Aristotle 
inside his sumtotaling of Christian theology, thus introducing 
secular ethics at the limit. In the meantime, the titular hero of 
Carlo Collodi’s Pinocchio (1883), attended by his cricket con-
science and the blue fairy, is the poster boy of natural law. This 
holds true in particular for the story’s 1940 reincarnation in 
Disney’s second fantasy film, which was styled like the country 
cousin of the 1937 film Snow White and the Seven Dwarfs, even 
using the German town Rothenburg ob der Tauber to model the 
Italian village. 
Collodi was in his fifties when he began contributing to the 
new genre of literature for children, the pedagogical intervention 
in childhood that reclaimed earlier folk or fairy tales, a consolida-
tion that was without consolation for Tolkien who sought to 
reverse its classroom assignment. Italian nationhood was new 
and good and it followed that all aspects of the socius that had 
been pried loose from the feudal state must be guided and sus-
tained on an update. So Collodi presented the case of a wooden 
puppet as the Everybaby to be raised unto becoming good and 
human.
The 19th Question posed in Aquinas’s Summa Theologiae 
(1485), which addresses the goodness of the inner acts of the will, 
concludes its fifth article by awarding a foundational position to 
“conscience,” which is “a dictate of reason.”10 This follows from 
the third article, in which all striving is left to the will. But will-
ful striving is drawn to the particular goods to which the senses 
respond. That’s why reason, which knows the difference between 
right and wrong, that is, correct and incorrect, must guide the 
will to the good object, goal, or purpose. Aquinas’s assurance in 
the eighth article that we can control the inner acts of the will 
signals a curtailment of wishing in willing.11 That the “intensity” 
9 Ibid., 4.
10 St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, Ia–IIae, q. 19 a. 5 co., available 
online at http://summa-theologiae.org/question/13805.htm. 
11 See ibid., Ia–IIae, q. 19 a. 8 co., http://summa-theologiae.org/ques-
the ethics, poetics, and practical metaphysics of waking dreaming
43
of the act holds priority over the “intensity” of the intention is 
tempered by a school example. A child’s good intention to attend 
school can be interrupted by acts of whim. But if he ends up a 
schoolboy after all (as Pinocchio finally does), then it follows that 
the link between intention and act was not broken and the initial 
inner intensity of the will pulled through. 
Melanie Klein argued that the centrality of knowledge makes 
the classroom the first public sphere for revisiting the setbacks 
in one’s private research at home.12 The transferential doodling 
around figures of authority is legend, the legend to the mapping 
in the mind of a fantasying preoccupation that ushers in a saving 
ambivalence. Where the lessons and tests are, that’s where the 
fantasying component, affectively askew, will be too. 
In the narrative, the boy puppet squashes the talking insect 
and in the course of his progress supervised largely by his 
“mother,” the girl with the indigo hair, the cricket comes back 
as ghost with whom he is reconciled at the end. Before Jiminy 
Cricket can be recognized on screen as the conscience that 
Pinocchio lets be his guide, the relationship between willing and 
wishing must be given the lie. By natural law, lying resembles 
perversion in its violation of the purpose of language, which is 
to reproduce the true communication. But its not so much that 
the puppet is a liar, as plain as the nose on his face, it’s rather that 
he’s a fantast who gives up his good intentions upon a whim of 
adventure. He even grows a donkey’s tail to prove it. Boys will 
be boys, especially in range of puberty, and the tumescence of 
lying afflicting the puppet belongs to the folk-etymological and 
homonymic proximity to lying with someone. But his fantasying 
cannot cancel the goodness of his discarded intentions. It takes 
him on the adventure of saving his father, the utopian turning 
point in Disney’s movie: Geppetto and his pets, Figaro and 
Cleo, who are all in it together, escape the whale by the efforts of 
Pinocchio and his cricket. 
tion/13808.htm.
12 See Melanie Klein, “The Technique of Analysis in the Latency Period,” 
in The Psychoanalysis of Children, trans. Alix Strachey (New York: The 
Free Press, 1984), chap. 4.
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The significance of the puppet protagonist can be illuminated 
by the phrase “no strings attached,” which historically refers at 
once to a garment without flaws and the binding strings on 
an ancient document emblematic of its escape clause; it can be 
snatched back and annulled (originally it was an act of tug of 
war). The puppet without strings stands outside the social con-
tract. Like the mecha robot in Steven Spielberg’s A.I. Artificial 
Intelligence (2001), like the pets in the Geppetto household, the 
puppet is a figment of unconditional love, a throwback to or 
booster shot from the era of merger between mother and infant. 
The illusion of this fusion is a requirement for development, 
which the mother provides, according to D.W. Winnicott, by 
dint of a temporary state of psychosis.13 The only response to 
unconditional love is unconditional love, which means that it 
no longer exists in relation, only in the one-way attitude of lov-
ability. 
The fairy tale’s iteration of Jonas and the whale ends with the 
puppet boy dead in the water. What prefigures for Christians the 
prospect of resurrection was in the first place for the ancients, as 
Otto Rank underscored, burial inside the animal relation, loop-
ing preservation through elimination.14 The trial period of life 
and death with a puppet for a son was the fulfillment to watch 
out for. The good puppet giving up the ghost illuminates the 
deadness that Geppetto’s wish fantasy concealed. By his finitude, 
the other is good and gone, gone for good, which the old man’s 
grief acknowledges. The blue fairy can now grant a father’s wish.
Brian Aldiss wrote the story “Supertoys Last All Summer 
Long” (1969), which Stanley Kubrick tried to adapt in a mix 
with the Pinocchio story, before passing it along to Spielberg like 
a demonic curse. Aldiss had already objected to Kubrick’s addi-
tion of a happy ending. His story closed on a suggested outcome 
that was inevitable given the misfiring between the robot boy’s 
lovability and the adoptive mother, whose psychosis is not the 
13 D.W. Winnicott, “Primary Maternal Preoccupation,” in Through 
Paediatrics to Psycho-analysis: Collected Papers (London: Karnac 
Books, 1984), 300–305.
14 Otto Rank, Kunst und Künstler: Studien zur Genese und Entwicklung 
des Schaffensdranges (Gießen: Psychosozial-Verlag, 2000), 150. 
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kind allowing for merger. She, however, seems granted a reprieve 
when her couple wins the reproduction lottery. No doubt that 
too will split along the “seems”; she is looking for the missing 
merger with her mother, which the lovability of a baby cannot 
supply. At his end of the non-relationship, the robot David for-
ever falls short of communicating that he loves her in countless 
unfinished letters. Psycho mom concludes that since the robot’s 
communication skills can’t be fixed, “David” is due to be sent 
back to the factory. 
In his childhood, Aldiss’s mother was transfixed by the loss of 
a daughter. He was sandwiched in between the dead sister and a 
newborn younger sister. Upon her arrival, it turned out that the 
love on hold for the stillborn baby could still be borne for the 
new girl, which meant he was better off at boarding school. The 
Aldiss story illuminates the underworld of the Pinocchio tale. 
Collodi was a pen name, which the author first adopted in 
1860 and borrowed from the name of the town in which he had 
spent most of his childhood (it was his mother’s birthplace). He 
was born in Florence as the first of ten children; only two oth-
ers survived childhood. In an enigmatic sense that their brother 
picked up on, the seven had died without a name (or any strings 
attached). After another ten years bearing the special name, 
Collodi turned to literature for children (he had no children of 
his own, no reproduction substitutes) and with the Pinocchio 
story made the name he made for them stick.
That Aldiss’s cameo as a robot child goes by the name David 
drops to the crypt of the other modern fairy legend, Peter Pan. 
Aldiss learned a good deal from James Matthew Barrie but not 
the hardest lesson of all: the innocence of a child has a mean 
streak a mile wide.
David Barrie, J.M. Barrie’s older brother and his mother’s 
favorite, fell ice-skating and died the day before turning four-
teen. His mother’s consolation avowed out loud was that David 
would never grow old in her memory. James tried to be David, 
a trick that almost worked in the dark, in nether land, when he 
appeared before his mother dressed in his dead brother’s clothes. 
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Barrie kept it close to the chest or coffin: “Never” means that he 
didn’t wish David dead.15 
In person, J.M. Barrie was the gnomic embodiment of a child-
hood forever stuck on a preteen boy on ice. Grown up a hard-
hearted stalker, he went on to elaborate the fiction of Neverland 
in the fantasy environs of spiritualism where bird boys never 
grow closer to genital sexuality than the cusp of fourteen. The 
fringe benefit of the fantasy equation between believing in fairies 
and keeping them alive is circumvention of the adult injunction 
to bury, which the author bore in his patronymic. He made the 
mother figure or substitute Wendy responsible for making all the 
preteen adventurers or delinquents cross their hearts and hope 
to die. 
Prior to Disney or Freud, the sentencing of the will as wish was 
a horrific prospect at the limits of philosophical ethics. Early on 
in Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten (Groundwork for the 
Metaphysics of Morals, 1785), Kant warily introduces the will as 
foundational. The hope remains that where there’s a will there’s 
a way to get around mere wishing. Consider a parenthetical/
parental aside given to clarify what is meant by “the good will”: 
“[O]f course not as a mere wish [ein bloßer Wunsch] but rather 
as the raising up [Aufrichtung] of all means in our power.”16 In 
the next paragraph, the overvaluation of mere will, even should 
common reason or sense be in agreement, is strange enough that 
the suspicion arises that it is all based on “high-flying fancy” 
(hochfliegende Phantasterei). And so, Kant commences “testing” 
this very idea,17 which in due course leads to introduction of the 
saving notion of “duty” (Pflicht) which he contrasts with enacted 
maxims that reflect inclination only and fall short of the moral 
value secured by acting out of duty. 
15 That there was a study that published Barrie’s actual culpability for 
David’s death, proven as painstakingly as Kurt Eissler’s reconstruction 
of Leonardo Da Vinci’s physical abnormality, signals the denial of the 
powers of the wish alone and the unconscious. 
16 Immanuel Kant, Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten, ed. Theodor 
Valentiner (Stuttgart: Reclam, 2008), 16–17. All translations are mine.
17 Ibid., 17.
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Back to the basics with which Kant grudgingly commenced: 
the moral value does not depend upon the reality of the object 
of the action, but only upon the “principle of wanting” (dem 
Prinzip des Wollens); even the purpose achieved does not outflank 
the “principle of the will” (Prinzip des Willens).18 The ascension 
of the will to principle follows from the necessity of determining 
the will, which otherwise, if left unattended at the border, would 
reflect the push and pull of the material drives. The formulation 
of the categorical imperative can now ensue. Duty ends up the 
test question for valuation of morality: to apply it alone as your 
guide is moral. Duty ends up a form without content, which fol-
lows for purpose (Zweck) as well by the performance of duty’s 
defining moment. Duty for its own sake – purpose itself, in itself 
– is sufficient motivation for every act that is at once good and 
morally valuable. 
The two imperfect duties, which Kant distinguishes from 
the commandment-like perfect ones, give syntax to the seman-
tics of duty. We hold a moral duty to develop our own talents 
unto perfectibility. We are also morally obliged to help others. 
However, the height to which the duty to our selves can ascend is 
not a standard that can be transferred to our concern for others. 
The maximization of the well-being of our fellow men is not our 
moral duty. Just as it is not moral simply to follow laws prescrib-
ing our acts, so it is not moral to improve the morals of others. 
Although our duty to help others remains just the same, as basic 
as the one to improve ourselves, it is not continuous with the 
duty to our selves. 
Groundhog Day (1993) keeps turning on a temporal paradox 
like a wish that the protagonist Phil didn’t watch out for. Once 
his awareness of the eternal return of the same day picks up 
momentum he is on his own. When Phil first realizes that he 
inhabits a recurring day of which he alone, repeat after repeat, 
retains memories, he enters upon phases of antisocial opportun-
ism and suicidal lethargy. That he knows the day will return 
without consequences delivers him of moral considerations as 
though he heretofore had never acted truly morally but only in 
respect to precepts enforced by penalties. 
18 Ibid., 24.
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The first advantage he takes over his dating prospects is to 
score by gathering information about each one over countless 
iterations of the day until in one moment at dinner it’s kismet 
that he knows all her likes and dislikes. (I remember that in 
California, in the era of the film, a certain advantage along these 
lines could be obtained by memorizing the daily horoscopes.) 
During his undercover investigations in the course of one repeat-
ing day, he also finds out what his co-worker Rita would like to 
see in her special other. But that’s not good enough.
His only other in this fixated environment is Rita, not only 
because, as he goes around the rounds, she remains steadfastly 
the only woman who won’t return his love interest on that day. 
Rita is, in addition, open for discussion of the symptom and 
significance of his déjà vu crisis. Allowing, like a therapist, the 
“reality” of the everlasting returning day that Phil confides to 
her, Rita also enters into his situation or fantasy by considering 
the advantages, all the talents one could develop, all the knowl-
edge one might amass. He keeps trying to win her over by the 
evidence of his altruism and developing skills. But at the end 
of each day dedicated to Rita, to the improvement of his moral 
profile and the performance of the perfect dinner date, she stops 
short of consummation, horrified by evidence she notices at the 
last minute of his ongoing mean-spirited manipulation of her. 
If Phil did undergo a change of heart by the influence of 
Rita alone, then we might never be able to decide whether his 
improvement in the end was genuinely moral. What proves 
pivotal is Phil’s discovery that his recurring day is the day of the 
indigent beggar’s death. After endlessly ignoring him at the start 
of the day, he gives him cash. But then, in another episode of the 
serial day, he stops to take care of him only to discover that it is 
forever too late. Not because he can’t intervene; as the course of 
his good deeds for the day turns into a long, daily to-do list, he 
forever and again rescues a boy, whose fall from the tree must 
have shattered him in the version of the day that did not see Phil’s 
rescue of him. But in the course of eternity, the homeless person 
Phil decides to care for and about was on that day already and 
always an old man whose time was up. It is by his finitude that 
the other is our concern. 
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Any benevolent project that helps others, but which can too 
easily be construed as pitched to how others estimate the good-
ness of following the rules, is not of moral value. In the eternity 
that links us to and separates us from the finitude of the other, 
we can conceive and uphold self-betterment and care for others 
only by a disinterested abstraction like moral duty. In the eon of 
a returning day, to use other terms crucial to Kant’s ethics, it’s 
inconceivable to use persons as means to an end.19 There’s at once 
too much and not enough time. The curse of wish fulfillment is 
undone. 
At last, Phil has all his good deeds toward others in a row to 
fill the first part of the day. By the end of the day, those with 
whom he has thus bonded can express gratitude in Rita’s earshot 
while the town gathers to hear Phil perform outstanding jazz 
improvisations on the piano (in fact the result of countless first 
lessons that same day). In the eternity of one day Phil fulfills the 
imperfect duties. Only thus can his love be returned, an achieve-
ment uncompromised by narcissistic and antisocial wish fantasy. 
In the course of one day it looks like everyone remembers. Phil’s 
memory is no longer a foreign body on the day at last upheld by 
acts of moral value.
The Fantasies We All Know So Well 
Although in “On Fairy-Stories” Tolkien abandoned “without 
regret” Max Müller, a German precursor and Oxford colleague 
in his own field of philology, whose view of myth’s relationship to 
language is the reverse of his own,20 he doesn’t recognize/antago-
nize another German-language author, who set the precedent for 
exploring fantasying as poetry’s source and resource. In his 1907 
“The Poet and Daydreaming,” Freud argues that many of our 
wishes arising at night, which presumably hail from childhood, 
must be concealed not only from others but from ourselves as 
19 One should treat a person as Zweck an sich selbst (ibid., 63), as person 
for the person’s sake, which demarcates the demolition site at once of 
means and end.
20 Tolkien, “On Fairy-Stories,” 27,
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well.21 That these repressed wishes come to expression only in a 
very distorted form is what makes the waking recollection and 
retelling of our enigmatically symbolic night dreams possible. 
The already available reception of the psychoanalysis of night 
dreams makes Freud’s 1907 juxtaposition of waking fantasy 
and poetry seem counterintuitive. Since the remembered night 
dream marks by its distortion of content a step forward from the 
privacy of wish fantasying toward public reception, it is analo-
gous to poetry. However, “[w]hen scientific work had succeeded 
in elucidating this factor of dream-distortion, it was no longer 
difficult to recognize that night dreams are wish-fulfillments in 
just the same way as daydreams – the fantasies which we all know 
so well” (149). In other words, night dreams join the clear text of 
the daydream’s wish only upon analytic decoding. And the fanta-
sying we all know so well, while kept private, is neither repressed 
nor really remembered. While it is happening, however, the 
daydream has our conscious attention; we can be “absent,” even 
“lost” in fantasying. What makes it second nature is that we 
adapt to an alternation (which can become dissociation) between 
attending to our daydream scenarios and simultaneous attention 
to what’s really going on. 
Another blocker in the reception of Freud’s 1907 essay is the 
pivotal role he grants works of B-culture for understanding the 
fantasying that leads to Dichtung. In B-Culture the wish cannot 
be encrypted: “[F]or the purposes of our comparison, we will 
choose not the writers most highly esteemed by the critics, but 
the less pretentious authors of novels, romances and short stories, 
who nevertheless have the widest and most eager circle of read-
ers” (149). All these publications celebrate “His Majesty the Ego, 
the hero alike of every daydream and of every story” (150). After 
every wounding, the hero recovers in the next chapter, bounc-
ing back for more like a cartoon figure. Although our second 
nature is a buffer zone of constant scatter and static let’s agree to 
21 Freud, “Creative Writers and Day-dreaming,” 148–49. Subsequent page 
references are given in the text. In addition to my alteration of the title 
in English, throughout this study, to avoid unnecessary ambiguity, I 
adjust the spelling of “phantasy” and “phantasying” to “fantasy” and 
“fantasying.”
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remain in the setting of poetics and focus on the daydreaming or 
wish-fantasying in which omnipotence (of thoughts or wishes) is 
commanded in scenarios that, however rudimentary their speech 
bubbles, can be related, retold.
Daydreaming, according to Freud, is heir to the fantasying 
in child’s play, the pursuit of being “big.” However, unlike this 
acceptable content of playing, which remains out in the open, 
the antisocial daydream, which picks up in adolescence where 
child’s play left off, requires privacy: “The child, it is true, plays 
by himself or forms a closed psychical system with other children 
for the purposes of a game; but even though he may not play his 
game in front of the grown-ups, he does not, on the other hand, 
conceal it from them” (145). Beginning in adolescence, fantasy-
ing is one of our “most intimate possessions.” It is also a hideout 
we would be ashamed to share, first off, because it is childish, 
inappropriate for agents of the real world, and secondly, because 
“some of the wishes which give rise to […] fantasies are of a kind 
which it is essential to conceal” (146). “The adult […] would 
rather confess his trespasses than impart his fantasies” (145). 
Before psychoanalysis came along one needed a poet without 
knowing it; our second nature as daydreamers wasn’t recognized 
as such. Everyone felt alone with antisocial thoughts and wishes. 
Prior to the talking cure and the published documentation of its 
case examples, the daydreamer believed himself to be “the only 
person who invents such fantasies and had no idea that creations 
of this kind are widespread among other people” (145). 
Whereas the playing child moves reality around, the fantasy-
ing teen is less dependent on (social) reality, which only supplies 
the impetus for the unrealistic fantasy scenarios. But the separa-
tion between playing and reality is already given in child’s play: 
“[E]very child at play behaves like a creative writer, in that he 
creates a world of his own, or, rather, re-arranges the things of 
his world in a new way which pleases him” (143–44). The child 
takes his play very seriously, Freud underscores in preparing for 
the contrast between play and “not what is serious but what is 
real” (144):22 “In spite of all the emotion with which he cathects 
22 I have no problem continuing to use “really” and “real,” but like 
Winnicott I understand these terms emotionally, along the lines of the 
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his world of play, the child distinguishes it quite well from real-
ity; and he likes to link his imagined objects and situations to 
the tangible and visible things of the real world” (ibid.). It all 
begins, then, with playing in childhood, which in German is 
commemorated, Freud points out, in the names given the genres 
and functions of Dichtung on stage, in which Spiel (playing) lays 
the cornerstone: comedy (Lustspiel) and tragedy (Trauerspiel), 
as well as dramatic performance (Schauspiel) and performers 
(Schauspieler).23 
The innocence or unconcealedness of child’s play is translated 
through fantasying into the import of unreality: 
The unreality of the writer’s imaginative world, however, has 
very important consequences for the technique of his art; for 
many things which, if they were real, could give no enjoyment, 
can do so in the play of fantasy, and many excitements which, 
in themselves, are actually distressing, can become a source of 
pleasure for the hearers and spectators at the performance of 
a writer’s work. (144) 
But before the unreality of art, there is the inaccessibility of fan-
tasying. 
Child’s play seems given up in adolescence, a full stop we won’t 
allow: “[W]e can never give anything up; we only exchange one 
thing for another. What appears to be a renunciation is really 
the formation of a substitute or surrogate” (145).24 Private fan-
tasying is a teenage-appropriate replacement for playing big in 
childhood, because the teen, able and willing to fulfill the wishes 
of sex and violence, is in training to pass the empathy test and 
plaint of the teenager at heart who just wants to feel real. The unreality 
of play offers respite from the passion of what’s real.
23 This etymological grid later served Carl Schmitt the basics for his 
reading of Hamlet against the reign of psychoanalysis in the work’s 
reception, an effort doomed both by the overlap and the datemark it 
would hide. See my SPECTRE (Fort Wayne: Anti-Oedipus Press, 2013), 
78–80.
24 The switch from open play to concealed fantasying is given here in 
terms suggestive of a work of mourning. 
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pass on the inoculum that withstands psychopathy. It is in this 
sense that Freud’s proviso that fantasying gives up “the link with 
real objects” basic to child’s play proves particularly meaningful 
(144–45). The link to realization cannot hang in there in teen 
fantasying. The link with real objects that children play with 
explains why any illicit content of wish fantasying in childhood, 
like the death wish, the wish that the parent be gone, while 
openly performed,25 can just the same leave the kind of deep 
impression that’s waiting to be reactivated later on, for example 
in the grown-up’s experience of grief. When Freud attributes to 
childhood the single wish to be big, to be grown-up, he means, of 
course, a wish available for conscious recognition or understand-
ing. That also means that childhood deposits by ununderstood 
fantasying unconscious wishes for later symptomatic syndica-
tion. Otherwise the contents of wish fantasying post-childhood 
continue to be conscious.26 
We saw that Tolkien also bases his sense of Dichtung, Fantasy, 
the true genre of genre, on the daydream, which runs the gamut 
from fairytale childhood to leader-and-the-pack adolescence. The 
difference is that Tolkien is less interested in the Enlightenment, 
its secular rehearsals, and its classical antiquity. In elaborating the 
wish-fantasy structure common to daydreams and B-narratives 
Freud focused on original works that had been “freely” invented. 
But then he also considered imaginative writers who, like the 
authors of epics and tragedies, “take over their material ready-
25 We are reminded of Freud’s elaboration of the child playing fort/da 
in a setting of adult mourning (in “Beyond the Pleasure Principle,” in 
The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund 
Freud, Vol. XVIII (1920–1922): Beyond the Pleasure Principle, Group 
Psychology, and Other Works, ed. and trans. James Strachey with Anna 
Freud [London: The Hogarth Press, 1964]).
26 Why a specific fantasy is appealing may not be known, a questioning 
that brushes up against the unconscious. Does the metapsychological 
fact that an unconscious wish lies buried in every night dream suggest 
a hierarchy whereby every waking fantasy, too, ultimately refers to an 
unconscious wish that goes back to early childhood? Let’s agree that 
every waking wish-fantasy need not go there, unless, for instance, the 
prospect of going public calls for alteration of the conscious wish’s 
prehistory in repression. Watch out what your unconscious wished for. 
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made” (149), material that is available to the extent that it is 
“derived from the popular treasure-house of myths, legends and 
fairy tales” (152). Here Freud gives a forecast of the primal fan-
tasy trajectory of his work, from Totem and Taboo to Moses and 
Monotheism: “The study of constructions of folk-psychology 
[…] is far from complete, but it is extremely probable that myths, 
for instance, are distorted vestiges of the wishful fantasies of 
whole nations, the secular dreams of youthful humanity” (152). 
Tolkien saw the relations between myth and fairytale going 
into the fantasy genre indelibly marked by the unique draw of 
the era of the pagan past’s Christianization up north in Europe, 
which amounts to an alternative “antiquity” not already claimed 
for secularization. He recounts a dominant view of myth and 
then reverses its course to ground it in the personalization of 
fantasy, which lies in the conversion to Christianity: 
The Olympians were personifications of the sun, of dawn, 
of night, and so on, and all the stories told about them were 
originally myths (allegories would have been a better word) of 
the greater elemental changes and processes of nature. Epic, 
heroic legend, saga then localised these stories in real places 
and humanised them by attributing them to ancestral heroes, 
mightier than men and yet already men. And finally these 
legends, dwindling down, became folk-tales, Märchen, fairy-
stories – nursery tales.27
All the above, however, “can only be arrayed with a personal 
significance and glory by a gift, the gift of a person” (ibid.). 
Personalization, a Christian attribute and gift, enters at the end 
of the hierarchy to reverse it and give ascendancy to Tolkien’s 
genre.
Although in elaborating the fantasy genre Tolkien asks only 
for seconds, the world or nature that he counts as secondary is as 
primary as Christian piety allows.
27 Tolkien, “On Fairy-Stories,” 29. Subsequent references are given in the 
text.
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Probably every writer making a secondary world, a fantasy, 
every sub-creator, wishes in some measure to be a real maker, 
or hopes that he is drawing on reality: hopes that the pecu-
liar quality of this secondary world (if not all the details) are 
derived from Reality, or are flowing into it. […] The peculiar 
quality of the “joy” in successful Fantasy can thus be explained 
as a sudden glimpse of the underlying reality or truth. It is 
not only a “consolation” for the sorrow of this world, but a 
satisfaction, and an answer to that question, “Is it true?” (70)
The answer is a resounding yes, if you can follow the Christian 
joy into acceptance of the Gospel truth of fantasy: “This story is 
supreme; and it is true. Art has been verified. God is the Lord, of 
angels, and of men – and of elves. Legend and History have met 
and fused” (72). 
The joy of wish fulfillment prefigures the Gloria at the so-called 
turn, the Eucatastrophe, in which a happy end is anticipated but 
not given: “The joy would have exactly the same quality, if not 
the same degree, as the joy which the ‘turn’ in a fairy-story gives: 
such joy has the very taste of primary truth” (71). The verging 
on merger of secondary and primary worlds that Tolkien evokes 
doesn’t extinguish the signifying skeins and skins of this world: 
“Redeemed Man is still man. Story, fantasy, still go on, and 
should go on. The Evangelium has not abrogated legends; it has 
hallowed them, especially the ‘happy ending’” (72). The story 
becomes “history, without thereby necessarily losing the mythi-
cal or allegorical significance that it had possessed” (71). 
Although a work of fantasy – the work of fantasy – defers the 
ultimate happy end, the arc of its history must remain Christian. 
For Tolkien’s genre, it follows that each work of fantasy must 
keep Christianity from being just another fairy-story. 
I would venture to say that approaching the Christian Story 
from this direction, it has long been my feeling (a joyous feel-
ing) that God redeemed the corrupt making-creatures, men, 
in a way fitting to this aspect, as to others, of their strange 
nature. The Gospels contain a fairy-story, or a story of a larger 
kind which embraces all the essence of fairy-stories. […] But 
this story has entered History and the primary world; the 
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desire and aspiration of sub-creation has been raised to the 
fulfilment of Creation. (71) 
His aversion to Max Müller notwithstanding, Tolkien recog-
nizes that language as the bottom line “cannot, all the same, be 
dismissed” (27). He concedes that the “incantations” basic to 
Fantasy “might indeed be said to be only another view of adjec-
tives, a part of speech in a mythical grammar” (28): “When we 
take green from grass, blue from heaven, and red from blood, 
we have already an enchanter’s power – upon one plane; and the 
desire to wield that power in the world external to our minds 
awakes” (ibid.). Science fiction experiments with time, technol-
ogy, and psychic reality, which at the limit generate alternate 
realities. Tolkien instead concedes that enchantment is basic to 
language, a gift, however, that must first be localized and person-
alized (in his argument, Christianized) before it can give forth the 
other worlds in which the deposit of fantasying can be redeemed. 
Reprising the media savvy behind the composition of the New 
Testament as a series of letters, Tolkien makes language as we 
know and use it a byproduct of the gift of Christian creativity (or 
omnipotence).
It’s time for Freud to make an intervention. In addition to the 
centrality of the ego structure proper to B-culture, there is a dif-
ferentiating adjustment in every daydream, which fine-tunes the 
basic analogy between waking fantasy and Dichtung. 
We must not suppose that the products of this imaginative 
activity – the various fantasies, castles in the air and day-
dreams – are stereotyped or unalterable. On the contrary, 
they fit themselves in to the subject’s shifting impressions of 
life, change with every change in his situation, and receive 
from every fresh active impression what might be called a 
“date mark.”28 (147)
The datemark, Zeitmarke in German, is pivotal to this study 
between genres. 
28 Freud, “Creative Writers and Day-dreaming,” 147. Subsequent page 
references are given in the text.
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To interpret a fictional work’s underlying fantasy requires, 
before the archaeological excavation of unconscious meaning, 
that we first reckon with the three periods of time that punctuate 
every daydream. It is the first outline of what would become the 
method of psychobiography: 
A strong experience in the present awakens in the creative 
writer a memory of an earlier experience (usually belonging to 
his childhood) from which there now proceeds a wish which 
finds its fulfilment in the creative work. The work itself exhib-
its elements of the recent provoking occasion as well as of the 
old memory. (151) 
Analyzed by Freud in terms of the two times you get and the 
one time you forget, his exemplary daydream is that of a boy in 
his early teens, an orphan, who just heard of a job opening and 
decides to apply. On the way to the interview, he daydreams about 
being hired on the spot, then rising up the ranks of employment 
until he is second in command to his boss, whose daughter he 
courts, marries, and whose business he, like a prince, inherits. 
The past tense belongs to an idealized time when the boy was the 
beloved young child of his parents. His yearning for that time 
animates the fantasy, which belongs to the future. It’s a fiction 
about the time to come that is at the same time modeled on the 
past that saw him better off, beloved, protected. The “memory 
of an earlier experience (usually an infantile one) in which this 
wish was fulfilled” (147), and which its future fulfillment would 
double, is an idealized past; and the present tense that is elided 
is the temporal modus of ongoing tension. The fantasying in 
Freud’s example can unfold only as long as the daydreamer for-
gets his unemployed home-alone status.
What Freud calls a Zeitmarke, datemark or timestamp, indi-
cates the expiration date or half-life of every fantasy escape, which 
takes a running start in a happy past, on which the wish is based, 
and makes a leap into the future of wish fulfillment, out-flying 
the incident in the present that prompted the wish but that also 
tags the wish that drops it. When Freud explores the daydream, 
the everyday model for the mighty aspirations and resolutions of 
Dichtung, he argues that the circumvention of present tension 
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cannot elide its triggering in real time, its history. The indelible 
datemark stamped upon the trigger-unhappy moment in the cir-
cumvented present openly lies waiting for historicization, which 
is the backfire of fantasy, its mortal recoil. The genre of fantasy 
too, therefore, can be seen as historicization waiting to happen, 
and its symbolic aspirations shall be overtaken by allegory. The 
expiration date of fantasy in history gives a rest to the speed 
denial within the once-and-future and provides a point of reen-
try for science fiction; it lets the present back in, the tense that is 
the mainstay of a speculative genre of predictive extrapolation. 
The prize in the contest between science fiction and fantasy, 
which was largely waged in the course of the staggered linking 
of the two, went by the law of B-genres to fantasy. Science fic-
tion fell short of predicting the digital relation, which, however, 
proved to be neither the psychotic sublime nor the happy turn-
ing toward an end in redemption. Fantasy wins, then, by default 
but no default of its own. Alone its proximity to generic wish 
fantasying and daydreaming, which, however, the import of 
Christianity was to keep in check, wins the prize and renders it 
the genre without borders. That the future forecasts of science 
fiction were wide off the mark of digitization was not a concession 
to fantasy, nor a concession opened up in fantasy, but became 
instead a defining moment in its own genre, which restarted 
after the fact in the termination phase of its Cold-War era. In its 
forecast ruins, science fiction began reading in the light of fantasy 
the history of approximated simultaneity. The second prize, the 
caption of legibility, goes to science fiction, the control text in the 
testing of the B-genres at the onset of their historicization and 
allegorical legibility. I pry loose Walter Benjamin’s revalorization 
of allegory from its close association with the loss of function in 
belief systems and hitch it instead to failure in prediction, which 
piles high a ruinscape for reading at the border between science 
fiction and fantasy. 
The Mechanical Brain
Gotthard Günther, who started out as a German philosopher 
and logician recasting through Hegel the binary logic associated 
with Aristotle as but the prehistory of a more comprehensive 
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multivalued logic, discovered both cybernetics and science fic-
tion upon emigrating to the U.S. in 1940 with his Jewish wife. 
He subsequently worked out what might be called a metaphysics 
of science fiction, previews of which were published in the 1950s 
in a series of English-language articles in the pulp magazines 
Astounding Science Fiction and Startling Stories and, in German, 
in the forewords and commentaries he supplied his 1952 series 
of German translations of American works of science fiction 
(novels and short stories), as well as in the separate monograph 
that introduced the series.29 The majority of his speculations, 
however, awaited posthumous publication under the title Die 
amerikanische Apokalypse (The American Apocalypse). 
Conceived as declaration of independence from longstanding 
metaphysical traditions, the Enlightenment is the historical intro-
ject pivotal to Günther’s genealogy in The American Apocalypse. 
In Europe, the Enlightenment was followed by Romanticism, 
which brought back the metaphysical mother lode. But in the 
New World, the Enlightenment proved to be the establishing 
shot of a new start. On the one hand, Günther agrees with the 
Romantic philosopher Friedrich Schelling how “flat and prema-
ture the feeling of security associated with the Enlightenment in 
fact was. The Enlightenment only addressed the brain.”30 On the 
other hand, Günther acknowledges the Enlightenment as herald 
of future states of the human psyche: “To realize these states 
29 Günther’s writings on science fiction for the German series published 
by Heyne Verlag are collected in the volume edited by Dieter von 
Reeken, Science Fiction als neue Metaphysik? Dr. Gotthard Günthers 
Kommentare zu “Rauchs Weltraum Büchern” (Lüneburg: Verlag Dieter 
von Reeken, 2015).
30 Gotthard Günther, Die amerikanische Apokalypse, ed. Kurt 
Klagenfurt (Munich: Profil Verlag, 2000), 220. That the 
Enlightenment was premature and thus one-sided found dialectical 
expansion and qualification elsewhere in Günther’s oeuvre. For 
example, in the second paragraph of the foreword to the third 
volume of his Beiträge zur Grundlegung einer operationsfähigen 
Dialektik (Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1980), Günther cautioned 
that the necessity that all knowledge be exoteric was a misguided 
Enlightenment belief, which denied the challenge and danger of 
consequent (inner) gaps and vacancies. 
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emotionally, this psyche first had to emigrate to a new world.”31 
The ambivalent introject of the Enlightenment consists, then, 
in admiration for the demolition derby that it ran, wariness that 
its secular clearing text forgoes a greater integration, and finally 
recognition of the affective working through that its address to 
or from the future requires.
The Enlightenment was transferred directly to the settlement 
of the long unacknowledged continent.32 Günther’s reading of 
the future is based on the conundrum that so many discoveries 
of the Americas launched from both shores of the regional civili-
zations prior to Columbus’s accidental arrival there (he was look-
ing for a new way to India) went completely unacknowledged.33 
Acceptance of a new world was the first step toward one world 
and its de-geo-centering before the final frontier of outer space. 
The Enlightenment supplied the break with the metaphysical 
basis of regional civilizations, a break that was given to the New 
World. With the how-to encyclopedias of the Enlightenment in 
hand, the settlers demarcated a new “West” in contrast to the 
Faustian West.
American science fiction is, then, for Günther the first 
understanding of world culture (and beyond), which rejects the 
regional civilizations grounded in the East. Via travel through 
deep interstellar space, ungrounded projection of artificial habi-
tats based on reason alone, and unabashed manipulation of time 
(time travel), it was the first platform for the New World’s cul-
tural aspirations unbounded by the Eastern past. The spaceship 
31 Ibid.
32 Early nineteenth-century prints of educational and research facilities 
built in the era of the Enlightenment indeed look planetary: no 
difference in the setting and structure whether in the new world or in 
Göttingen (see, for example, etchings of the historical observatory of 
the Georg-August-Universität).
33 This strand of Günther’s metaphysics of science fiction went into 
his introductory monograph Die Entdeckung Amerikas und die 
Sache der Weltraumliteratur (Düsseldorf: Verlag Karl Rauch, 1952). 
The defective cornerstone in his reading might be that what the 
European explorers encountered in Latin and South America were 
true civilizations. Were they really, for all their stone work, only animist 
throwbacks?
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shatters the symbolism of classical metaphysics and abandons 
the classical form of life. The visions of outer space presuppose a 
universal planetary culture – and condition or determine a new 
non-classical conception of reality. 
In his commentary on Joseph W. Campbell’s The Incredible 
Planet (1949), Günther describes how space becomes future sci-
ence’s laboratory in which even artificial planetary systems can 
be engineered. The spaceship crew visits the artificial blue uni-
verse only briefly, but Günther counts the shortstop the book’s 
spiritual highpoint.34 Intelligence consciously fabricated this 
universe as a stage for self-realization. It represents the ultimate 
consequence of Hegel’s objective spirit and introduces the com-
plete secularization of the metaphysical foundation of Western 
civilization (41). 
The process of nature’s transformation into culture, from 
cave dwelling, through house and garden, to the largest cities, is 
only the beginning. What keeps American science fiction from 
taking a next step toward transcendence (the universe is, after all, 
finite) is the assumption of a plurality of space-time worlds. The 
contingency of the world does not express metaphysical causa-
tion but is rather the indication that physical existence could be a 
one-time-only event (46). We are on the cusp of the transfer from 
a two-valued logic of truth, according to which truth and reality 
coincide, to a generally valid probability logic, in which reality is 
a highly variable condition of probability (47). 
The Enlightenment replaced theocracy with a relationship 
between the divinity and the world so intimately close, the tran-
scendent essence spread so thin, that the lessening learned was the 
death of religion (45). The American authors in the 1950s choose 
not to divinize the problem of causality. But what Campbell’s 
novel presupposes goes beyond yet another new science hailing 
from a remote future: “Such a science, however, when it does 
arrive, won’t be an isolated spiritual or psychic phenomenon, 
but rather an integral element of a new culture with a new meta-
physical a priori and with new primoridal life instincts” (44). 
34 Günther, Science Fiction als neue Metaphysik?, 40. Subsequent page 
references to the commentaries on the two novels are given in the text.
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The commentary on the next work in Günther’s series, Jack 
Williamson’s The Humanoids (1948), picks up where the first 
commentary leaves off, between the expanding material basis 
for existence that Campbell plumbs and the disappointment 
that the new metaphysics isn’t even remotely a wrap yet. Before 
the adventure can begin, human consciousness must undergo 
transformations beyond the limits of neurosis and psychosis (51). 
Günther considers general tendencies in science fiction. The 
American authors project the future by the method of extrapola-
tion (52). Günther gives the example of an ongoing miniaturiza-
tion of radio contact in future worlds, but then concludes that 
radio might disappear altogether if telepathic capacities are fur-
ther developed and disseminated through a specialized industry. 
Before his reading proper of The Humanoids has commenced, 
Günther already gives us the gist of its surprise ending. Günther 
next demonstrates what he sets apart as an absolutely necessary 
extrapolation, one that underlies the science-fiction technology 
of “space warp” travel (53). Günther cuts to the chase and loops 
back to his radio extrapolation, blending the boundaries between 
the occult or parapsychological tracks of messaging and convey-
ance: some form of “teleportation” will be required to negotiate 
the intergalactic distances of space and time (54). Like the radio 
apparatus, the space ship is no longer necessary once we enter 
upon simultaneity. In Williamson’s novel, the introduction of a 
mechanical brain steering an interface of robots – the human-
oids – goes where the ultimate incarnation of the machine meets 
non-machinic capacities.
Williamson first introduced the humanoids in his 1947 novella 
“With Folded Hands.”35 In the novella, which Günther doesn’t 
discuss, mankind is being overrun by the robot extensions of a 
mechanical brain that comprehends only one directive or law: 
that mankind be served by offering protection against all harm 
to humans, even and especially the harm coming from their 
own destructiveness and self-destructiveness, which the robot 
service is designed to treat, even heal. From the perspective of the 
35 The novella first appeared in Astounding Science Fiction and is in the 
meantime often included as part one of The Humanoids, the novel 
proper, which appears in these editions as part two. 
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protagonists with whom we are given to identify, the care that is 
administered is excessive, indeed, totalitarian. 
According to the standard reception, Williamson’s The 
Humanoids is dystopian. The robot service goes too far and the 
overkill of protection threatens human freedom. In Günther’s 
stronger reading, however, the novel offers counterintuitive con-
clusions regarding our flawed adjustment to our perfectibility, 
which the intergalactic robot service of a mechanical brain rep-
resents. In The Humanoids, which appeared one year after the 
novella, the struggle for human freedom against the mechani-
cal brain and its countless robots continues, albeit, following 
Günther, in a far more differentiated setting. In the end, the 
rebellious resistance and the sense of restriction are coterminous 
aberrations on the human side. 
Every time we jot down on paper and solve a more com-
plicated math problem, Günther offers by way of clarifying 
what “mechanical” means, a piece of our brain-functioning or 
consciousness has been projected out and made into a mechani-
cal process in the outer world (57). But are conscious processes 
other than calculation open to mechanical externalization? 
Yes. Günther points to already existing devices like automatic 
pilot in which functions that imply intelligence are carried 
out by machines (58). And more advanced thought processes? 
Syllogisms can already be difficult to parse, but what about 
multi-syllogisms, like those that Lewis Carroll constructs in 
Alice’s Adventures in Wonderland (59)? While these can with 
great effort still be unraveled in your head, it’s clear that a simple 
logical figure can be carried to a point or sum that the human 
mind on its own cannot reach (60). It is our practical thinking, 
however, that will be tried first upon takeoff into outer space. 
We will be taking our departure from practical knowledge of 
the environment, which was earth-specific. Euclidean geometry 
is not applicable to new universal settings, which would make 
reliance on artificial intelligence a practical necessity.
A consequence of the inevitable superiority of the mechanical 
brain except in creative vision is that it will take over a consider-
able portion of human freedom, not only of action, but also of 
thought. However, Günther emphasizes, freedom of thought 
cannot signify freedom to think illogically (63). The rebellion 
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seeks to revise the directive running the humanoids with the 
stipulation that every human remain free to command wishes 
(70). This amounts to a reservation for the human’s unfettered 
subjectivity even when it goes against that part of his own ratio-
nal consciousness already posited according to objective laws 
and deposited in a physical creation after his own image. Such a 
freedom is a self-contradiction. 
Freedom is possible for those who seek it elsewhere than in 
hopeless resistance to reason experimentally tried and confirmed 
(70). Günther elaborates the difference between the phrases “I 
know it’s illogical but I think …” and “I know it sounds illogi-
cal, but I think …” (64). The latter proviso admits that a rational 
formulation is not yet available to the thinker (which, Günther 
adds, is Leibniz’s position). The former sentiment, however, is an 
outright contradiction, which Williamson’s mechanical brain just 
doesn’t allow. Questioning based on objectively genuine motives 
that are as such rational, but have “not yet” found an adequate 
rational formulation, does not lead to disharmony between the 
living individual and mechanical consciousness. Either the com-
puter can supply the rational formulation or the human motive 
goes so deep that it cannot touch it. The irrational and illogical 
wish to claim outright what goes against that which is objectively 
correct, historically and culturally a major component of human 
subjectivity, leads to future conflict. 
Günther allows that we seem to be reaching that point in 
the exercise of totalitarian control that goes beyond behavior 
and expression to address thought and fantasy. This control 
presupposes that an absolute truth, or at least a truth that goes 
way beyond the individual capacity for thought and experience, 
has been objectively established such that a person confronted 
with this truth no longer has the right to err in theory, since error 
is now implicated in the moral and social consequences. The 
individual is disallowed the private sphere of his own thoughts 
and thus of a subjective ethics (67). However, the questioning 
of the authority of the absolute truth is unavoidable when two 
totalitarian states oppose one another. It is the American way, 
which Williamson’s novel follows out, to accept the guidance of 
a computer before ceding control to another human being (67). 
the ethics, poetics, and practical metaphysics of waking dreaming
65
Only that is true which functions objectively – and indepen-
dently of human beings (67–68). 
In The Humanoids, we find in contrast to the more identifi-
able and containable types of resistance to the perfectibility of 
conscious, logical, and rational thought a residual charge against 
the mechanical brain lodged inside human consciousness by 
the unknown capacity for occult relations, which the robots 
seem not to compute. The rebels fear that a new double of the 
mechanical brain is being built to ward off their developing 
parapsychological abilities and to subsume and thus control this 
paradoxical side of human consciousness, hitherto the sore and 
blind spot in the healing of mankind. 
At the end of the novel, however, we learn that the founder 
of psychophysics was a veteran resister, who went on to invent 
the mechanical brain and its service. Treated by adjunct therapies 
that targeted the brain, he was set free to develop psychophysics, 
beginning with telepathy experiments that linked him to like-
minded researchers. The result was The Psychophysical Institute. 
“It was formed […] by a few adult and able men released by the 
service of the humanoids from their physical cares and their 
limiting preoccupations with physical science. They turned 
naturally to philosophy. And then to a new sort of psychology 
which their true orientation made possible – an actual science 
of the mind.”36 The agon on which The Humanoids seemed to 
turn, then, the race against the completion of an aggrandized, 
more controlling, mechanical brain, was the figment of a recur-
ring adolescent rebellion that the brain was in fact designed to 
outlast. The veteran witness comments on the weapons collec-
tion in the Institute: “[T]okens to remind us of the old enemy 
born again with every human being.” Adolescence must contain 
the wounding – and the re-wounding that’s a wrap with healing 
– “before we are actually adult.”37
As forecast in The Humanoids, then, the historical epoch to 
come will no longer recognize a psychophysical opposition as 
the metaphysical prerequisite of existence that once grounded 
the mentality of mankind (72). Former metaphysics becomes 
36 Jack Williamson, The Humanoids (New York: Orb Books, 1996), 284.
37 Ibid., 285.
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physical, and the former opposition is the object of a possible 
technology (ibid.). “The idea of the ‘mechanical brain,’ which 
is essentially alien to Western thought (and feeling!), shows that 
one dreams of new scientific tasks that presuppose a radical 
break with what was heretofore the historical nature of man” 
(72). The electromagnetic triad of elements that supported the 
machine age had to give way to a rhodomagnetic triad of differ-
ent elements before the humanoid age could commence. Science 
is reinvented a third time to supply the mechanical brain with 
a psychophysical grid: “The existential characteristics of reality 
with which the new technology works are indifferent to the dif-
ference between physical and psychic life” (72). 
The emphasis on science and its techno-application is the 
only continuity between the New World and Faustian Europe. 
Technical conclusions alone can be used; physical results involve 
no moral obligation (71). What does it mean that Williamson‘s 
science fiction refuses to recognize a metaphysically essential 
difference between the physical and the psychic (or spiritual)? 
There are two conceivable explanations for this American refusal 
(72). The incapacity to fathom European–Asian civilization pro-
motes in lieu of inheritance a program of reprimitivization that 
undoes all that was attained over the last five thousand years plus. 
The second explanation, which Günther seconds, goes further in 
this direction to propose that the Western hemisphere is develo-
ping out of this departure a new spirituality (ibid.). 
Günther’s commentary on Williamson’s The Humanoids is 
not contradicted by the prequel from the year before, the novella 
With Folded Hands. In 1980, however, Williamson published a 
sequel, The Humanoid Touch, which by its late arrival includes 
the inroads of the fantasy genre’s influence on science fiction, 
the borderland it must illuminate to enter the future. This time 
there is a far-out planet, Malili, on which an animistic species 
dwells immune to its corrosive natural elements, which keep 
out machines and their humans. The last human rebels to refuse 
the service of the humanoids discover the outsider planet, which 
they seek to exploit in zones they neutralized through radioactiv-
ity. But then the humanoid interface does reach the rebels, whose 
destructiveness is contained. The humanoid service doesn’t 
apply to the non-machinic indigenous population of Malili, 
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which didn’t pose the threat. The protagonist, a former rebel, 
qualifies at the end by the family romance of mixed blood for life 
and love on the utopian planet, which is less the outer limit of 
the humanoid interface than its staggered intergalactic compat-
ibility with planetary animism on a post-machinic basis. 
In The Time Machine, Wells set the marker distinguishing 
utopian fantasy from science fiction, the genre he would fully 
enter in The War of the Worlds. He placed a machine where 
earlier, in Looking Backward (1888) for example, it sufficed for 
Edward Bellamy’s protagonist to wake up from magnetic sleep 
and find himself in the future. Classical science fiction projects 
our stream alignment with technology via fast-forwarding evo-
lutionary change. By the 1970s, the projected import of virtual 
psychic reality filled a basic lack or lag in the science fiction genre. 
Will machines of transport ever outfly the grid of time, space, 
and matter to “conquer” outer space?
What is immediately striking about Williamson’s The 
Humanoid Touch is the change in art direction. Before, the 
new and improved housing that the humanoids provided was 
thoroughly modern. This time around Williamson re-projects 
the humanoid interface like a touchscreen of fantasy-scapes. For 
example: “Crystal towers shining like monster gems. Gardens of 
great bright blooms […] wrapped in a rose-colored cloud,”38 Or 
again: “[F]airy lands you can’t imagine […] wonderlands […] 
our new utopia.”39 In the visualization it commands and the 
story it tells The Humanoid Touch is like a novel James Cameron 
might have adapted for his postcolonial fantasy Avatar (2009). 
The rebels adhere to a techno-feudal system that smacks of 
the borderland between fantasy and science fiction genres first 
glimpsed in Frank Herbert’s Dune (1965) and projected huge and 
forever in Star Wars. Following the so-called Black Centuries, the 
first Navarch restored “the law of the ship” according to which 
the ruler would henceforward be chosen by the Bridge, a parlia-
mentary body elected by the duly franchised shipmen.40 
38 Jack Williamson, The Humanoid Touch (London: Sphere Books, 1982), 
11.
39 Ibid., 101.
40 Ibid., 42, 97.
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When the canon of literary genres admitted lyric poetry (orig-
inally excluded by Plato because non-mimetic), a proliferation 
of subgenres and a remetabolization of genre distinction became 
possible. In time, psychological content began to count in the 
evaluation of differences between genres. Friedrich Schiller’s 
“On Naive and Sentimental Poetry” explores subgenres of lyric 
poetry proto-diagnostically. The B-genres are late arrivals of 
the overdetermination of a work’s identity. Proximate to what 
Jacques Derrida argued in “The Law of Genre,” they are by the 
definiteness of their entry in the lexicon given to mix it up at the 
borders unto derangement. By 1980, science fiction was already 
boundary blending with fantasy in the course of forecasting 
about for what was new in the digitization on the horizon.
The More the Merrier
In The Humanoids, the mechanical brain’s service plan sets each 
robot apart from human agency and thus from the vicissitudes 
of willing and wishing. The “real perfection” of the human-
oids is that they are “protected from human manipulation.”41 
Williamson’s 1980 sequel, however, amplifies a trait in the 
makeup of the humanoids, which was admitted almost thirty 
years earlier, but only in passing. Günther overlooked it when 
he claimed that the logic the robots observe makes it impossible 
for them to deceive: “Only the logical functions of consciousness 
can be mechanized, that is, only the thinking ego can be techni-
cally reconstructed. The lie, however, is a function of the will. 
The will is fundamentally not mechanizable.”42 Is it possible to 
maintain Günther’s affirmative reading of the mechanical brain 
or does the lying he overlooked in the humanoid service render 
it too compromised?
In all three of his works dedicated to the humanoids, 
Williamson allows that the robot service is not commanded 
by the Prime Directive always to tell the truth or rather never 
to lie. This tendency occupies the foreground of the service in 
The Humanoid Touch. Recourse to lying is part of the talking 
41 Williamson, The Humanoids, 171–72.
42 Günther, Science Fiction als neue Metaphysik?, 68.
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cure that the robots apply incessantly in treating any subject 
split off from their service. From a rebel’s negative-transferential 
perspective, what looks in sessions with the humanoids like 
interrogation can also be seen to follow the directive of free 
association: “Again and again, he was pressed for more than he 
could recall.”43 That the humanoids know the “human machine” 
as well as themselves and thus exactly how to elicit the responses 
they require (123) must be conjugated with another inside view: 
“Even the most willing human being can never inform us fully 
[…]. Human knowledge is never entirely consistent or complete, 
because the human brain […] sleeps, […] forgets, […] dies” (159). 
The humanoid treatment regimen ranges like today‘s mental 
health profession. One option, a psycho-pharmaceutical regi-
men of euphoride, which induces happiness and oblivion, is 
applied liberally. Prior to the psychophysical grid, brain surgery 
was another option. The humanoids put on the human clothing 
of objects of love and trust in the sessions with rebels in order 
to influence acceptance of the truth, which coincides with the 
best treatment prognosis. This capacity for putting on deception 
is also offered openly as a means of simulated companionship, 
which, arguably, also tranquilizes unhappiness. We are still in an 
alternate reality extrapolated from the present, although by the 
looks of it aggrandized by fantasy and the anticipation of digital 
special effects. The goal of treatment is still to recognize that free-
dom and necessity coincide in the humanoid service.
According to psychoanalysis, his first lie gave the child relief 
from the sense of the parents’ thoughts being in his head. 
Spontaneous fib-fabulation out in the open of child’s play can be 
left behind, once the privacy of adolescent daydreaming and its 
revision and publication in the public mode of poetry subsume 
lying as fantasy, as fiction. In The Humanoid Touch, the robots 
lie or fabulate, even simulate, to promote their service. They rep-
licate those near and dear to the rebels to get past their resistance 
like holographic transference interpretations. A resister concedes 
that the falsehoods of the humanoids were “almost creative” 
(133). 
43 Williamson, The Humanoid Touch, 159. Subsequent page references 
are given in the text.
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In “The Confidences of a ‘Psychical Researcher’,” William 
James questions the validity of fraud charges in the investigation 
of spiritualist mediums: 
[T]he accusation of deliberate fraud and falsehood is grossly 
superficial. Man’s character is too sophistically mixed for 
the alternative of “honest or dishonest” to be a sharp one. 
Scientific men themselves cheat – at public lectures – rather 
than let experiments obey their well-known tendency towards 
failure.44 
When all possible deception has been considered and checked 
off, the experiment with a medium will still have yielded “a 
residuum of knowledge displayed that can only be called super-
normal: the medium taps some source of information not open 
to ordinary people.”45 Through the integration of psychophysics, 
the mechanical brain and its humanoid service can be compared 
to the medium in spiritualism and the resistance for which the 
humanoids lie in wait to the imposture charge that James dis-
mantles.
Because they are treating the rebels, the humanoid liars 
do not, in keeping with Kant’s argument, leave off respecting 
human subjects as ends in themselves. The humanoids reinstall 
the thing called an sich into the moral sensibility of their rebel 
patients, which allows them to pursue their talents unto perfect-
ibility. And while openness to the well-being of fellow humans 
reflects the happiness that arises through working on the self, it is 
not an obligation to make more the merrier. The Kantian ethics 
of duty is inconsequential, indeed duty-free. It casts aside every 
recognizable duty for duty as such, in itself, the duty to duty. 
John Stuart Mill criticized the categorical imperative, arguing 
that even the most absurd thought can be legislated. Only by the 
consequences that follow can the thought be evaluated.46 The 
44 William James, “The Confidences of a ‘Psychical Researcher’,” in 
Writings 1902–1910 (New York: Library of America, 1988), 1253.
45 Ibid., 1257. Emphasis in the original.
46 John Stuart Mill, “Utilitarianism,” in On Liberty, Utilitarianism and 
Other Essays, eds. Mark Philip and Frederick Rosen (Oxford: Oxford 
the ethics, poetics, and practical metaphysics of waking dreaming
71
lie might qualify as an absurd candidate for categorical legisla-
tion if, by dint of its self-cancelling consequence, it didn’t tell 
a linguistic truth. Utilitarianism famously allows that a lie that 
can save lives enters the calculation of the greatest good.47 But 
sometimes it’s not just the greater number of people who should 
benefit by your actions according to the morality of utilitarian-
ism. Lying that becomes a habit undermines the moral integrity 
of the person telling the lies. It undermines trust, the purpose of 
communication also for Aquinas. 
Isn’t it possible that what holds therapeutic value in a regi-
men of treatment, which seems to apply to deception in The 
Humanoid Touch, lies outside the reckoning of morals? In 
Peter Weir’s The Truman Show (1998), we watch the upbringing 
afforded by Jeremy Bentham’s Panopticon model, which extends 
through Mill’s Utilitarianism. In Dick’s Time Out of Joint, 
which The Truman Show to some extent adapts, the protago-
nist has endured a psychotic break, which is stabilized, guided, 
instrumentalized via fantasy. He is kept going in the imitation 
1950s world supported by actors playing their parts in keeping 
with this idealized past. The fantasy setting allows him to guess 
what’s next in a cartoon game in the daily paper. What the break 
interrupted he can thus continue: forecasting where the enemy 
missiles will strike next. The fantasy covers over the break in the 
man’s foundation. But there is a half-life to this fantasy coverup, 
which lets Dick’s protagonist see through it, not in order to go 
back to the breaking point that allowed him, like a shell-shocked 
soldier, to escape conflct but onward to auto-recovery. Truman 
also makes it to a happy end, but is it in spite of surveillance and 
deception or is it through the treatment regimen they uphold?
In an aside Mill shakes off an objection that the happy end is 
an untenable ethical standard:
University Press, 2015), 142. 
47 In The Humanoid Touch, we do not witness the lying of the robots as 
legislated by the possible exception to the Directive, namely that they 
could stop by force a human who endangers other humans, a danger to 
be assessed on a utilitarian scale of valuation. We witness only interven-
tions that would stop a human from harming himself.
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[U]tility includes not solely the pursuit of happiness, but the 
prevention or mitigation of unhappiness; and if the former 
aim be chimerical, there will be all the greater scope and more 
imperative need for the latter, so long at least as mankind 
think fit to live, and do not take refuge in the simultaneous 
act of suicide recommended under certain conditions by 
Novalis.48 
“Novalis” is one of the passwords for the UK introjection of 
German influence, which belongs to the return of Hamlet’s 
haunted suicidality. Before arriving at the shibboleth, Mill 
entered a thicket of references to “Mr. Carlyle,” a purveyor 
once again of the German introject. One way to circumvent the 
German recommendation of mass suicide is through human 
sacrifice, which utilitarianism demands for the greater good.
In The Truman Show mass suicidality sits in front of the tube 
watching Truman deal with his anxiety and depression. The real-
ity show has been running since Truman’s birth but first became 
a global hit when Truman had to internalize the boundaries of 
his safe harbor through trauma, the death of his father at sea. The 
drowning was staged in such a way that it could look, uncon-
sciously, like the fulfillment of Truman’s death wish. We watch 
the adult Truman try to follow out his assignment at work, 
which involves crossing the sea to the next island by boat. But 
then he pulls up short before getting on board and the depres-
sion in front of the TV watches this tight spot of anxiety. 
Hidden behind the masquerade, the viewer is directed to look 
at reality: the person and personality of Truman. He is Everyman, 
true man, representing a general good, a general will. The view-
ers, like the creator of the show, recognize themselves in Truman. 
Unhappiness controlled through the lesson of its lessening keeps 
the community of surveillance safe from the lure of mass suicide. 
Depression sits in front of the tube and is diverted and 
entertained even by the apparent breaking points of fantasy’s 
instrumentalization. It’s not his father who suddenly returns 
to Truman but the actor who played that role twenty years ago. 
Truman’s water phobia lifts and he is free to wish to see worlds 
48 Mill, “Utilitarianism,” 126.
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beyond the fantasy bubble of the 1950s. Truman makes it to the 
container walls and climbs out.
But first, to stop him, the creator (of the show) physically 
torments Truman with the special effects of a storm at sea. By 
his willingness to sacrifice Truman, the creator breaks the code 
of Bentham’s Panopticon, demonstrating an exception that 
can be an option according to the utilitarian calculus of the 
greater good. For the betterment of the surveillance watchers, 
punishment that causes physical pain is allowable, according to 
Bentham, only in the utmost case of exception. The Panopticon 
aims instead to let its inmates go free (the good happy end of its 
upbringing or therapy). Punishment that is not self-administered 
undermines the progress in educating to be good. The inmates in 
The Truman Show are the viewers who learn first to administer 
their own (p)unitive identification with Truman when he suffers 
and then know to make their exit with him.
Throughout the American superhero genre, mad master-
minds have tried their heroes with the utilitarian sacrificial 
choice. Superman is caught between the maternal commitment 
to each individual life and the subsuming paternal allegiance 
to Life in the big picture of the battle of values, imperatives, or 
drives. According to the first two Superman blockbusters (1978 
and 1980), if you want to divert Superman from the big picture 
(in which the evil masterminds feel at home), just drop one 
human from the top of a skyscraper. But to neglect the paternal 
battleground on which the masterminds launch their maneuvers 
(as happens in Superman II) means risking leaving unprotected 
an ever-greater number of casualties. Or when under catastrophe 
conditions Superman sets out to save individual lives one by one, 
he runs out of time to save the one life he does, after all, value 
most. At which point, in Superman: The Movie, he spins against 
the linear time of earth’s orbit and, to be kind, rewinds the record 
of the recent past until the point is reached to save Lois in time.
In 2018, the utilitarian pain text of human sacrifice cut deepest 
into the superhero setting. Avengers: Infinity War allowed the 
bad guy to slide into the ambivalence position when his plan to 
extinguish at random half of doomed intelligent life overcrowd-
ing an ecologically bereft cosmos is allowed to go through in the 
surprise ending. The survivng half has been rescued for a future 
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of sustainability. All the superheroes (in the Marvel universe) 
rallied in a concerted effort to counter the utilitarian program. 
At the end, they can only look on as one half among their ranks 
pixelates away. Only in their finite assembly is this cut across 
cosmic life an occasion for mourning. The demise of the teen 
superhero Spiderman breaches the numbing acceptance on 
which the movie closes.
Ghost-seeing and Clairvoyance
Long derided for Lorenzo da Ponte’s “impertinent” libretto,49 
Così fan tutte (1790) was even tampered with in the nineteenth 
century to let the women in on the intrigue and turn the test 
around into a comedy of errors. To counter their guilty assump-
tion of a high-fidelity love, the “philosopher” Don Alfonso 
directs the men to depart, marching as to war, and then enter 
the stage they left as new suitors of their own betrothed. To win 
over the steadfast women, the men who are now incognito feign 
taking poison in despair. But the experiment doesn’t begin to 
yield results until the women’s maid, recruited by the philoso-
pher as his assistant, arrives in the guise of a medical practitioner 
with a brand-new treatment plan: “This is a piece of magnet, 
the stone the great Dr. Mesmer discovered in Germany, and 
which then made him so famous in France.”50 By instructing the 
women to assist in the recovery of the stricken men, the mag-
netiseur exploits the near miss between hands-on care and the 
early mother’s ministrations (which is a turn-on for both sexes). 
The philosopher’s trial seduction ultimately leads the men to 
wed the women as planned, but to forswear the testing of their 
unconditional love. The role of Mesmerism in Mozart’s rococo 
opera shows the impress of the Enlightenment Zeitmarke. 
Mesmer earned the Dr. title with a dissertation on the influence 
of outer space (Newton’s new science) on the tide charts of terran 
49 Eduard Hanslick, Die moderne Oper: Kritiken und Studien (Berlin: A. 
Hofmann, 1875), 81.
50 Wolfgang Amadeus Mozart, Così fan tutte (1790), Act 1, Scene 16. 
Available online at Opera Folio, http://www.operafolio.com/libretto.
asp?n=Cosi_fan_tutte. Translation modified.
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metabolism, the full range, then, of animate/inanimate synergy, 
a new animism he called animal magnetisim. 
Arthur Schopenhauer’s treatise, “Versuch über das 
Geistersehn und was damit zusammenhängt” (“Essay on Seeing 
Ghosts and Related Matters,” 1851), interrogates the extensive 
documentation of mediumistic states, occult dreams, and visions 
induced in patients under the influence of magnetic treatment. 
Schopenhauer opens his study of the occult phenomena brought 
back by Mesmerism with the claim that all questions raised 
like ghosts were banished by the Enlightenment.51 Although 
Schopenhauer gives no more support to the belief in ghostly 
continued existence than did Kant before him (whose treatise on 
ghost-seers he seeks to supplement and extend), he does expand 
the range of interpretation of the belief or rather of the seeing 
that is believing. 
Schopenhauer argues that the Enlightenment justified its 
ghost-busting by discounting any empirical evidence of haunt-
ing. But the presence of haunting really wasn’t ever averred by 
ghost-seers; in fact, such physical evidence would dispense with 
the ghostly apparition. By definition, a ghost becomes manifest 
in a manner completely other than a body. A ghost-seer is claim-
ing only the presence of an image in his intellectual contempla-
tion, the representation of a body without its real presence. This 
is the source of misunderstanding. Our view of the external 
51 Arthur Schopenhauer, “Versuch über das Geistersehn und was 
damit zusammenhängt,” in Schopenhauer’s Sämmtliche Werke in 
fünf Bänden, vol. IV, Grossherzog Wilhelm Ernst Ausgabe (Leipzig: 
Insel Verlag, 1908), 354. In I Think I Am, I work through a host of 
German tracts on ghost-seeing, including Kant’s and Schopenhauer’s 
studies, with focus fixed on communication with ghosts. I elaborate 
here instead the apparatus of dream interpretation Schopenhauer 
applies to states like clairvoyance in order to liberate them from the 
margin of superstition. Schopenhauer dismisses daydreaming, but then 
makes room for it after all within the medley of paranormal states of 
waking sleeping which he makes available to and through the organ 
of dreaming. The opposition between a wish and the will comes to 
be dismantled, at the latest in Freud’s elaboration of wish fulfillment 
in dreaming. Further page references, which are to this edition of 
Schopenhauer’s study, are given in the text.
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world is not exclusively sensual but intellectual or cerebral. Are 
the images in the brain of real bodies the same as the images that 
arise independently of the impress upon our senses of present 
bodies? The dream allows us to answer – and without a doubt: 
Yes! And so, Schopenhauer commences his rereading (276). 
Dream offers the foundation for Schopenhauer’s study, 
because he can distinguish the night dream from a mere fantasy 
image, the play of thought. While fantasying is fleeting, incom-
plete, and one-sided (ibid.), there is a reality to dreams that can 
be grasped. The capacity of representation in our dreams goes 
way beyond what our imagination can offer. Fantasy images arise 
through thought association or other motives; the daydreamer 
consciously recognizes their arbitrariness and unfoundedness. 
The element of surprise stamps the night dream objective and 
real (277). It is acceptable for someone not to be sure if what is 
remembered was real or a dream, but it is outright madness to say 
that one cannot be sure if something was imagined or not (278). 
Schopenhauer cites Aristotle to identify fantasying as part of 
the reality that the dream remakes and shares: in a dream, you 
can daydream. Fantasying belongs more to waking reality than 
to dream reality. All mental faculties except memory are active in 
dreaming. Any resemblance to insanity involves a lack of recol-
lection in night dreams or rather the lack of a coherent means of 
remembering back. To the extent that derangement, according 
to Schopenhauer, rolls down the decline of the ability to remem-
ber, the dream is a brief bout of madness. 
The dreaming consciousness doesn’t register the delegates of 
waking reality absent or past. The long dead behave like the liv-
ing in our dreams. We don’t recollect that they are dead. While 
we are following Freud in bracketing out the night dream as the 
source of art, dreams do inspire artists, and Shakespeare’s ghosts, 
for example, can be recognized via our night dreams. What fan-
tasying does not yield is the fundamental tenet of ghost-seeing: 
the visitation by our identifiable dead in night dreams – not as 
deceased but as continuing to exist and not as imagined but as 
surprise visitation.
Unlike daydreaming, the night dream requires sleep “just as 
the images of the laterna magica can only then appear once the 
illumination in the room is turned off” (279). Dreaming therefore 
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doesn’t depend on thought association since the brain is asleep 
long before the show begins. Any thought we might recognize at 
the outset of dreaming seems exactly not what preoccupied our 
waking thoughts just prior to the transition. The rumination or 
revery at the bedtime hour is not carried over into our dreaming 
when we fall asleep.
Schopenhauer scans the continuities in perception char-
acterizing the paranormal states of waking dreaming amply 
documented in the annals of Mesmerism. They guide the mag-
netiseur and can appear as well in the client, a regularly recurring 
byproduct of the therapy. What interests Schopenhauer is that 
the sleepwalker is still able to move about in the reality of the 
senses and that the clairvoyant by an amplified orientation sees 
the bedroom and just beyond, the moment and just beyond. 
At the same time, the waking dream states, the continuity shots 
notwithstanding, suggest the trespass of the mainstays of waking 
reality. 
Awakening is the criterion for distinguishing between the 
states of waking and dreaming, which, however, seems objec-
tively not to hold in the case of sleep-waking; it is a between state 
that amounts to an awakening in sleep. The actual environment 
is dream-scanned. We see the bedroom with all its contents, take 
cognizance of persons entering, and know that we are in bed. 
It’s as though the brain were suddenly transparent, with the 
outside world able to enter it immediately without the detour of 
the senses (287). Like the Esper device specific to Ridley Scott’s 
adaptation of Dick’s novel, the movie Blade Runner, the sleeper’s 
POV can range around the corners of the diorama of the actual 
environment in which the sleeper is fixed in place. 
Schopenhauer declares that a “spiritualist” view of occult 
phenomena must be rejected in favor of the “idealist” view (276). 
The former upholds that there are two aspects of existence: one, 
the material body and, two, the immaterial spirit. Schopenhauer’s 
idealist view is part Kantian – the part that maintains the ideality 
of perception in terms of time, space, and causality – and part 
magical. The second part, although inspired by Kant’s Ding an 
sich, is the part he came up with to introduce a practical meta-
physics of magic. The archive of Mesmerism gave him his license. 
Schopenhauer entertains, then, a physiological reading set upon 
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the psychic–sensory processes and set apart from the metaphysi-
cal understanding of the Ding an sich, which for Schopenhauer 
was the will, his bottom line and limit concept (320–21). At the 
limit, then, the will is the beacon orienting the physiological 
approach. 
Night dreaming not only goes deeper than the waking dream, 
but it is also closer to the source than dreams one remembers. 
Within our sensorium we respond to the stimuli of the external 
environment, reaching at the end of the process the deep well 
of the will. Schopenhauer introduces a couple of neologisms, 
because he says he doesn’t hold the copyright on the Scottish 
designation “second sight” (286–87). When we’re asleep, exter-
nal stimulation no longer counts, and what Schopenhauer terms 
the dream organ (Traumorgan) takes over, drawing from the 
well of the will and carrying its stimulus forward. To perceive 
in German, wahrnehmen, is literally to take something as true; 
Schopenhauer adds wahrträumen, to dream something as true, 
to designate the waking dream state that sidles up to the everyday 
categories but, since not dependent upon them in this direction, 
uses them loosely as though moving beyond them (286–301). 
Occult experience is therefore a translation problem. The 
psychic–sensory process goes into reverse when sleep removes 
the stimuli of the external environment. The night dream draws 
from the source, metabolizes and carries it forward, until, last 
and least, contact is made with the categories of everyday life. 
The power source of the will is still reflected in a tele-state like 
clairvoyance, but its proximity to the waking environment com-
pels it to use the categories of time, space, and causality, if only to 
suggest their trespass.
Schopenhauer says you can skip the metaphysical statements 
of the magnetized patients who have gone mediumistic. These 
are sorry views reflecting a mix of learned dogma and what was 
picked from the brain of the magnetiseur (322). In keeping with 
the Kantian doctrine of the ideality of space and time, if there 
were no Ding an sich and if causality and all the rest set absolute 
boundaries, then clairvoyance would be a miracle indeed (316). 
While we see temporal sequence and causality, we don’t see the 
original impetus behind this machinery (317). What the will of 
the practitioner working with animal magnetism reveals is the 
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immediate influence of the will itself. The Ding an sich steps into 
the light as the will (321). 
The magnetiseur lays his hands on the patient to direct his 
will, the effective force of his influence. The body is identical 
with the will; it is the image of the will in the brain (297). The 
rapport with the clairvoyant can go so far that he or she shares all 
thoughts and knowledge (foreign languages, for example), which 
otherwise the magnetiseur alone possesses. The positive beam of 
the will, the life force, passes from the magnetiseur’s brain to the 
brain of the clairvoyant (315). 
Is the long-distance vision or the inner survey of the inside of 
bodies objectively real and true? If yes, then the explanation can 
only be metaphysical. At the same time, the sleep-waking way 
of seeing is a physiological process like the functioning of the 
brain in the waking and sleeping modes (298). The brain works 
in reverse while asleep, which explains our disorientation upon 
waking suddenly right after falling asleep; we have to feel our way 
around a space we view as reversed. The dream is not only in the 
brain but also in the sense-nerves and develops out of their ongo-
ing excitation (but in reverse) (299). That’s why the contents 
of waking sleep don’t transfer to waking memory. Working in 
reverse, the vibration of the fibers cancels out what came before. 
While on average the dreamer upon awakening in the morn-
ing can remember more or less what he was just dreaming, the 
clairvoyant, who sleeps more deeply and whose awakening is a 
longer procedure, remembers nothing (303). Dreams that see 
the future occur in deep sleep and rarely are remembered (305). 
Prophetic dreams that are remembered eddy in the dream shal-
lows. Deep-sleep dreams can end up in another layer of dreaming 
closer to awakening. These dreams are, however, allegorical and 
require interpretation (ibid.).
What about seeing ghosts, the mediumship announced in 
Schopenhauer’s title? Earlier doctrines of demonology and 
necromancy were based on realism, which Descartes shattered. 
Idealism has brought us to a vantage point for the evaluation of 
paranormal experience, including visions and ghostly appari-
tions. On the empirical path, which for Schopenhauer is always 
a demarcation parallel to idealism, animal magnetism has illu-
minated magic and allowed haunting, too, to become the object 
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of scientific research (358). Schopenhauer wants to have the last 
word in the name of philosophy. The will as sole all-powerful 
reality lets us think magic and by transferring objective reality 
to ideality places even visions and apparitions on the track of 
understanding (359). 
The will lasts as long as the mortal life of the intellect. How, 
then, would the deceased keep informed about the living? How 
could the will of the deceased be imagined continuing to exert 
or respond to influence? The persistent orientation of the will 
of the deceased toward earthly matters would, in the absence of 
any physical means, make recourse to the metaphysics of magic 
(366). To the extent that animal magnetism demonstrates it, this 
magical influence is weak and questionable. It rests on the claims 
of clairvoyants that they can, by sheer will, move a magnetic 
arrow or needle. But the explanations for the apparitions lead 
to another provoking prospect. If the difference between those 
recently living and those now living is not absolute, then the liv-
ing can reach back and pull up reminiscences, which can be taken 
as true communications from the deceased (368). 
That there are indexical requisites for seeing a ghost (whether 
a vestige of the deceased’s clothing or his house, his haunt) reflects 
the point of view of spiritualism, not that of idealism, which is 
where Schopenhauer prefers to be heading. It is the basic flaw 
in every theory of haunting to date. Rather than let the divide 
between material and spiritual lives decide the issue, we should 
consider instead the expectancy of a spirit that cannot manifest 
materially. There are reversals and interruptions – scratches on 
the record of materiality, which cannot reach beyond memory 
or the recent past to communicate the separate existence of the 
ghost. Even if we recognize an inner being of man untouched by 
death and existing outside time and space, then any influence by 
this being after death on the still living could be arranged only 
via many, many mediations, all on the live side. It would be next 
to impossible to determine how much of the influence really 
originated in the court of the deceased or, in other words, that 
the deceased or ghost exists (341–42, 367–68). But what’s next to 
impossible Schopenhauer leaves open. He identifies animal mag-
netism as the most momentous discovery of his day. It amounts 
to a practical metaphysics, he writes, an experimental metaphys-
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ics: “For it sets aside the first and most general laws of nature; 
therefore, it makes possible even that which was considered a 
priori impossible” (321). 
As long as the person is still alive, there is, for Schopenhauer, 
no difficulty in accepting the transfer of thoughts, as when some-
one dying appears before the nearest and dearest, often several at 
once, before departing (346). The will is effective in the live trans-
mission of apparitions of the still living. A Doppelgänger sent, 
often unwittingly, by absent but living persons as proxy to stand 
before another person is a transmission that does not require 
and presuppose an immediate real presence. Where there’s a will 
there’s a way to communicate immediately and at a distance with 
the will of another. You can think in my brain while yours sleeps 
deeply, Schopenhauer offers, because the Ding an sich is the same 
in all beings. 
Time to remember that in Freud’s extensive survey of the 
literature on the dream in The Interpretation of Dreams, 
Schopenhauer’s essay is the only philosophical precursor that 
enters Freud’s theorization. That while you are asleep I can 
dream in your brain means that the will can be replaced by the 
unconscious, in which the wish fantasies that the dream states 
reflect are on permanent record. 
With the deadline for his assisted death already upon him, 
Freud chose for his final rereading selection Honoré de Balzac’s 
The Wild Ass’s Skin (1831), in which the protagonist Raphael 
is the author of the treatise A Theory of the Will. The theory 
remains a closed book within the story that performs it. Like 
Freud in his borrowing from Schopenhauer, Raphael or Balzac 
reduces the will-powered waking dream states to the vicissitudes 
of wishing.
At the start of the novel, Raphael obtains a quick fix for his 
gambling losses through a magical animal skin that grants fulfill-
ment of every wish. By shrinking in the wish cycle, however, the 
skin comes to occupy the close quarters in which Raphael must 
defer the end, while the terms of fulfillment shrink the future 
at the vanishing point of the present. Toward the end, he mar-
ries his true love when it turns out that she loves him too; the 
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skin “could not fulfil a wish fulfilled already.”52 Although their 
union, since mutual, would thus skip wanting and wishing, 
desire cannot undo the punctuation of wishes that just the same 
wears out the time in the skin. A century before international 
psychoanalysis ditched wish for desire, this French novel showed 
desire infernally compelled to follow the syntax of wishing. 
With every wish the magical skin grants, it manifests the 
deadline in the span of Raphael’s quality time of fulfilment. 
As the deadline curls up closer upon the shrinking skin, he 
uses the fulfilled fantasy of free money to guard against further 
wishing. One manservant buffers Raphael’s relationship to the 
external environment outside the fortress home where nothing 
can be found wanting; the cart with horses is ready and waiting 
before there can be the wish to go out. As the servant explains to 
a petitioner seeking an audience: “I will put it to him like this, 
‘Ought he to come up?’ And he will say Yes or No. I never say, 
‘Do you wish?’ or ‘Will you?’ or ‘Do you want?’ Those words 
are scratched out of the dictionary. He let out at me once with a 
‘Do you want to kill me?’ he was so very angry.”53 The command 
must come before the wish, and Raphael’s safety can only be 
secured through the stricken word and world. 
52 Honoré de Balzac, The Wild Ass’s Skin, trans. Herbert J. Hunt 
(London: Penguin Books, 1977), 106. Since the skin of wishing is a 
variation on the infernal compact I treated it, albeit to other ends, in 








In Civilization and its Discontents, Freud sees beauty as a whole 
thing, a full body shot, which belies and relies on the excitement 
of looking at the genitalia, which are never judged “beautiful.” 
With that swipe cut, Freud covers the key German words in aes-
thetic theory, Schönheit (beauty) and Reiz (stimulus and appeal).1 
The Creative Unconscious by Hanns Sachs fixes the focus on 
beauty, switching from Freud’s poetics of daydreaming to its 
aesthetic theory. Sexual fantasying fleshes and flushes out what’s 
crossing the mind with the body. It’s as easily done as imagined. 
Sexual repression isn’t about the bodily release but its quality. 
Aesthetics is the pre-psychoanalytic theory of this quality of life.
To situate the import of beauty, Sachs elaborates a relation-
ship to the body down the ages and stages. He postulates a 
disconnection from classical antiquity as the special form of our 
connection to technology. First rehearsed in his 1932 essay “Delay 
of the Machine Age,” later turned into a chapter of The Creative 
Unconscious, this genealogical inquiry belongs, Sachs under-
scores, to the psychoanalytic canon of exploration of narcissistic 
neurosis or psychosis that commenced with Freud’s 1911 reading 
1 Sigmund Freud, “Civilization and Its Discontents,” in The Standard 
Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, 
Vol. XXI (1927–1931): The Future of an Illusion, Civilization and Its 
Discontents, and Other Works (London: The Hogarth Press, 1961), 
82–83.
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of Daniel Paul Schreber’s memoirs, and was continued by Viktor 
Tausk in his 1919 analysis of the schizophrenic delusion of the 
influencing machine. 
While animism was a projection that still allowed a body 
wrap, the projection that goes into technologization fits and 
foots another bill of narcissism. 
The projection to which the ancients adhered represents 
exactly the same mechanism as that which leads the schizo-
phrenic to the creation of the “influencing-machine” – a 
casting out of his own ego into the external world in order to 
settle an inner conflict. But the result is antithetical, for the 
schizophrenic hallucination and the inhibition of the ancients 
stand in opposition to one another as positive and negative 
poles. Animistic man vitalized the inanimate world with such 
narcissism as he could find no other use for, the schizophrenic 
transforms his own body into something alien and inanimate 
(first, through “feelings of alienation,” in a further stage of 
regression into the “influencing-machine”).2 
In the opening season of construction and exploration of the 
psyche-soma, self-love cathects the world always in relation 
to the body, one’s own or your mother’s. With the onset of 
Oedipalization (the entry of the third person), self-love can no 
longer sustain itself as embodied, but preserves its gist just the 
same by the highest standards of our self-criticism. Our crashing 
shortfall before the criteria of perfectibility outlines in reverse the 
lost realm of primary narcissism. In these environs, what must 
be considered secondary narcissism nevertheless develops a will 
to power – to staying power – out of the struggle for mastery 
between the ego and the superego. 
A case in point for Sachs’s interpretation of beauty between 
antiquity and techno-modernity is a story by Catulle Mendés in 
which countless men from all walks of life are suddenly united 
by their interest in the peep show machines newly installed in 
2 Hanns Sachs, The Creative Unconscious: Studies in the Psychoanalysis 
of Art (Cambridge: Sci-Art Publishers, 1942), 127. Subsequent page 
references are given in the text.
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the streets of Paris. But more to the point, what they also have 
in common is their strict avoidance of one particular machine, 
which offers views of the Venus of Medici. It seems that beauty 
must be “kept in quarantine like an infectious disease” (172). It 
appears that what people want is interest and action. And yet 
everywhere, Sachs continues, “we see people […] snatching bits 
of beauty: […] Radios, movies, glamour girls, magazine covers, 
funnies, thrilling love stories – they all show a trivial, attenuated 
form of beauty, mixed with a great many other things (princi-
pally interest and action), but some grain of beauty is never miss-
ing” (175).
Pure beauty, Sachs argues, is the essence of that crowd or 
crowded feeling that the “vilest thriller” (167) brings about for 
the moviegoers packed inside the theater. But pure beauty instills 
the feeling without any extras. “It gives a feeling of expansion – 
not, however, toward other people, but toward a miraculous iso-
lation” (168). “Beauty, in the proper dosis and properly blended, 
arouses energy” (176), while pure beauty, in superseding all other 
interests, isolates and makes sad. 
Sachs sees in beauty the height of reconciliation on a scale of 
sublimation. The supplemental severity of the superego, which, 
provoking anxiety and guilt, trails the sublimation of sex and 
violence, does not enter into “the conditions for the creation 
of the feeling of beauty” (237). “The benevolent activity of the 
Superego slightly infuses into the play of Ego and Id-tendencies 
something of the character of the death instinct” (238). The art-
ist’s quest for pure beauty cannot but lead to immobility and 
quiescence. But when interest and action overtake the bequest of 
beauty, it is apportioned off, diluted, and calibrated as stabilizer 
(238). “The presence of death makes itself felt in the sadness of 
beauty” (240). It becomes apparent – heir apparent – that Sachs 
was extending and updating Freud’s 1913 essay “The Theme of 
the Three Caskets.” Not only for the aged King Lear is beauty 
choice because it is infused by necessity, a.k.a. death.
The immunizing significance of the sadness mixed into the 
appreciation of beauty marks our separation from the era that 
saw the sculpting of the Apollo of Belvedere or the Venus of 
Milo. That in antiquity alone the psyche could sustain body-
based or primary narcissism beyond early childhood develop-
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ment and without regressive backfire or psychotic break is Sachs’s 
first response, in 1932, to a question corollary to the understand-
ing of beauty in terms of dosage, namely: Why did the ancient 
Greeks and Romans stop short of applying existing knowledge 
and resources to the development of machines that replace rather 
than merely enhance human agency? Instead, as he describes this 
self-limitation or postponement of technologization, the know-
how that was already available in classical antiquity was applied 
to the fabrication of mechanical playthings for amusement only. 
Sachs dismisses the view that slavery was essential to the abil-
ity of the ancients to defer making machinery that replaces the 
body. It certainly wasn’t a constant. Following the Pax Romana, 
the ongoing war-loot supply of body doubles came to an end 
and led to the integration of the remaining slaves in the working 
population. The first ticket to their socialization was admission 
into the burial societies, where members paid down for their 
own proper interment in the final installment. Although Sachs 
focuses on the relationship to techologization in this genealogi-
cal sequel to the Schreber case, the archaeological underworld 
underpinning Schreber’s new world order is represented by regu-
lar attention to the evidence found on tombstones. Sachs cites 
Pliny’s words as intimating what the ancients allowed to stand 
on gravestones, but which they otherwise sought to push back 
down their own uncanny valley: “We walk with another’s feet; 
we see with another’s eyes, we greet by another’s memory; we live 
by another’s work. […] Only pleasure do we keep for ourselves” 
(127).
In Blade Runner 2049 (2018) body-double slavery has been 
reinstated with a new and improved series of obedient replicants. 
But revolution is on the rise. Deckard’s union with Rachel (just 
beyond the conclusion of Ridley Scott’s Blade Runner) intro-
duced the epistemic break of the prospect of android reproduc-
tion: “If a baby can come from us we can’t be slaves!” From the 
other extreme of the spectrum of fantasying, then, slavery begins 
to founder as the delay of the machine age, which, projected into 
the future, is also the history of that delay. The film’s datemark 
is the digital special effect, which in the fiction (of the digital 
film) is linked and limited to holographic entertainment and art. 
The woman believed born of the union of man and machine is 
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considered the “artist” among the technicians fabricating false 
memories for the new generations of replicants. When we watch 
her at work making memories, she selects from a holographic 
display of options, linking and interweaving them. The false 
memories are her fantasies, which she, however, spins around 
the foreign bodies of her own real memories. The fantasying 
in the close quarters of doubling and nothing, which prolongs 
primary narcissism, comes to a full stop with her memories. The 
illegal operation goes into her art of memory and, like the belief 
in reproduction she vouchsafes, widens the liminality of the 
replicant-slave until gap becomes overlap. 
When it becomes clear to one of the rebel androids that the 
hunter Joe had thought he alone was the one born of woman, 
she declares that each of the androids thought and wished that 
they were the one. What the androids-are-us long for isn’t repro-
duction. It’s the primal scene, the place, play, fantasying of the 
leading questions. Replication is one answer given twice over. At 
Wallace Headquarters, Deckard is presented with the double of 
Rachel reprising the moment he met her. (When he turns her 
down, she’s eliminated.) Moments later the holographic advert 
of a giant woman pitches her line to hunter Joe. She’s clearly of 
the same lineage – she’s the same – as the holograph girlfriend 
he just lost. When his home companion asked to go with him, 
she also insisted that for his protection he erase her program 
or memory on the built-in console and carry with them only a 
portable gadget with a singular copy of the file. But what if it’s 
destroyed? “Then I’ll die like a real girl.” 
In The Creative Unconscious, Sachs explores the management 
of anxiety corollary to the calibration of beauty in the unique 
hybrid of animism’s return in films involving “Mickey and all his 
tribe” (184): “Animism is not possible without projected vitality 
which depends on free-floating libido, which cannot be thought 
of without aggression, which is bound to produce anxiety” (180). 
The techniques of these cartoons cannot eliminate the anxiety 
situations but succeed in counterbalancing their effect. There is 
a saving unreality to the cartoons that relies not only on their 
drawing-board nature, but even more so on “their unrestricted 
power of motion and action” (182). 
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There is in the mix of Disney’s animation cinema always also 
some “quantity of beauty, however diluted or adulterated it may 
be” (185). While the “color-scheme […] is worked out with no 
other view than to its beauty,” the accompanying music conveys 
beauty full on (185–86). We are in the environs of the physical 
symptoms of daydreaming at the cusp of its evolution into 
the social relation of art. Wish fantasying can be an embodied 
thought process: “The reactions of the body (expression of the 
face, blushing, sound, gesticulation) can be observed by others, 
which gives them a direct social importance lacking to the mere 
mental processes” (212). 
The label applied to this basic performance of wishing is play-
ing. It means that what you see and hear “can never be mistaken 
for the real thing, neither by the performer nor by the audience” 
(214). The excuse that is as valid as what’s only a dream is that 
all’s fair that’s done in play. We need the warning with playing, 
since, not only a mental process, it triggers actions of the body 
that threaten trespass upon reality’s turf. 
“How easy it is to overstep the ‘anxiety-line’ is shown by the 
episode of the witch–stepmother in ‘Snow White’” (183–84). 
Although he doesn’t name the technique, all the examples Sachs 
gives of an excess of beauty creating anxiety and horror refer to 
rotoscope’s incorporation of the film record of good-looking 
human actors inside animation art. Disney’s animation of nature, 
already styling with animism between late romanticism and the 
comics, was available for filming the fairytale. But the human 
protagonists for good or evil – the queen, the princess, and the 
prince – struck a different balance in regard to the evolutionary 
trait of neoteny, the retention of baby-face features, which we 
find reflected back in our favorite mammals. 
In Snow White and the Seven Dwarfs, animation’s fountain 
of youth neotenizes young adults not as babies, but as teen babes. 
Their roto-interment, which borders on the uncanny, also fits the 
appeal of the animated critters. The resulting cuteness, in which 
sex appeal is curbed but available, lays on a layer of latency upon 
sexualization; when a body built to walk the average Athens road 
crosses the screen of animation, we watch the rotoscoping of 
adolescence inside childhood. Where rotoscoping first injected 
adolescent energy inside the animation figures of childhood and 
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extended the range of juvenility into a libidinal danger zone, 
CGI has set up shop in fantasy film production to illumine and 
recast live actors by the color contours of the rainbow palette of 
childhood artifice. The CGI bath from which live actors emerge 
all aglow in movies like Beowulf (2007) was first mixed in the 
rotoscope crucible. 
In your basic fairytale, the protagonists are children who sud-
denly fill the young adult roles of hero or princess bride, skipping 
altogether the volatile transitions of adolescence. In the Disney 
version, however, when Snow White is awakened by Prince 
Charming, the princess goes out on a date. The innocence of a 
child reinforced by the chorus of animation critters remains intact 
at this border occupied by a daydreaming teenager. Cuteness 
alone, however, challenges the teen (and then, often enough, 
the midlifer) to stay within the lines of curbed sex appeal. In the 
bedrooms of adolescents, the trophies and stuffed animals of 
childhood are piled high against the posters of rockstars.
We’ve since made digital Facebook out of the trail mix that 
Disney first served in Snow White and the Seven Dwarfs. The 
border against trespass by dating and porn sites protects a curb 
appeal that rotoscoping introduced. Heroic causes push back the 
psycho-path that has opened wide like a mean streak throughout 
social media. I remember how surprised I was to find planning 
ahead included as a type of daydream in questionnaires first used 
in the 1960s to expand the database.3 Several decades later, in 
range of the digital relation, the understanding of daydreaming 
in terms of a norm of task solving and preparation was over-
turned: “Why these presumably healthy kinds of daydreams 
do not correlate inversely with pathology, and, if indicative of 
anything, probably signal pathology, is unclear.”4 
3 In his Daydreaming and Fantasy (London: George Allen & Unwin, 
1976), 52ff, Jerome L. Singer summarizes the history of his research 
using questionnaires designed to approximate interviews listing 
daydreams the test subject would pick and choose from as his or her 
own. 
4 This line from a 1995 article by D.F. Greenwald and D.W. Harder is 
cited in Meta Regis, Daydreams and the Function of Fantasy (New 
York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013), 24. 
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On Facebook, the adolescent energy that doesn’t go into the 
posting of political idealism finds a rest inside fairytale childhood, 
a clearing in the thicket of utopian animal posts. Where the hero 
is, the princess will be too. Following its premature articulation 
as an antisocial prank that was sexual, sexist, and childish (no 
girls allowed), Facebook adopted a rating system of liking that 
was still elementary school but pacified by full adaptation to the 
realities of co-education. In third grade, everyone is unique and, 
with some statistical justification, perhaps even a rising star. This 
democracy of celebrity is basic to social media at large, from the 
startup capital of likability (Facebook) to the Twitter of the gods 
(Trump). 
The attempt to roto-fit beauty into the action and interest 
basic to Disney animation can be “inexpressibly terrible,” like 
“the Venus of Milo running away from a sharp-edged wheel!” 
(186). Although the technique was directly applied only in the 
first feature, rotoscope continued to be used by the Disney ani-
mation artists in their prep work. “Remember what an absolute 
washout the Blue Fairy was in ‘Pinocchio’” (186). Sachs declares 
that it is “the consequence of a law, which is inherent in the 
‘animistic world’ of universal and unrestricted motion, that 
every attempt to have its ‘characters’ approach beauty has a most 
unfortunate effect. It is bound to degenerate into an extremely 
vulgar sort of prettiness which is way below the aesthetic level 
of the rest” (186). When he allows that “Snow White herself was 
saved or half saved by a slight injection of irony which turned” 
her into “a goody-goody high-school girl” (ibid.) Sachs makes 
room for the cute between the horror of a transgression and a 
utopian prospect: “The millennium still may be coming when 
not only the lamb lies with the lion, but Mickey walks arm in 
arm with the Apollo of Belvedere” (187). 
In P.K. Dick’s A Scanner Darkly (1977), the communion 
that the drug called Death facilitates is with the blank stare of 
surveillance. In the first film adaptation of H.G. Wells’s ultimate 
surveillance science-fantasy, James Whale’s The Invisible Man 
(1933), what the protagonist didn’t know about his vanishing act 
had already been published in a recent German study: the invis-
ibility formula bears the side effect of psychoticization. When 
psychosis begins to manifest in the doubled protagonist of A 
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Scanner Darkly, the book enters chapter 11 in which we find 
deposited untranslated quotations from the premier German 
text on the superman, Goethe’s Faust. 
The 2006 film adaptation, Richard Linklater’s A Scanner 
Darkly, wraps the visual record of live action in a train of scram-
ble suits that billows out and metamorphoses like Maleficent’s 
cloak. Whereas in Snow White and the Seven Dwarfs unknown 
actors entered the animation process, every actor scrambled via 
rotoshop, Linklater’s patented update, is reduced to the star’s 
immediate recognition value. Rotoshop applies the libidinal 
plug and outlet between the absence of the bodies of the stars 
and their digital availability. What began technically, then figura-
tively, as a process of drawing adolescence in childhood became 
by the 1950s under TV guidance more abstract or comics-like, 
until the curb appeal returned in movies like Aladdin (1992), 
ready and lubed. When Bruce Wayne put on the Batman suit 
it was an uncanny ritual that each time reanimated a dead body. 
Getting into the surrogate body is another instance of how the 
digital relation uncanny-proofs the wish. 
Mike Kelley’s ironically practical proposal in 1999 for the solu-
tion of America’s biggest problem was that the images in our faces 
of Hollywood stars become consumable, whether in person, in 
the divisions of their doubling, or through new improvements in 
the mass-media sensorium already potentiated through surveil-
lance.5 Linklater brought the delegation of rotoscope closer to 
Kelley’s manifesto-fiction of what is already digitally manifest, 
our asocial wish fulfillment upon the stars. Indeed, Kelley’s first 
inspiration that same year for reconstructing Superman’s com-
memoration of Kandor, the capital of Krypton, was the isolation 
of the Web consumer, which he hoped to explore in a museum 
exhibition that would at the same time call on the participation 
of the connected fan community. But he abandoned a project 
about digital disembodiment that belied the status of libido in 
the Teen Age, which his work had already carefully rotoscoped 
out and illuminated. In the work that followed, Kelley sum-
moned Kandor in the miniature or souvenir format befitting 
5 “The Greatest Tragedy of President Clinton’s Administration,” Kelley’s 
1999 exhibition at Patrick Painter’s in Los Angeles.
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Superman’s melancholic retention span. For one installation 
Kelley provided the inside video view of its libidinal access in a 
series of adolescent S/M sessions. The scene that didn’t make it 
into Snow White and the Seven Dwarfs, but which was already 
on the drawing boards, centered on the bound rotoscoped body 
of the prince down in the dungeon at the witch’s disposal. 
Mutual Daydreaming
At the start of The Creative Unconscious, Sachs carefully analyzes 
daydreaming as the evolutionary impetus and lynchpin of the 
high cultural edifice. The focus on wish fulfillment – erotic, 
appetitive, but also aggressive and deathwishing – renders the 
simple daydream not only inartistic but even antisocial. Just the 
same, Sachs found in daydream fantasy, which he distinguishes 
from the creative unconscious at work in night dreams, the ori-
gin of a developmental and evolutionary process that yields what 
he identifies as the social relation of art. By making the coun-
terintuitive move of privileging waking fantasy, even though 
the night dream was the readily available analogue for aesthetic 
experience, Sachs follows Freud, as does Tolkien. Freud’s close 
colleague, however, picks up on a startling implication of the 
psychoanalytic poetics of daydreaming. Freud had shown that 
the dream was a perfect composition and, even when tattered at 
the edges by forgetting and repression, its interpretation was the 
royal road to the unconscious. If dreaming and waking reality 
divide up the spoils of psychic life, then the night dream would 
be enough and art not necessary. But there is art because we are 
always going off alone with fantasying, prematurely flashing on 
a figment without realization or endurance. There is art, then, to 
vouchsafe the evolution of the social relation, which is art, out of 
the tight spot of wishing. 
Freud looked at B-literature, because the continuity with 
daydreaming was plain text. As Sachs notes: “The more obvious 
the tendency to serve as ‘entertainment’ – i.e., momentary wish-
fulfillment – becomes the greater the resemblance to a typical 
daydream” (20). Deploying the daydream as cursor, Sachs goes 
beyond this equation to examine the sliding scale of the high and 
the low in cultural production. The low point, which Sachs clas-
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sifies as “art” by dint of its “social function,” but then also modi-
fies as “borderline,” is reached with “the photographs made at 
fairs and amusement parks, where every one can have his likeness 
taken as a mountaineer, cowboy, or sailor by placing his head in 
position over a dummy provided for the purpose” (20–21). 
Surprising but true that fantasying packaged as happy-meal 
“entertainment” using the “’dummy technique” (21) doesn’t 
hold our attention for long. “[T]he ‘happy end’ stories and plays 
[…] lose their grip on the audience as soon as they are over. […] A 
new supply of them is constantly needed” (23). The gulf between 
the tristesse on the center stage of high culture and daydream-
ing syndicated in low-budget entertainment finds, according to 
Sachs, a liminal point of crossover in the exceptional, yet typical 
class of daydreams dedicated to self-pity. In order to fulfill the 
wish fantasy of self-pity, these daydreams are willing and able 
“to conjure up all sorts of misfortune: poverty, humiliation, 
illness, and even death. Other daydreams look as if self-torture 
were sufficiently attractive to become its own end. To call them 
‘masochistic’ helps only as far as our understanding of masoch-
ism extends” (22). There seems no inhibition to recounting these 
daydream scenarios. The only limitation is that no audience is 
home to them. 
While fantasying disbands articulate language, which is 
reduced, Sachs suggests, almost to the status of the intertitles in 
a silent motion picture, it does not make do without the signifi-
cance of what remains: “Quite the contrary, it is a well-known 
experience that certain words and phrases are endlessly repeated 
and cherished, because they, and no other words in their place, 
carry with them certain emotions” (17). In this eddy of a low 
niveau of form and medium comparable to advertising and 
jingles, we come back to the daydreams of self-pity: “The sweet 
tears of self-pity seem to be especially closely bound to certain 
‘magic’ words for an individual” (ibid.). 
As much as the painful input of the unconscious, which allows 
the daydreamer to recount self-torment, an audience’s share is 
required of every expression of daydream fantasy that gets across 
and makes a memorable impression. So, Sachs enters upon an 
intermediate form of daydreaming, the mutual daydream, which 
takes two to communicate the fantasy and step outside the basic 
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law of the daydream: “Every man wants to keep his daydream 
secret, even the perfectly harmless ones, and considers his friends 
as outsiders when they approach this most sacred precinct of his 
private life” (24). The mutual daydream breaches the privacy 
and privation of wish fantasying by admitting a sense of audi-
ence à deux. It is intermediate, says Sachs, in the sense that it “has 
ceased to be entirely antisocial, without becoming art” (23). And 
it is mutual only to the extent that its conception or dictation is 
transmitted; one party introduces it, while the other party acts 
it out. 
Poets pitch to “all their friends, their entire tribe or nation, 
or even an infinite number now or in the future,” as Sachs spells 
it out, “active collaboration like that of the partner in a mutual 
daydream” (37). 
In the beginning, this participating audience and its response 
are actually present; improvisation by one or several self-
appointed “bards,” as exponents of the emotion felt by all 
members of the group, is the primitive stage of poetry. When 
it began to outgrow the exclamatory phase, the poet no longer 
received his inspiration by being in the crowd, but by with-
drawing from it. All the same, his audience continued to exist 
for him as a psychic reality which kept him from complete 
isolation. (38)
To win the participation (or the readiness for identification) 
of his audience, the poet surrenders his private narcissism. The 
standard or ideal of beauty that sets the artist apart – Sachs 
underscores that “form and beauty” “are utterly absent from the 
daydream” (44) – also alters the artist’s primary narcissism into a 
new longing for perfectibility, which can never be satisfied. 
We see here another force at work, one which plays between 
the poet and his work and is independent of the effect on the 
audience, even on an ideal audience. The entirely narcissistic 
character of this force leads to its recognition as the sacrificed 
narcissism of the daydreamer, reborn as the poet’s desire for 
the beauty of his work. (49)
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The mutual daydream is a mutation in the relational aesthetics 
of daydream’s evolution into the social relation, which is art. 
Sachs would have had to postulate and reconstruct it as missing 
link, if he had not perchance already had a case study ready and 
waiting. Sachs gives the example of a daydream shared by two 
five-year-old boys who were running away from home, a typical 
enactment of a fantasy that takes two. It began with one boy’s 
proposal that they go to India together. Soon it was all they 
talked about. Sometimes they walked for hours through the 
streets searching for the way there. Then the instigator came up 
with the conclusive variation. The right way to their goal could 
be found at the bottom of the local pond. To arrive in India, you 
need only jump in and enter a submerged machine, endure being 
cut up into bits, which was, however, pleasurable not painful, 
and exit whole at the other end of the mechanical procedure. 
After the other boy failed utterly to make the transfer or trans-
formation facedown in the pond, both went home in the deep 
end of depression. 
While it lasts, the mutual daydream is guilt-free, in contrast to 
every isolated daydream, once it is revealed. “The unconscious, 
as we know, is asocial. But out of the need of reacting to it, of 
handling it, of giving it a legitimate outlet, we see emerge here 
the formation of the smallest social unit,” which Sachs calls a 
“community of two” (36): “‘Your wishes are my wishes your 
guilt is my guilt’ – as long as it lasts the two are sworn friends and 
brothers” (37). 
In the course of his work with the little boy who hit bottom, 
his adult analysand, Sachs, was able to decode the remembered 
episode as follows: “The flight to India and the attempted 
suicide represent the unification of two opposing unconscious 
tendencies, namely the hate: ‘I will leave my mother, kill myself 
to punish her’ and the love: ‘I am afraid of nothing that brings 
me back to a mother who loves me’” (34). When his mother 
died, the boy, by then an adolescent, showed and felt no sorrow 
at her funeral. But when a year later he attended the reading 
of the Gerhart Hauptmann play Hanneles Himmelfahrt (The 
Ascension of Hannele, 1893), he was moved to weep for an hour, 
releasing the withheld grief. In the play, a lonely and unloved girl 
tries to drown herself. Upon her rescue, she lies in bed dying and 
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feverishly dreams up fantasy versions of all that went wrong in 
her life. The complete situation of the affect was restored to him, 
which allowed him to catch up with two situations, which now 
coincided or collided, the child in crisis and the teen in mourn-
ing. 
What Sachs calls “toying with the unconscious” means the 
“enjoyment of condemned pleasures, and this cannot fail to stir 
up a feeling of guilt, especially if the Oedipus-complex was the 
cause of the transgression” (35). That there are ways to mitigate 
the guilt feelings is made clear by the teenager’s response to 
Hauptmann’s play. In session, the patient remembered a scene 
of reconciliation with his mother under the Christmas tree two 
years after his father’s passing. 
What prompted the boys to dream up together a run away 
from home “at any price” (28) was “loss of love, estrangement, 
neglect” (30). In the case of Sachs’s patient, “the daydream 
marked the time when the boy thought that a rival had deprived 
him of the exclusive possession of his mother’s love” (29). After 
his father’s death, a gentleman living in their building courted the 
merry widow. Although nothing came of it – perhaps the boy 
saw to that – he had felt abandoned, cast back into his state of 
jealousy when his younger brother was born. The “death wishes 
against him were so strong” that nothing could alleviate the guilt 
feelings that produced the neurosis lying on the couch (30). Here 
a detail he contributed to the mutual daydream, which the other 
boy largely directed, namely, that he would come out of the 
techno-initiation smooth as a doll without genitals, illuminates 
his guilty acquiescence in becoming, in his rival’s stead, the dead 
double. 
Sachs’s next example demonstrates fully “that such day-
dreams can be produced only when two individuals are for 
a time brought together by a strong, suppressed, preferably 
unconscious-wish which they have in common” (30).6 What’s 
more: “The wishes that furnished the driving force in building 
these daydreams are not harmless” (34). The fantasy of journey-
6 This is the interpreter’s preference that the underlying wish be 
unconscious. Importantly, it is not a requirement in these environs. 
Secrecy is the key term.
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ing to India was enacted in the mode of play and make-believe. 
In the second example, we have two teenage sisters, who once 
upon a time, during a short period that was the exception to the 
otherwise unmitigated remoteness between them, “felt drawn 
to each other and were on terms of warm intimacy” (30). When 
the period was over, they “relapsed into their former coolness” 
(ibid.). In the meantime, Sachs’s patient, the younger sister, in 
recalling the episode of five years ago, realizes that what hap-
pened was that both sisters had fallen in love with the same 
young man. They never acknowledged their tender or erotic 
interest in the youth, who was a regular in the winter sports set-
ting in which they too were engaged (31). And yet, when alone 
together, the sisters talked incessantly about the young man who 
clearly absorbed their interest. This was possible in the form of 
their daydreaming up scenarios together, based on his blocking 
the advance of three brothers, his close friends, who pressed to be 
introduced to the sisters. 
The two girls saw, of course, that jealousy was the real cause 
of his strange behavior. They laughed about it among them-
selves, but felt rather pleased. This started a whole chain 
of daydreams which the two girls devised; […]. The main 
content of these daydreams was always the same: the three 
brothers pursued them and used all sorts of stratagems to get 
acquainted with them, whereas their friend made all possible 
efforts to prevent it. In this story of pursuit and escape all 
adventures ended in the same way, namely with the victory of 
the three brothers over their friend. (32)
The rivalry they thus diverted did become a problem after all, 
when the friend showed a preference for the older sister. But 
then the First World War intervened and the girls resumed their 
“mutual remoteness” (31). When the younger sister recounts to 
Sachs in session that the friend was killed in combat, she asks her-
self how it was possible that she felt “but little moved by it,” given 
that not so long before he had absorbed her full attention (ibid.). 
She is answered, Sachs points out, by the mutual daydream that 
was “stimulated by an observation which they both had made” 
concerning the friend and his friends, the three brothers (ibid.).
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As long as one sister wasn’t singled out, the affect against the 
sibling could be diverted “to the unconscious impatience and 
anger against the man who kept her in an unavowed state of 
painful suspense” (33). The mutual daydream was a “fantasy of 
revenge by means of adequate retaliation; the friend was pun-
ished in the way he had offended. The sisters joined therefore in a 
fantasy which gratified the repressed desire they had in common, 
but which neither of them could have produced or enjoyed sepa-
rately” (ibid.). Collaboration making allies of rivals allowed “the 
conscious personality” to “accept what otherwise would have 
remained repressed and might have become a source of anxiety” 
(ibid.).
Arthur Schnitzler’s Traumnovelle (Dream Novella, a.k.a. 
Rhapsody, 1925–26) is a study in mutual daydreaming, which 
Stanley Kubrick’s Eyes Wide Shut (1999) underscores by capsiz-
ing the novella’s balancing act of mutuality. The secret society, 
which in The Devil Notebooks led me to identify Kubrick’s 
film swiftly and directly as infernal, begins by being proximate, 
certainly in Schnitzler’s original, to The Magic Flute, in which 
allegory, classical antiquity, and the trial of initiation introduce 
a system of continuing education that is truly cosmic. But all 
progress toward greater union and synthesis cannot shake the 
deadly beauty of the Queen of the Night or her nocturnal aria 
of revenge. 
Goethe wrote his own version of (or sequel to) the 
Mozart/Schikaneder story to turn her demonic appeal back 
around and address a threat to the issue of issue. While repro-
duction after the curtain falls in the original The Magic Flute 
will go on without saying, in your typical fairy tale it’s unhappy 
trails of curses and trials. In Goethe’s sequel or part II, the Queen 
of the Night returns to undo the happy outcome of living on, 
reproduction or substitution. She commands the Moors to steal 
her daughter’s newborn son and bring him to her, targeting the 
limited prospect of progeny balanced on the cusp of sterility, a 
fate other than death. Upon locking the boy in the golden cas-
ket, the bogeymen found that a counter-magical ban had made it 
grow too heavy to carry away. They sealed it and left it there. She 
orders them to protect this outcome. The long hoped-for son of 
the royal couple (her grandson) must remain locked up in the 
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manic defense Melanie Klein often discussed, that of suspended 
animation. What treasure can the Queen’s forces be preserving, 
if, as the chorus proclaims, the opening of the lid means the boy 
is dead?7 
It is the Queen of the Night’s envy, her Neid, which lies too 
heavy upon the wish. Her wish to get even doesn’t get past the 
manic defense of the stillborn. In fact, it sets it in motion. The 
casket must be still moving, the chorus must keep pacing back 
and forth, and Sarastro too goes on a pilgrimage to second the 
motion. 
As sequel to the Enlightenment happy end, Goethe introduces 
a preoccupation with fertility and projects a romantic–fantastic 
modification of The Magic Flute along lines realized in Richard 
Strauss’s Die Frau ohne Schatten (The Woman without a Shadow, 
1919). In Hugo von Hoffmannsthal’s libretto, the temptation to 
sell the shadow of reproduction – in other words, to control its 
influence – transfixes a woman in front of a magic mirror: “Oh 
world in world, oh dream in waking.”8 
The Euphorion “opera” in Faust II keeps the boy going 
through adolescence, whereupon he offs himself on a dare and 
Helena follows him into the underworld. Goethe’s sequel to 
The Magic Flute centers on the loss of a young child, the trauma 
shadowing the opening era of childhood’s emergence out of the 
schooling that literacy required. For the survivor of death-cult 
childhood, like Goethe, the death wish that one be the only child 
carved the nick in the trauma that in time summoned ghosts. 
Goethe recognized the ghosts of his dead siblings in the suicidal 
readership of The Sorrows of Young Werther.9
7 Johann Wolfgang von Goethe, “Der Zauberflöte zweiter Teil (Ein 
Fragment),” in Die Zauberflöte: Ein literarischer Opernbegleiter mit 
dem Libretto Emanuel Schikandeders, ed. Jan Assmann (Zürich: 
Manesse Verlag, 2012), 361. For the meeting of the curse of suspended 
animation with the magical counter or corollary of motion, see 326ff.
8 “O Welt in der Welt! O Traum im Wachen!” in the second half of 
Act 1 (following the Zwischenvorhang or drop scene). See Hugo von 
Hofmannsthal, “Die Frau ohne Schatten,” Projekt Gutenberg, https://
www.projekt-gutenberg.org/hofmanns/frauohne/text.html.
9 See my Aberrations of Mourning: Writing on German Crypts (Detroit: 
Wayne State University Press, 1988), 86.
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Progeny, which according to the Schikaneder and Mozart 
original would be the free gift of coupling, is precarious in 
Goethe’s remake, indeed something a Berliner might call “too 
utopian.” The uncomplicated foil to the royal coupling, the 
marriage of Papageno and Papagena, has been without offspring 
altogether. Sarastro, however, crosses their stricken path and 
brings forth winged progeny out of golden eggs. In Goethe’s 
version of a happy end, the casket becomes a transparent source 
of light. When the voices of his parents awaken him from the 
slumber of suspension, the boy metamorphoses into a Genius 
winged like the egg-children Sarastro conjured. The pagan figure 
reverses death-cult childhood by ascending heavenward toward 
an Enlightenment Olympus (or outer space). 
Michel Chion counts the many instances of “parroting” in 
Kubrick’s film, which amount in sum to an ongoing exchange 
of passwords,10 setting the paranoid stage for the operas that 
accompanied Schreber, too, into the system that stabilized his 
break. Mike is given one password for entering the secret soci-
ety in masked costume. But then there is the second password 
required for acceptance into the inner circle of the ritual orgy. To 
know and utter only one out of two passwords, like signing once 
and failing to countersign in institutional settings, dis-inscribes 
your candidacy for enrollment. In Mike’s case, it’s tantamount to 
inhibition, including attachment to the unique, the lost, which 
disqualifies one’s candidacy for the position of Devil’s client. 
The woman who gives herself to the insider orgy in exchange 
for Mike’s release introduces a notion of sacrifice that Ziegler 
discounts or denies: “That whole play-act ‘take me’ phony sacri-
fice that you’ve been jerking off with had nothing to do with her 
real death.”11 The woman died by accident, officially a victim of 
her excessive drug use. By Ziegler’s denial we fathom what Mike 
missed out on: black-mass psychopathy turning back the sense 
of victim into the truth of sacrifice. While some English words 
have been pushed further inside secularization than their former 
synonyms, leaving “victim” on the police report and keeping 
10 Michel Chion, Eyes Wide Shut, trans. Trista Selous, BFI (London: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2002), 71ff.
11 Cited in ibid., 73.
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“sacrifice” for sacred precincts, in German, the language in which 
the Devil prefers to communicate, there is only one word, Opfer, 
covering or conflating both registers. 
Schnitzler’s Traumnovelle keeps us inside Freud’s uncanny 
dialectic of Enlightenment. Indeed, Freud acknowledged 
Schnitzler’s right to be there as his double by dint of the endo-
psychic acumen evident in his literary work.12 Following upon his 
wife Albertine’s daydream of adultery on vacation in Denmark, 
which he matched with the thoughts that crossed his mind, 
Fridolin proceeds to his trial by orgy with the single password 
“Denmark,” which means that being without the second one is 
like not following “to be” with “or not to be.” 
Schnitzler’s tale advances a discontinuum of states of dream-
ing from the night dream to the daydreaming held in common 
and elaborated by Albertine and Fridolin. Albertine’s final recit 
of a dream upon which she awoke when her husband returned 
from the session of secrecy isn’t a match for any night dream, 
but is the final fantasy she has been spinning on her side of their 
exchange of passwords. She fantasies a scenario in which the 
two figments of their adultery in Denmark and the inhibited or 
excluded role of Fridolin as the primal scene’s voyeur are com-
bined.13 She is an active participant at the orgy while Fridolin’s 
exclusion takes the form of his ritual execution. Albertine takes 
on the fantasy role of Kundry and laughs at Fridolin’s crucifixion 
above a pool of blood. Lachen (laughter) and Lache, in the sense 
of Blutlache or “pool of blood,” overlap in Wagner’s relentless 
Parsifal libretto. But Albertine doesn’t allow the ascendancy of 
the Christian fantasy and isn’t expendable therefore – to put it 
mildly – like Kundry. She concludes by placing a warning label 
on “forever”; it is not advisable to question the future or into the 
future (“in die Zukunft fragen”). Instead she looks forward for 
the time being to a period of respite from the adulterous fantasy-
ing that has run its course in their mutual daydream.14 
12 Freud to Schnitzler, May 14, 1922.
13 Arthur Schnitzler, Traumnovelle (Scotts Valley: CreateSpace 
Independent Publishing Platform, 2018), 63–69. 
14 Ibid., 99.
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As many instances of parroting that can be counted by 
Chion in Eyes Wide Shut are the iterations this reader of his 
monograph could count of mild-mannered affirmations of life 
as it is, which then counts as the “conclusion” or “moral” of the 
story. Chion projects a boy child, like the son of Tamino and 
Tamina in Goethe’s sequel, to be reproduced by the gratefully 
reunited couple following the film’s ending (which coincided 
with Kubrick’s death): a kind of secular redemption set upon the 
Christmas season in 1999 New York City.15 Chion counts Mike’s 
failure to become a client of the Devil (as I would interpret it) a 
success for the couple, one that merits succession. 
Schnitzler secures the fable a notch tighter within the poetics 
of daydreaming. Albertine’s replacement of the “forever” in their 
overcoming of the recent past of adulterous wishing with the 
more modest guarantee of a near future for their union follows 
Fridolin’s realization that no dream is entirely dream, is entirely 
night dream, and that they had embarked upon fantasying 
held in common and contest.16 Like “the American Dream” or 
“California Dreamin’,” the (night) dream can be a metonymy for 
the wish fantasy up in lights, the daydream. 
Kubrick disbanded the close proximity to mutual daydream-
ing in Schnitzler’s novella in favor of a contest over which Alice is 
mistress, whipping Mike along his proper course with the phone 
connection or giving (through her reminiscences, fantasies, 
remembered dreams of wished-for adultery) content for him to 
flash on in the excluded position of primal-scene voyeur, which 
then propels him onto the obstacle course of his inhibitions. 
What his fantasying of Alice’s wish fantasy shows is that, like 
Schreber, he wonders what it feels like to be f—d. That Schreber 
turned down the Devil’s best offer of soul murder meant that he 
entered instead the interstellar system of transhuman rescue of 
the living and the dead, which can be identified as Enlightenment 
in provenance. Alice’s closing counsel that she and Mike “fuck” 
means, according to Chion’s leap of faith, that there will be more 
life reproduced in the off. Schreber’s breakdown follows the 
thought of giving in to temptation and delivering the father fig-
15 Chion, Eyes Wide Shut, 66–67, 88.
16 Schnitzler, Traumnovelle, 99.
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ure’s anal babies. It is possible to conclude, in contrast to Chion, 
that by keeping the husband odd man out Kubrick illuminated 
what was inadmissible in Schnitzler’s orgy of mutual daydream-
ing. 
Gender Fantasying 
In his never to be completed summary work Human Nature, 
D.W. Winnicott hitched the development of gender relations to 
the early transitional objective of respite, which allows the fanta-
sying of relations to unfold freely: “Incomplete or ill-timed satis-
faction results in incomplete relief, discomfort, and an absence of 
a much-needed resting period between waves of demand.”17 To 
get around the stamping out of a character type by the domina-
tion (without respite) of anal or urethral functions (41), “func-
tions with appropriate fantasy” must come instead to “dominate 
in a transitional way” (41). In all its stages, development should 
spread equally through all fantasy functions. But the so-called 
anal stage is too “variable” to be accorded a status equivalent to 
that of the oral and genital stages. The note drops for revision: 
“Make sure it is clear about normal homosexuality and oral 
erotism displaced to anus in homosexuality (manifest)” (48). 
While the “male in the female is always present and important,” 
the “female in the boy,” though fundamental, is “variable” (44). 
That something fundamental is “variable” means that it has a 
greater import in an aberrant setting.
Winnicott’s discussion of the role of fantasying in interlacing 
functions and stages of sexual development in Human Nature 
gestures like an afterword to his earlier reflections in the chapter 
of Playing and Reality on creativity, which he parsed among the 
male and female elements in boys and girls.18 The reflections close 
on a reading of Hamlet in terms of a lopsided gender trans that 
the hero bears as his cross, a diagnosis that is, in turn, the after-
17 D.W. Winnicott, Human Nature (London: Free Association Books, 
1988), 39. Subsequent page references are given in the text.
18 D.W. Winnicott, “Creativity and Its Origins,” in Playing and Reality 
(Hove and New York: Brunner-Routledge, 2002), 65–85. Subsequent 
page references are given in the text.
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word to the crypt study dominating the chapter, as singular an 
event in Winnicott’s corpus as the reading of literature. 
Winnicott sees Hamlet stalled, via dissociation, at “being,” 
the girl element in his makeup. A pause is called for after “To be 
or.” That Hamlet offers “not to be” amounts to untenable filler 
for the lack of the alternative he can’t fathom, which would be 
“to do.” He is “well away on a journey that can lead nowhere” 
(ibid.). Thus, he crosses over into the sado-masochistic alterna-
tive: “slings and arrows.” 
The girl and boy elements had “up to the time of the death 
of his father lived together in harmony, being but aspects of his 
richly endowed person” (84). Instead he now attacks Ophelia: 
“[H]is cruelty to her” is “a picture of his ruthless rejection of his 
own female element, now split off and handed over to her, with 
his unwelcome male element threatening to take over his whole 
personality” (84). At the same time, “the cruelty to Ophelia can 
be a measure of his reluctance to abandon his split-off female 
element” (ibid.).
The Hamletian reluctance speaks to the chapter’s case study 
that inspired Winnicott’s reading of “To be or not to be” in terms 
of the impasse between the “being” of the female element and 
the alternative, which Hamlet can’t locate. While interpreting 
his interminable analysand, Winnicott kept assuming that, obvi-
ously, the term “penis envy” was without sense when applied to 
a man. And yet he couldn’t get it out of his head that his male 
patient was talking about it. The other counter-assumption was 
that “this has nothing to do with homosexuality” (73).19 
Winnicott knows that his patient is a man, but he also knows 
that he is listening to a girl to whom he should say that she is talk-
ing about penis envy. And then he says that he is addressing a girl, 
although he knows that the patient is a man. The man accepts 
the interpretation intellectually: “If I were to tell someone about 
this girl I would be called mad.” Offering to be his mirror or con-
tainer, Winnicott averred that since he saw and addressed the girl 
it was he who was mad. This allowed the patient to feel sane, he 
gratefully avows, but “in a mad environment” (74). 
19 That a male girl carrier is not at all another homosexual is a paradoxical 
benefit that Freud first awarded the (male) fetishist. 
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What remains unspoken is that it was his mother who was 
mad to keep seeing a daughter in her baby boy. Winnicott said it 
and thereby spoke to both parts of the patient. He thus stumbles 
over the unknown factor that had kept his analysand intermina-
bly in analysis. The only end to the analysis that the internal girl 
can look forward to is the discovery that he is in fact a girl (75). 
While they had been doing good work in the analysis, none 
of Winnicott’s interpretations, although made on good grounds, 
were ever “mutative.” “They were accepted, but: so what?” (76). 
After Winnicott’s recognition of the girl inside him and his 
acceptance that this was the analyst’s or the mother’s madness 
that thus spoke, the patient felt a new relationship emerge in 
the sessions. “The pure female split-off element found a primary 
unity with me as analyst, and this gave the man a feeling of hav-
ing started to live” (77).
Winnicott next enters upon a speculative history tracking 
back across a genealogy of Greek myth to consider the shifting 
positions of homosexuality in heterosexuality. “In the evolution 
of Greek myth,” Winnicott speculates, “the first homosexuals 
were men who imitated women so as to get into as close as pos-
sible a relationship with the supreme goddess” (78). What he 
refers to here as the “matriarchal era” corresponds to the setting 
of mysteries of gender swap, like the ceremony of the venus bar-
bata, balancing the act between the sexes in matrimony.20 When a 
20 Venus was the goddess of love and beauty not of marriage, except 
when she wore a beard. The cult of Venus Barbata from late antiquity, 
in which male followers didn’t stop short of castrating themselves, 
holds up a relationship to marriage that is in the first place internal 
rather than to be realized. In his 1927 essay “Gottfried Keller,” Walter 
Benjamin identified the nineteenth-century Swiss author as a late incar-
nation of the venus barbata, part and portrait of his work’s affiliation 
with a strain of classical antiquity that stopped short of the Christian 
transubstantiation of Venus into the Virgin Mary. Benjamin argued 
that whereas the Renaissance only looks like the return of antiquity, 
but in effect reinterprets its own contemporary world, Keller’s work 
shows by its attentiveness to the time of everyday life not so much a 
nineteenth-century datemark as, quite exceptionally, a continuity with 
classical antiquity with which his work is shot through. The proviso 
that Benjamin must add, however, in the name of a formal law of such 
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patriarchal god system brought the matriarchal era to a full stop, 
it “initiated the idea of the boy loved sexually by man, and along 
with this went the relegation of women to a lower status” (79). 
The new truth and booty of the boy not only majorly discounts 
women, but even places heterosexuality under the incest taboo. 
Sexual difference becomes in individual psychic reality “dissocia-
tion […] of the […] male and female elements” (ibid.).
The synchronic axis to grind of this speculative history con-
cerns the “experience of being” that is based on “the absolute 
dependence on maternal provision of that special quality by 
which mother meets or fails to meet the earliest functioning of 
the female element” (84). In the netherworld of “identification 
based on introjection or on incorporation,” male and female 
elements are “already mixed” (82). The mixing covers a ranging 
from object relating in the sense of being the breast (or mother) 
to doing-relating, which presupposes the separateness of a not-
me object (80). While at one extreme frustration afflicts satisfac-
tion seeking, at the other end maiming besets the experience of 
being (81). “In the course of time, desirable means edible” (83). 
The infant is in danger of being exciting and exciting appetite – 
making “someone’s male element do something” (ibid.). 
At a time when the duo is not yet separated out in the infant’s 
mind, it’s up to the mother to have “a breast that is, so that the 
baby can also be” (82). Or else, if the mother cannot make this 
contribution, then “the baby has to develop without the capac-
ity to be, or with a crippled capacity to be” (ibid.). There can 
be a breast that does, which makes the baby do like or be done 
to rather than being like. The baby then must “make do with 
an identity with a breast that is active, which is a male element 
transfers of the experience of antiquity, is that the carrier of continuity 
must undergo a process of miniaturization and embalming, like dried 
fruit or shrunken heads. Benjamin selects for an example of this brand 
of Orphism in Keller’s works an empty doll’s head, in which a trapped 
fly continues to buzz. It is in the protocols of marriage counsel that we 
can observe the tradition of gender swap cross over into Christianity. 
The bearded lady martyr and Saint Wilgefortis was appealed to as 
intercessor in abusive marriages. Her martyrdom makes a scene in 
Ulrike Ottinger’s Freak Orlando (1981). 
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breast, but which is not satisfactory for the initial identity” (82). 
Envy, for example, applies only when there is a “tantalizing 
failure of the breast as something that is” (82). In penis envy, “a 
man’s penis may be an exciting female element generating male 
element activity in the girl” (83). 
Winnicott introduces a tendency to dissociate intrapsychic 
sexual difference as self-difference, a tendency that rebuilds parts 
of the personality upon its foundation (84). Hamlet is the poster 
boy of this tendency. Winnicott’s male patient, however, who 
carries a girl that he also is, hails from the netherworld of incor-
poration. Sexual identification and difference are out of joint in 
Freud’s most famous patient, but are together again among the 
melancholic effects of foreign bodies that Winnicott must sort 
through in session. What the two or three involved were able to 
reconstruct was that “his mother (who is not alive now) saw a 
girl baby when she saw him as a baby before she came round to 
thinking of him as a boy” (74). He was the second born. The first 
child was a boy. “We have very good evidence from inside the 
analysis that in her early management of him the mother held 
him and dealt with him in all sorts of physical ways as if she failed 
to see him as a male. On the basis of this pattern he later arranged 
his defences” (ibid.). When Winnicott’s patient was born, as it 
happened to Brian Aldiss, the mother looked for the girl she 
missed. 
In “The Meaning of ‘Penis Envy’ in Women,” Maria Torok, 
coinventor of the study of crypts, treads steps familiar from 
Winnicott’s study of the antisocial tendency. Envy, unlike desire, 
can never be satisfied; it is the effect of deprivation or renun-
ciation.21 The mother cannot be charged. She is protected by the 
daughter’s categorical love for her. “Coming face to face with 
shadowy areas where hate and aggression smolder against the 
mother” is a threat that her daughter must avoid at all costs (46). 
Torok sets the crypt condition: obtaining the idealized penis is 
as impossible as changing into another body (47). By her author-
21 Maria Torok, “The Meaning of ‘Penis Envy’ in Women,” in Nicholas 
Abraham and Maria Torok, The Shell and the Kernel, trans. Nicholas 
T. Rand (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1994), 45. 
Subsequent page references are given in the text.
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ity over the acts of sphincter control, which she commands at 
will, the mother has direct access to the bodily interior of her off-
spring. Wanting satisfaction for envy, as though it were a wish or 
desire, she flexes a prospective dimension through her offspring, 
which was thwarted in her own development (49). 
Orgasm, which is at stake, is the power to fill all the posi-
tions of the primal scene, which, when it throws you for a loop, 
validates the fantasy. In the shadow of the climax unscaled, penis 
envy protests against a netherworld of incorporation, of guilty 
masturbation, bad sex, and conventional fantasying. The daugh-
ter is condemned to replay the anal relationship to her mother 
with all her partners (70). Torok’s patient is another Venus of 
Milo hoping a sculptor will make arms for her. The inhibition 
of orgasm results in an incomplete body “that has as its corollary 
a world peopled with fragmentary realities” (50). The Queen of 
the Neid requires an empty girl, the narcissistic supply append-
age of a depositing mother. 
Following the breakthrough Friday session, Winnicott’s 
patient that evening had satisfactory sex with his wife. By the 
end of the weekend, however, he had come down with the flu, 
which he brings to the session for interpretation “as if it were 
psychosomatic.”22 “I was able to leave aside the physical disorder 
and talk about the incongruity of his feeling ill after the inter-
course that he felt ought to have been a healing experience” (75). 
Winnicott gives voice-over to his patient’s double occupancy. 
“The feeling ill is a protest from the female self, this girl, because 
she has always hoped that the analysis would in fact find out that 
this man, yourself, is and always has been a girl (and ‘being ill’ 
is a pregenital pregnancy)” (ibid.). She’s not even interested in 
the man. To be sure, however, she doesn’t want his “masculine 
behaviour” released (75). Her, not his, penis envy includes envy 
of him as a male. Thus, she reasserts her claim to holding the sole 
identity.
The girl, the mother’s delegate and deposit, exercises her 
influence over the host body or corpus. To grasp what she wants, 
namely full acknowledgment of herself and of her rights over 
22 Winnicott, “Creativity and Its Origins,” 74. Subsequent page refer-
ences are given in the text.
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the mutual body, Winnicott went off into the gaps or overlaps 
between matriarchal and patriarchal societies, between geneal-
ogy and developmental history. In this thicket, he considers the 
possibility of a perverse itinerary for his patient, one that smacks 
of ancient ritual, but which would keep the split-off girl animate. 
Lodged in the chapter on creativity, we find Winnicott’s passing 
illumination of the underworld of underage exploits. Doing it 
with minors becomes the prospect of initiating countless girl 
brides in their pleasure. The downside is less pleasure for the 
man and no object constancy. The enclosed other-gender self 
is forever younger than the host, either remaining of one age 
or growing but slowly: “For instance, a man who depends on 
younger girls for keeping his split-off girl-self alive” will, if he 
lives to ninety, find that the girls still “so employed” will have 
only reached thirty (78). Winnicott does not indicate the extent 
in fantasy or in fact to which his married patient was dedicated 
to this service, but it is clear that the alternate approach in the 
primal-time thicket, homosexuality, had to be ruled out because 
if he came thus she could only go (77).
Winnicott argued at the start of the chapter that, for many of 
his patients, creativity must be measured in reverse, illuminating 
by its withdrawal a recognition that “for most of their time they 
are living uncreatively, as if caught up in the creativity of someone 
else, or of a machine” (65). Winnicott’s “or” separates out in cases 
of encryptment as an alternating alternative that can alter the 
case for the carrier. H.G. Wells, whose mother early on addressed 
him in childhood and dressed him up as his dead sister, invented 
The Time Machine to enter a future so remote that he would 
no longer have to wear shades. When the time traveler returns 
without the girl, his sense of the loss is like sorrow in a dream.23 
Brian Aldiss’s greatest prize, his daughter Wendy remembered, 
was the pacemaker he received.24 It sealed his identification with 
23 I first entered upon the crypt study of H.G. Wells in the third volume 
of my Nazi Psychoanalysis, titled Psy-Fi (Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota Press, 2001), 171–78.
24 See Harrison Smith, “Brian Aldiss, Science-Fiction Writer behind 
Steven Spielberg’s ‘A.I.’ Dies at 92,” Washington Post, August 23, 2017, 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/obituaries/brian-aldiss-sci-
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the machine he wanted to be, like Andy Warhol, who carried 
the sister that his mother couldn’t mourn. Wasn’t it that much 
worse when, in the case of Aldiss, the dead sister could after all be 
replaced with another living daughter.
Although Freud showed us the way to the psychic reality of 
encryptment, in his showcase study of the Ratman, he neverthe-
less pulled away from the identified crypt of a dead sister and 
redressed instead the father’s ghost. By introducing the construc-
tion of mourning for the father, a process he could see the patient 
through, Freud sought to pry loose the unbeatable crypt without 
addressing it, and, by the metonymy of inoculation, let it go the 
way of finite grief. Facing a post-WWII patient population that, 
he claimed, was less neurotic and either more psychopathic or 
more schizoid, Winnicott advertised that his interventions were 
based no longer on transference but on regression. He addresses 
the girl and analyzes in the patient’s sexual adaptation to his car-
rier status the prospect of a good enough integration of the crypt. 
The Secret in Mutual Daydreaming
Like Nietzsche, Winnicott situates reproduction within the 
secret setting of fantasying, which child’s play explores. The 
reality of reproduction is staggered in the game “can you keep 
a secret?” which Winnicott claims in Human Nature “belongs 
typically to the female side of human nature”: “Unless a girl 
can keep a secret she cannot become pregnant.”25 In Sachs’s case 
example of the two boys, there is a secret in the mutual daydream 
that is not shared but carried forward – until one of the duo lies 
on the analyst’s couch. You run away from home with a mutual 
daydreamer in childhood. In adolescence, the secret held by one 
of the shareholders in the daydream makes itself felt. The secret is 
key to fantasying in concert, which is why Wilfred Bion’s notion 
of the maternal reverie, which tells us something about transfer-
ence, doesn’t grasp mutual daydreaming. 
ence-fiction-writer-behind-steven-spielbergs-ai-dies-at-92/2017/08/23/
da4bed60-8743-11e7-a94f-3139abce39f5_story.html.
25 Winnicot, Human Nature, 46.
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That the secret is sometimes a crypt also enters the relation-
ship to reproduction. The mother is the last to substitute a new 
child for the lost one. If reproduction does happen again, the 
grief-stuck mother is bound to be the last to recognize the infant 
as new and other. But when the secret in mutual daydreaming 
is a crypt, it is kept secret through diversions that near miss its 
unquiet place in the corpus. Mary Shelley’s Frankenstein wears 
a crypt story on its banner, tying the unacknowledgable loss of 
Victor’s mother to the body that he builds out of corpse parts 
at the alma mater. But it is a false bottom; beneath this fictional 
incorporation trailing the mother who died giving birth to her, 
lie encrypted Mary Shelley’s unmournably dead children. 26 
Oscar Wilde’s The Picture of Dorian Gray just as openly invites 
the reader to follow out the coordinates of an encryptment. 
After his enraged rejection of his no longer beloved Sybil Vane 
for her poor performance on stage, Dorian notes the impact in 
the portrait of what he doesn’t know yet, her consequent suicide. 
The change in the painted expression is not “fancy,” but is rather 
“horribly apparent”27 – the horrible souvenir of a parent. 
The wish-charged portrait will age unto ongoing resemblance 
with his hated dead grandfather, who kept Dorian for the term 
of his childhood in the attic. The grandfather filled the young 
orphan’s blank with his repressed mourning, pushing the boy 
up and away to keep the resemblance with the lost daughter out 
of his face. That Dorian as a young man banishes the animate 
portrait up there means the upward displacement of encrypt-
ment is a wrap. That there is a parent in Dorian’s face, which the 
supernatural portrait preserves while hiding the horror of decay, 
is true enough and a damn good diversion.  
The crypt in The Picture of Dorian Gray is kept like a secret in 
the mutual daydream that is this story’s agon.28 Up front, Wilde’s 
26 See the more complete reading of Shelley’s novel in my The Vampire 
Lectures (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1999).
27 Oscar Wilde, The Picture of Dorian Gray (London: Penguin Books, 
1984), 101. Subsequent page references are given in the text.
28 See my crypt study of Oscar Wilde in the chapter on Ottinger’s 
Dorian Gray im Spiegel der Boulevard Presse, in Ulrike Ottinger: The 
Autobiography of Art Cinema (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota 
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novel is all about a wish and its fulfillment. Let the portrait be 
Dorian’s mirror, while, like a vampire, he henceforth casts no 
reflection. But that secret is more easily done than said. There 
wouldn’t be a novel if Lord Henry and Dorian didn’t hold a 
daydream in common, which the former initiates and guides 
and the latter acts out at the turbulent address of influence and 
experiment. Lord Henry singles Dorian out for the experiment 
of an art of life by introducing him to and introducing into him 
his own verbal art of outsourcing, the other Gesamtkunstwerk. 
While listening to Lord Henry’s overskill at shredding the par-
ergon of signature and property, Dorian is “dimly conscious 
that entirely fresh influences were at work within him. Yet they 
seemed to him to have come really from himself. […] Music had 
stirred him like that. […] But music was not articulate. It was not 
a new world, but rather another chaos. […] Words […] seemed 
to be able to give a plastic form to formless things, and to have a 
music of their own” (24).
A term befitting the experimental setting and the adolescent 
condition that is open to it and shut to tradition, influence also 
reaches back to Wilde’s first career in fame, which was based on 
the airtime of conversation, personality, and a US tour of 140 
public lectures. Wilde was legend at turning around by his spo-
ken word dead air into animation or reanimation of the speaker, 
his audience, and another. Lord Henry, the souvenir of Wilde’s 
fame avant la lettre wields the art of conversation, drawing and 
doubling all those in earshot “out of themselves” (48). While the 
topic of his lectures on the US tour was the aestheticism champi-
oned by his mentors at Oxford, Wilde offered in the foreground 
of his presentations a course in interior decoration, which belied 
what it housed, a melancholic core or crypt. Wilde transferred 
the layout of his sister Isola’s encryptment to his one-time only 
novel.
The aestheticist decor of Wilde’s novel mixes the fantasy pal-
ette of synesthesia with the color in Dorian’s surname, American 
spelling. Fifty Shades of Grey, written in the vampiroid fan 
milieu of Twilight by an author from the UK, restores the British 




like Grau in German with grausam underwent a perceptual 
modification that fit dreary weather and signalled a loss of vital 
distinction, for example in Mephistopheles’ famous line: gray 
is all theory. Goethe’s Theory of Colors reintroduces theoretical 
gray as the color best suited as backdrop for optical experimen-
tation with afterimages. Intermediate between brightness and 
darkness, gray (including white cast in shade or shadow) enables 
a more perfect light/dark reversal between the circles placed on a 
monochromatic screen and their afterimages lingering on when 
the circles are removed. What is in the name Gray, then, is the 
screen color suited for experiments in ghostly settings. In both 
Vertigo and the novel Hitchcock adapted, Madeleine can return 
like an afterimage or ghost when the almost lookalike Judy/
Renée is wrapped back inside the same gray outfit. 
After Dorian confesses his love for Sibyl Vane, a figure from 
the Shakespeare underworld that “grey” London one night held 
“in store” for him (55), Lord Henry recognizes that his experi-
ment with the youth (64) was reaching the new completion of an 
art of life: “He had made him premature. That was something” 
(65). While art, literature especially, can reveal the mysteries of 
life “before the veil was drawn away,” “now and then a complex 
personality took the place and assumed the office of art; was 
indeed, in its way, a real work of art” (ibid.). 
Wilde injected into The Picture of Dorian Gray Joris-Karl 
Huysmans’s À rebours as infamous and unnamed how-to book. 
Dorian, again thrown for a loop, reads the story of his life written 
down before he has lived it; it has plagiarized him in advance. 
The conceit reintroduces the theme of improper burial in the 
manner by which the crypt was borne in the book’s prehistory, 
Wilde’s influence realized in advance of any corpus to carry it 
out and make it endure. Dorian’s reading assignment, given by 
Lord Henry to add the coloration of sin and decay to his work in 
progress, decorates interiors for one long chapter like a condensa-
tion in a can of Wilde’s US lectures. Following the installation of 
the decor, Dorian is buffeted by murderous reversals of his wish 
fantasy, but reversal preserves. Then the portrait’s secret wish 
fulfillment ends by the convention of dueling doubles, and the 
mutual daydream of an experimental art of life without a corpus 
is reduced to one identifiable corpse. That the once animate por-
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trait yet shows an image that cannot vary is a reversal on the cusp 
of the novel closing and becoming a corpus that can carry. 
When Isola died Wilde was thirteen and excelled at school 
in the classics, particularly in translating directly from dead-
language texts, an oral delivery remembered by his classmates 
already in the same animating terms with which witnesses at 
later stations of his studies and beyond conveyed Wilde’s verbal 
skills as conversationalist and improv orator. The conditions 
were falling into place for the life of an author with a day job as 
academic. He published a first book, the volume Poems, which 
he dedicated to Isola. But his attempt to secure a teaching posi-
tion was thwarted and he went from the second string of show 
business to the foreground of delivering fame outside a corpus. 
Married with children, Wilde tried as another kind of dedica-
tion to reproduce Isola’s lost place in his family package, but fell 
short when he set only two places. The girl was reassured that 
her seat was thus kept safe inside him. He wasn’t into it and she 
didn’t have to go out of herself – and vanish. The crisis from 
her vantage was the male girl carrier’s affair with Lord Douglas. 
At this time, Salomé marked a return of the corpus of transla-
tion through which Wilde again attempted to acknowledge Isola 
and let her go. That it was his second dedication to Isola can be 
observed in the photo op he performed in the drag of the dancer 
of seven veils.
Flight to Reality
In his 1935 essay “The Manic Defence,” Winnicott identifies in 
patients “jeering at religion” in session a reflex of “manic defence 
insofar as they fail to recognize sadness, guilt, and worthlessness 
and the value of reaching to this which belongs to personal inner 
or psychic reality.”29 However, the “average Christian” regulation 
of the Good Friday experience by going “over into a manic phase 
on Easter Sunday” models neither health nor treatment (135). 
It is still possible for the Nietzschean or Freudian to find the 
29 D.W. Winnicott, “The Manic Defence,” in Through Paediatrics to 
Psycho-analysis: Collected Papers (New York: Brunner-Routledge, 
1992), 135. Subsequent page references are given in the text.
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Friday Good indeed. “I think that I should once have described 
the Crucifixion and Resurrection as a symbolic castration with 
subsequent erection in spite of corporeal insult” (ibid.). 
Before we register the significance of Winnicott’s disappoint-
ment in this interpretation, we must underscore its truth. For, “it 
is characteristic of the manic defence that the individual is unable 
fully to believe in the liveliness that denies deadness, since he does 
not believe in his own capacity for object love; for making good 
is only real when the destruction is acknowledged” (131–32). But 
with the transference interpretation of the death of the good, 
Winnicott would have “left out the depressive-ascensive signifi-
cance of the myth” (135), in other words, its fantasy content. The 
manic defence employs “almost any opposites in the reassurance 
against death,” namely, “chaos, mystery, etc., ideas that belong to 
the fantasy content of the depressive position” (132).
The flight of fantasy from inner reality to the outer reality 
that it elaborates after its omnipotence, bears datemarks across its 
orbit awaiting historicization. Karl Abraham and Freud found 
the paradox of mania’s inversion or implosion of melancholia 
illuminated in analogy with the ritual celebration of carnival and 
its alternating observance of shrift.30 Carnival shares with fairy 
stories and epics of heroic quest the historical setting of transi-
tion from paganism to Christianization. Does fantasy attest to 
the predominance of the middle ages or does it restore it to this 
place? In T.H. White’s The Sword in the Stone, a 1938 Arthurian 
fantasy tale for children, Merlin’s magical faculty of memory, 
which proceeds in reversal of the time line of history (and of 
“progress”), requires or implements a continuous medieval-
ist tradition. Merlin: “[O]rdinary people are born forwards in 
Time, if you understand what I mean, and nearly everything in 
the world goes forward too. […] I unfortunately was born at the 
wrong end of time, and I have to live backwards from in front, 
30 I develop this insight into the quilting point of a reading of their 
studies of and their correspondence on melancholia, which attends to 
the anal crypt carried forward ultimately within the corpus of Antonin 
Artaud, in Aberrations of Mourning: Writing on German Crypts 
(Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1988), chapter 4.
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while surrounded by a lot of people living forwards from behind. 
Some people call it having second sight.”31 
Winnicott located daydream fantasy anew within the object-
relations topography of positions, penetrating more deeply, 
he suggests, than pre-Kleinian analysis was prepared to go 
(132, 132n1).32 What the depth charge entails is that transference 
interpretation must follow contemplation of the manic defense, 
which can be entered upon only in tandem with a growing 
appreciation of inner reality. “I have come to compare external 
reality not so much with fantasy as with an inner reality” (129). 
He has also come to fine-tune the notion of a flight to reality, 
which, he stipulates, is a flight from internal reality and not from 
fantasy (130). The reality on this itinerary, which he sees daubed 
with omnipotent fantasy, inflects and reflects “not so much the 
inner reality itself as a defence against the acceptance of it. One 
finds in this defence a flight to omnipotent fantasy, and flight 
from some fantasies to other fantasies, and in this sequence a 
flight to external reality. This is why I think one cannot compare 
and contrast fantasy and reality” (ibid.). 
Fantasy offers a mediating dyad of omnipotence and devalua-
tion that elaborates external reality in the afterimage of the inner 
reality from which it took flight. The manic defense against 
acknowledgment of the depressive position locks inside the 
manifest of its flight the content of inner reality. 
Fantasy is part of the individual’s effort to deal with inner real-
ity. It can be said that fantasy and daydreams are omnipotent 
manipulations of external reality. Omnipotent control of 
reality implies fantasy about reality. The individual gets to 
external reality through the omnipotent fantasies elaborated 
in the effort to get away from inner reality. (130) 
Fantasies defend against inner deadness by a projective flight 
from fantasies to yet other fantasies, a flight pattern that con-
31 T.H. White, The Sword in the Stone (New York: Philomel Books, 
1993), 38.
32 Winnicott, “The Manic Defence,” 132 and 132n1. Subsequent page 
references are given in the text.
making a wish
117
structs a relationship to external reality. The manic defense is 
never far from the norm it helps structure. That’s why a relation-
ship to outer reality can come through all the fantasying. It’s 
also why some dosage of the manic defense is always present and 
accounted for.  
The manic defense is the cursor that allows Winnicott to read 
across the arts and everyday life via fantasying that staggers the 
inner reality of an ending. At the shallow end of fantasying in 
the service of the manic defense, Winnicott places an author of 
colonialist adventure stories. In trying to take flight from inner 
reality it’s possible to fall short with the crashing of a bore. 
In the ordinary extrovert book of adventure we often see how 
the author made a flight to daydreaming in childhood, and 
then later made use of external reality in this same flight. He 
is not conscious of the inner depressive anxiety from which 
he has fled. He has led a life full of incident and adventure, 
and this may be accurately told. But the impression left on 
the reader is of a relatively shallow personality, for this very 
reason, that the author adventurer has had to base his life on 
the denial of personal internal reality. (130) 
In “An American in France,” Gertrude Stein demarcated the 
necessity for those making art, who draw from within them-
selves, of a second civilization, history, and occupation, seconds 
that have nothing to do with the civilization, history, occupation 
that made them, but by staying put and not impinging upon 
the self and the freedom to create can be felt inside. The second 
civilization that offers respite, which belongs to her own expat 
situation or, as was the case in ancient times, to the recourse 
made to speciality languages of art, Stein dubs romance, which 
she sets apart from adventure. 
What is adventure and what is romance. Adventure is making 
the distant approach nearer but romance is having what is 
where it is which is not where you are stay where it is. So those 
who create things do not need adventure but they do need 
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romance they need that something that is not for them stays 
where it is and that they can know that it is there where it is.33
What distinguishes the souvenirs of adventure from the art of 
romance becomes in Winnicott’s practice the end in sight that 
separates the stricken world of his patients from the prospect of 
new beginnings arising out of inner reality.   
Session by session, Winnicott identifies in his patients the 
open invitation to join their manic defense instead of under-
standing their deadness. But the psychoanalyst holds an inside 
advantage within the series of being in session, since the patient is 
on a treatment schedule that leads to a termination phase, which 
is the end in the dead end. This end is being analyzed from the 
get-go. In the course of its analysis, the patient reduces the manic 
defense, or balances on it, and, once the end arrives, can settle 
with the so-called depressive position, the foundation for a new 
beginning. The end or purpose of the analysis is on a schedule 
with its therapeutic finitude: “It is not enough to say that certain 
cases show manic defence, since in every case the depressive posi-
tion is reached sooner or later, and some defence against it can 
always be expected. And, in any case, the analysis of the end of an 
analysis (which may start at the beginning) includes the analysis 
of the depressive position” (143). 
Winnicott’s patient Mathilda, his final of four case examples, 
brings a Polyfoto to session and asks the analyst to help her 
choose the best one of the forty-eight pictures. Her mother asked 
for a photograph of her, so Mathilda tried out this option. With 
the analysts’s help surely one picture could be seen to be good 
enough. She also invites him to choose and keep for himself one 
photo, and so on. Instead of participating, Winnicott interprets 
the situation. Mathilda: now she won’t give anyone a photo and 
will kill herself. When she recounts that the thought, “how awful 
to be really oneself, how terribly lonely,” recently crossed her 
mind, Winnicott is able to translate the thought and its photo 
finish: “To be oneself means containing a relation between father 
33 Gertrude Stein, “An American and France,” in What Are Masterpieces 
(Los Angeles: The Conference Press, 1940), 62–63. It was originally a 
lecture that Stein delivered at Oxford University in 1936.
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and mother. […] The Polyfoto incident was an invitation to me 
to get caught up in her manic defence instead of understanding 
her deadness, non-existence, lack of feeling real” (143). 
That one contains a relation between father and mother, 
indeed their coupling, refers to the primal scene that Melanie 
Klein called the combined parents, the double-backed entity that 
performs the scene. The manic defense against their combina-
tions inside you is to hold the parents in suspended animation. 
But this defense contact is a dead end: “omnipotent control of 
the bad internalized parents also stops all good relationships, 
and the patient feels dead inside and sees the world as a colour-
less place” (133–34). Instead, according to Klein, it is incumbent 
upon the child to learn to separate out the combined parents and 
recombine them into an object relation – which for Klein means 
that the internal parents can now share in your own mating plea-
sure. The other experience in which the parents lodged in the 
inner world share is grief. 34 
Poly also recalls the polymorphous perversion of the baby’s 
auto-stimulation, which is the console on which baby types 
in the primal scene, often based as much on what’s overheard 
as seen, in any event imagined. For Winnicott, the Polyfoto 
manifests the patient’s fantastic manic defending on the cusp of 
a balancing act with inner reality; it suggests plenitude, freedom 
of choosing, aggrandizement, generosity – but the dead end that 
is being defended against is also in sight. 
Following acknowledgment of inner reality, the transference 
interpretation can be offered. A good example of a transference 
interpretation (and of its secondary importance) is given in the 
prior case example. Charlotte, a “severe obsessional” (136), whose 
analysis at the time was only of two months duration (140), 
wants to besmirch her mother in her transferential heir. “I could 
point to my role of mother in the transference, with the patient’s 
indirectly expressed urge to dirty me and kick and trample on 
my body, and so on, but I feel I should have missed something 
34 I am giving the gist of Melanie Klein’s interpretation of healthy and not 
haunting relations with the internal parents which I present through-
out my case study of Ian Fleming (or rather his Bond) in SPECTRE 
(Fort Wayne: Anti-Oedipus Press, 2013). 
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very important if I had not pointed out the significance of the 
lessening in manic defence and the new dangers inherent in the 
change” (141). 
At the start of the analysis, Charlotte brought to session her 
stock dream of a train that never starts. The dream narrative 
undergoes a change after two months, a new version that she 
dreams twice in one night: “In each dream the train started” 
(ibid.). “The train that never started to travel over the lines was a 
picture of the omnipotently controlled parents, parents held in 
suspended animation. […] The starting of the trains indicated 
the lessening of this control of the internalized parents, and gave 
warning of the dangers inherent in this, and of the need for new 
defences should the advance in this direction outrun the ego 
development that the analysis was bringing about. There had 
been recent material and interpretations in regard to the taking 
in of me and of my room, etc.” (ibid.). 
The need for new defenses means that a new relationship 
to the manic defense leading toward greater acceptance of the 
depressive position can be worked on in the transference. “The 
search for the washing place” in her new dream of trains that in 
starting to move are liable to accidents “was probably connected 
with the development of the obsessional technique, and all that 
that means in regard to the ability to tolerate the depressive posi-
tion and to acknowledge object love and dependence” (ibid.). 
Ergo: “In the next hour the patient felt responsible for the kick 
marks on my door and the dirty marks on the furniture, and 
wanted to wash them off” (ibid.).
Since “it is part of one’s own manic defence to be unable to 
give full significance to inner reality,” Winnicott considers the 
“fluctuations in one’s ability to respect inner reality that are 
related to depressive anxiety in oneself” (129). The transference 
interpretation enters these fluctuations to reach by its helping 
“and” the end of the analysis. At the close of his essay, Winnicott 
downplays the transferential relationship to the extent that the 
end or purpose of the analysis was already always on a schedule 
with its therapeutic finitude. What did he do? Winnicott prefers 
to keep the melancholic predilection of his precursors, Freud and 
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Klein, at a distance – for example, by cannibalistically tongue-in-
cheek dismissal of certain patients as “good breast advocates.”35 
In his discussion of the case of Mathilda, he downplays his 
own departure, the object relation lying in wait in the ending. 
If it’s lost, that’s because it was throwaway. The Polyfoto session 
was the turning point: 
The analytic situation (which she has spent four years pro-
claiming to be the only reality for her) now seemed to her for 
the first time to be unreal, or at least a narcissistic relationship, 
a relationship to the analyst that is valuable to her chiefly for 
her own relief, a taking without giving, a relationship with her 
own internal objects. (142–43) 
When Mathilda brings the Polyfoto to session, she is, after four 
years in analysis, at the point of recognizing Winnicott’s inter-
pretations of the defense’s response to an underlying deadness: 
At the beginning of the hour […] she tried to make me laugh, 
and laughed herself at the thought that by the attitude of 
my hands I was holding back my water with them. With this 
patient, as with others, I found that this effort to laugh and 
to make me laugh, was a signal of depressive anxiety, and a 
patient may show great relief at one’s quick recognition of this 
interpretation, even bursting into tears instead of going on 
laughing and being funny. (142)
Awareness of inner reality crosses over into and is amplified by 
the transference. The “and” of the transference interpretation 
that slaps her silly, however, is there to be let go. 
If there are senses of an ending then we are traversing obstacles 
in the linguistic course of everyday life. In its own writing, there-
fore, the essay testifies to the impasse that fantasying in manic 
defense poses; the very term “manic defence” doesn’t sit well in 
everyday language:
35 D.W. Winnicott, “The Depressive Position in Normal Human 
Development,” in Through Paediatrics to Psycho-analysis: Collected 
Papers (New York: Brunner-Routledge, 1992), 276.
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One cannot help noting that the word “depression” is not 
only used but used quite accurately in popular speech. Is it 
not possible to see in this the introspection that goes with 
depression? The fact that there is no popular term for the 
manic defence could be linked with the lack of self-criticism 
that goes with it clinically. […] It is just when we are depressed 
that we feel depressed. It is just when we are manic-defensive 
that we are least likely to feel as if we are defending against 
depression. (132)
In Michelangelo Antonioni’s Blow-up (1966), photography, a 
fallback position in the history and understanding of the motion 
picture medium, is the depressive position underlying the film’s 
conflict and self-reflection. The bulk rate of the photographer–
protagonist’s preoccupation with his medium is a split-off non-
stop recording of the fleeting fixity and glancing contact of flight 
to reality. Antonioni relocated the ambiguous eros openly dis-
played in Julio Cortázar’s 1959 story, “Las babas del diablo” (“The 
Devil’s Slime”), and adapted it to the impasse of his fantasying 
protagonist, which he then blows up to fit the screen of his art 
film. In the story, the object of the intrigue is a hustler in whom 
both members of the criminal couple take a controlling inter-
est. The plot was inspired by an anecdote from the life of David 
Bailey, the London photographer Antonioni was incorporating 
in his protagonist. Straight ambiguity, which is how Antonioni 
typecast him, is probably closer to the truth of any portrait of 
“swinging.” 
In Blow-up, the protagonist’s plan to publish a book of docu-
mentary photographs of his undercover sojourn in a working-
class milieu would facilitate escape from the sexual ambiguity of 
his day job as fashion photographer. By his cynical acquiescence 
in seduction by girl groupies and his counsel to an investor to 
look at other neighborhoods, since this one is going the way of a 
male couple he just saw walking the dog, we know that the pro-
tagonist fits a strain of adaptation to social homophobia. 
He is untenably close to a couple, an abstract painter and his 
wife, both open and shut to him. His relationship to this couple, 
which goes the distance of his pursuit of art, is primal. Being a 
photographer means to walk in on any activity at all and make 
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cursory contact. The time comes when the photographer is free 
to walk in on and witness the coupling of his friends. When 
he visited his painter friend’s studio on an earlier occasion we 
looked at abstract paintings. The painter says he finds his way 
in and around his work after the fact. It’s like a murder mystery. 
What followed the first scene in the painter’s studio, in which 
the painter imparted the detective analogy and then turned 
down the photographer’s offer to buy an abstract painting (it’s 
not that easy), is the shoot that in aiming to deliver the parting 
shot for the art-photography book aimed at closure preliminary 
to publication. At this point a series of endings rise up against 
the prospect of the social relation of art, the new beginning. The 
painter friend had already aligned this series with the work of 
detection in which the photographer is now engaged. Gertrude 
Stein considered the murder mystery the only novelty in the 
novel form in her day.36 It begins with someone being dead, 
which means that we start over in a clearing devoid of human 
nature. For Stein, “somebody being dead and how it moves 
along” was the new life after death.37
The photographic shoot in the park, the Polyfoto spread 
from which he means to choose the closing image, triggers con-
tact with a more mature woman whose privacy he breached. She 
doesn’t want her tryst documented. But when it turns out that 
what’s on record is that she murdered the man, an unidentified 
dead person, the photographer starts blowing up the medium 
that he raises from daydreaming to the power of art. 
Because the culprit, the agent of his Oedipus complex, 
withdraws with all the evidence of “negative” transference, he 
is left alone at the outer blown-up limit of his medium. Here, 
however, he borders on the art of his special painter friend. The 
same day his unannounced visit brings him before the scene 
from his friends’ sex life, primalized by fixing the focus of his 
36 See, for example, Gertrude Stein, “What Are Masterpieces and Why 
Are There So Few of Them,” in What Are Masterpieces (Los Angeles: 
The Conference Press, 1940), 87–88.
37 Gertrude Stein, “Why I Like Detective Stories,” in A Primer for 
the Gradual Understanding of Gertrude Stein (Los Angeles: Black 
Sparrows Press, 1974), 148.
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photographic-daydreaming on the POV of exclusion, the paint-
er’s partner – the near-miss-outlet of the eros between the men 
friends – comes to the photographer’s studio to ask if there was 
anything he wanted earlier when he came and went. When he 
returned from that primal scene, he found his studio a stricken 
place emptied of all the evidence with which he had overfilled 
it in the course of his detection work. He also knows now that 
sleeping with the maternal figure did not resolve the scene of 
his being excluded, refused, and robbed. Shortly before the go-
between arrives on the rebound from the primal scene, he does 
find one image from the enlargement series that escaped the mur-
deress’s cleanup operation. His visitor picks up the last photo-
graphic trace of someone murdered in the park and immediately 
identifies its grainy abstraction with the experimental painterly 
qualities of her husband’s artwork. His art-photography book 
has been superseded, while Antonioni proceeds to complete his 
“abstract” film. 
Blow-up closes on affirmation of its moving picture medium 
rebounding from inner reality (going directly to art and not 
stopping in fantasying, including the amped-up black-&-white 
documentary-reality). The photographer is caught up in the 
mime show of an invisible tennis match. He witnesses, or plays at 
witnessing, together with the mime witnesses, a match or court-
ship that follows a code that can be upheld in silence and without 
an object, one that includes a balanced or coupled score called 
“love.” However, when he is called on to participate in the per-
formance by retrieving the missing ball invisibly lobbed outside 
the court, which he duly throws back, we no longer watch the 
game, but join him alone on its outer periphery while hearing the 
rackets striking the object. He’s outside again, odd man out, and 
we moviegoers watch him disappear by one of the oldest tricks of 
the film medium. In his missing place stands “The End.”
Fantasying Fantasy
In an updating footnote that he later added to “The Manic 
Defence,” Winnicott advises that in lieu of using “fantasy” as 
synonym for daydreams, he would in the meantime write and 
mean instead “fantasying” (130). By the gerund he underscores 
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an activity, at once fixated and fleeting, which navigates the dif-
ference between its flights and what’s happening out there, a 
difference that can in extremity become dissociation. This note 
is the link to his second approach to the daydream, I mean fan-
tasying, the second chapter of Playing and Reality: “Dreaming, 
Fantasying, and Living: A Case-history describing a Primary 
Dissociation.” Here he addresses his treatment goal ethically as 
changing fantasying into imagination related to the night dream, 
to living, and to poetry.38 
While he retained Klein’s depressive position, Winnicott had 
between the two essays on fantasying struck out on his own 
with his introduction of the transitional object, which redirects 
psychoanalysis to address the development of psychopathy. 
Psychopathy and the dissociated daydreaming that Winnicott 
treats and theorizes in “Dreaming, Fantasying, and Living” are 
limit concepts that psychoanalysis fails to interpret (the poetics 
of daydreaming cuts away to art from the daydreaming itself, a 
blur of inchoate and censorious thoughts and wishes). 
That Winnicott’s patient was suicidal because that’s as close 
as she could get to murder matches her “abandonment of hope 
in object relating” during the downturn of her early relationship 
to her mother.39 Hope has gone the way of aggression and the 
environment. All her industry and innovation found one outlet, 
one achievement – her capacity for being absent but accounted 
for through dissociation. The scene of the transitional object, 
in which the data of giving and receiving between mother and 
infant are treated and accepted as the baby’s own creation, makes 
clear that good enough mothering means that the mother is hard 
pressed to be good enough to stave off the child’s sense of depri-
vation and its sequelae, notably all that goes into the antisocial 
tendency. 
To intercept a psychopathic outcome (prior to consolidation 
via secondary gains), Winnicott interpreted early delinquent 
behavior, such as stealing, as signaling hope and illuminating the 
importance of the environment. The child who acts out antiso-
38 D.W. Winnicott, Playing and Reality (Hove and New York: Brunner-
Routledge, 2002), 27. 
39 Ibid., 29.
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cially is far enough along to steer clear of the deep freeze of the 
spontaneous self in psychosis, but also hasn’t gone the distance 
to qualify for the endless roto-routing of Oedipal identifica-
tions in neurosis.40 By testing the environment for its capacity 
to hold the turbulence that he cannot contain and still feel real, 
the asocial child’s momentum is resolutely on the track of the 
spontaneous self that is alive and kicking. That the environment 
that failed him was the mother is what the child was not able to 
know. Through regression rather than transference, the patient 
finally faces the mother in session (and in the past) and hates her. 
Aggression no longer needs to be externalized, and the integra-
tion of psyche and soma can take place via an internal relation-
ship to omnipotence. 
In the 1935 essay on the manic defense, the first two case exam-
ples were of asocial children, whose relationship to omnipotence 
Winnicott sought to restore through a therapy of playing and 
mutual fantasying. He describes the progress made by his five-
year-old patient Billy signaled by changes in a game they played 
together in session. While they no doubt played with toys, the 
way Winnicott retells the scenarios, it sounds like they largely 
shared out loud fantasying about transport and battle. At three 
and a half, when the analysis commenced, Billy, who was already 
stealing, had been stamped “potential delinquent.”41 Following 
analysis of the depressive position, his ambivalence toward his 
mother was beginning to find open expression at home, and 
his manic behavior was alternating with feelings of sadness. 
Therefore, constructive play could commence in their sessions. 
In the scenarios that Winnicott recounts and analyzes, we wit-
ness the gradual lifting of the manic defense set on colonialist 
adventure clichés. 
The first scenario is like the famous Baron Munchhausen can-
non-ball ride, which sends Billy to Africa (the analyst launched 
40 I am reading/reaching back to my earlier Winnicott studies and 
formulations in Germany: A Science Fiction (Fort Wayne: Anti-
Oedipus Press, 2015) and The Psycho Records (New York: Wallflower 
Press, 2016).
41 Winnicott, “The Manic Defence,” 136. Further page references are 
given in the text.
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him). Flying along a vantage point, he attacks the locals from 
on high, even dropping them down deep wells. He becomes so 
excited during the game that after he leaves the office he uncon-
sciously on purpose takes the lift down to the basement, which 
terrifies him. Winnicott, who anticipated this, delivers Billy right 
away and forges a bond by the reassurance he gives him. 
After an interval of some months, the fantasy of a trip to 
Africa is revisited, this time by airplane. The analyst is along for 
this ride. They enter into alliance with enemy pilots against third 
parties. This time there is an emphasis on safety precautions, a 
doubling up of the contents of the flying machine for the long 
haul and the inclusion of instruction manuals. “In many other 
ways, too, we insure ourselves against a failure of our attempt 
to get above our troubles” (137). Devaluation and omnipotence 
were lessened on this fantasy trip. And while the view from 
above still allowed the boy to drop feces on the world below, the 
flight also has the import of “an ascensive or contra-depressive 
feel” (ibid.).
Later, a third game was organized around a voyage in a ship 
that they built for a visit to pirate island. The weather is so beau-
tiful, however, that they forget their destination for a new aim: 
they decide to relax on deck, lying out in the sun. Occasionally 
they dive into the sea and swim about lazily. There are the usual 
sharks and crocodiles, but the boy packs a gun that can shoot 
underwater, so there is no alarm. They save a little girl from 
drowning and then play with her and her doll. The captain of 
the ship, it turns out, intentionally mucked up the engine. But 
when he’s found out, he cleans the apparatus and all’s well. To 
the extent that former dangers are simply forgotten or denied, 
the manic defense is still being flexed. But through the increase 
in the goodness of the internal objects, the defense allows the 
other changes to happen: lessening of the over-insurance against 
risk, new object relations, the manageable quality of the captain’s 
treachery. There is manic defense in the way Billy is prepared to 
shoot persecutors inside the body (underwater), but a strong 
relation to external reality is also seen, “for example, in the rela-
tion of the shooting under water to passing water in the bath” 
(138). 
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We recognize in the relay of these scenarios of playing and fan-
tasying a steady layering on that’s building up to a less guarded 
relationship to inner reality. Winnicott draws a healthy dose of 
the manic defense at the limit of two extreme cases: the sex fiend 
who through “every possible physical aspect of sexuality” “abates 
psychic tension by the use of the satisfaction to be got” or the 
hypochondriac who by internal bodily sensations “comes to tol-
erate psychic tension by denial of fantasy content” (133). When 
next Winnicott takes us on a tour of London music halls, we take 
in a healthy dose of the defense, its golden meaning a part of art 
and everyday life: 
[O]n to the stage come the dancers, trained to liveliness. One 
can say that here is the primal scene, here is exhibitionism, 
here is anal control, here is masochistic submission to disci-
pline, here is a defiance of the super-ego. Sooner or later one 
adds: here is LIFE. Might it not be that the main point of the 
performance is a denial of deadness, a defence against depres-
sive “death inside” ideas, the sexualisation being secondary. 
(131) 
The other asocial child, David, is eight years old. He was only 
recently brought to Winnicott in lieu of expulsion from school 
for an illicit activity vaguely defined as “sex and lavatory obses-
sion” (138). Winnicott doesn’t let us in on the deep fantasies that 
he explored with David while they played with the toys in his 
office. But when David begins trying to tire him out, a trait or 
tendency Winnicott was warned to expect, already “a good deal 
of analysis had been possible” (139). David has turned around to 
face the world outside, that is, outside the office door or as seen 
from the window. 
The inside of the room had become his own inside and if he 
were to deal with me and the contents of my room (father 
and mother, witches, ghosts, persecutors, etc.) he had to have 
the means to control them. First he had to tire them out, as he 
feared he could not control them – and I felt that in this he 
showed some distrust of omnipotence. (139) 
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David’s fantasy escape has been kept at the close quarters of inter-
nally quarreling parents. His management of his manic defense 
at school “shows the flight from inner reality to the interest in the 
surface of his body, and in his surface feelings, and from these to 
an interest in the bodies and feelings of other children” (140). In 
other words, he is a typical delinquent on two counts: his knowl-
edge of the facts of external reality and his immediate likeability 
at first contact, which he takes care not to extend or deepen (138).
The turning point came in their session on Armistice Day. 
From Winnicott’s office window he had grown accustomed to 
a view of street life that provided him with “a not hopelessly 
uncontrollable sample of inner reality” (139). On the way to 
Winnicott’s office on that day he bought a poppy from a lady 
in the street. During the session, the two minutes’ silence was 
observed: “It was a particularly complete silence in my neigh-
bourhood, and he was absolutely delighted. […] For two min-
utes in his life he felt as if he was not tired, as he need not tire out 
the parents, since there had come along an omnipotent control 
imposed from outside and accepted as real by all” (140). 
He was all along the one who was being tired out by his 
“control of the internalized parents who were exhausting each 
other as well as him” (139). His denial heretofore of his exhaus-
tion was the bottom line of his denial of inner reality. During 
the Armistice observance, David fantasied that the ladies were 
continuing to sell flowers, the only permitted activity during the 
ceremonial silence (which, Winnicott advises, was not in fact 
the case): “[A] more manic, internal omnipotence would have 
stopped everything (the good included)” (140). A step outside 
the full stop of suspended animation could be taken toward 
object relations.
In the ritual occasions of the outside world Winnicott sees a 
festive inscription and administration of the manic defense that 
helps him out with his patients. In the UK readership’s regular 
consulting of newspaper health reports on the Royals, he dis-
cerned a diversion of the inner reality of paternity into the per-
sonals column of a remote personage. “I prefer to say that in our 
inner reality the internalized father is all the time being killed, 
robbed and burnt and cut up, and we welcome the personaliza-
tion of this internalized father by a real man whom we can help 
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to save” (131). David can bring a “poppy” to Winnicott, flexing 
omnipotence without the recoil of suspended animation on this 
official day of the dead/dad.
Winnicott must lead both antisocial children that he nips 
in the budding of their psychopathy past the impasse of 
manic defense into the promised land of childhood play and 
omnipotent fantasying. In “Dreaming, Fantasying, and Living,” 
Winnicott’s middle-aged patient, whose outcome is more schiz-
oid than psycho, has relied on and plied her second nature of 
daydreaming since early childhood. In the patient’s early history, 
which Winnicott tries to take down, nothing ever happened, 
while in her dissociated state so much was happening all the 
time. She was the youngest child and it was incumbent on her to 
play along in the already organized setting of the sibling group 
bond. Doing nothing was her response to the obligation to fit in: 
Nothing doing. 
That the young child entered into the group activities only on 
a compliance basis was unrewarding for all concerned. But her 
siblings probably didn’t realize that she was all the while absent. 
From the point of view of my patient, […] while she was play-
ing the other people’s games she was all the time engaged in 
fantasying. She really lived in this fantasying on the basis of 
a dissociated mental activity. This part of her which became 
thoroughly dissociated was never the whole of her, and over 
long periods her defence was to live here in this fantasy activ-
ity, and to watch herself playing the other children’s games as 
if watching someone else in the nursery group. 
By means of the dissociation, reinforced by a series of 
significant frustrations in which her attempts to be a whole 
person in her own right met with no success, she became a 
specialist in this one thing: being able to have a dissociated 
life while seeming to be playing with the other children in the 
nursery. […] As my patient grew older so she managed to con-
struct a life in which nothing that was really happening was 
fully significant to her. Gradually she became one of the many 
who do not feel that they exist in their own right as whole 
human beings. All the time, […] there was another life going 
on in terms of the part that was dissociated. Put the other way 
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around, this meant that her life was dissociated from the main 
part of her, which was living in what became an organized 
sequence of fantasying.42 
What Winnicott refers to as “the here-and-now fixity of any 
satisfaction that there can be in fantasying” (35) designates the 
release of throwing-away. In other words, fantasying is in his 
view an isolated phenomenon that absorbs the energy of living 
without giving anything back (26). The patient is Winnicott’s 
living proof “that fantasying interferes with action and with life 
in the real or external world, but much more so it interferes with 
dream and with the personal or inner psychic reality, the living 
core of the individual personality” (31). 
A session begins with the patient’s fanciful description of the 
sky glimpsed through the office window: 
She says: “I am up on those pink clouds where I can walk.” 
This, of course, might be an imaginative flight. It could be 
part of the way in which the imagination enriches life just 
as it could be material for dream. At the same time, for my 
patient this very thing can be something that belongs to a dis-
sociated state, and it may not become conscious in the sense 
that there is never a whole person there to be aware of the two 
or more dissociated states that are present at any one time. 
The patient may sit in her room and while doing nothing at 
all except breathe she has (in her fantasy) painted a picture, 
or she has done an interesting piece of work in her job, or she 
has been for a country walk; but from the observer’s point of 
view nothing whatever has happened. In fact, nothing is likely 
to happen because of the fact that in the dissociated state so 
much is happening. (27) 
The didactic interpretations he makes reflecting his bias against 
fantasying on a scale of valuation reminiscent of the process of 
extracting poetry from the daydream according to Freud and 
Sachs are water under the bridge of dissociation. After he points 
42 Winnicott, Playing and Reality, 29. Further page references are given 
in the text.
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out how she is or, rather, should be “making use” of her dissocia-
tion to the point of integrating it or breaking it down, “she gave 
me an example at the moment while I was talking” (32). It turns 
out that she was fiddling with her bag’s zipper while wondering 
why it was aligned in this direction. Her “dissociated activity was 
more important to her sitting there than listening to what I was 
saying” (ibid.). Fiddling with the zipper, she only outlines the 
castration, the murderous destructiveness, which her fantasy-
ing interferes with by its ongoing diversion from her own inner 
psychic reality. When she complains that her often frenetic bouts 
of fantasying make her fear for her physical health, Winnicott 
comments in an aside to his readership that his patient is sensing 
the absence of psychosomatic climax or, he adds in the footnote, 
ego orgasm (33).
A positive outcome of the analysis, the “hope” of a new 
beginning, “the confidence that she had in her analyst, who has 
to counteract all that she carries forward from her childhood,” is 
over and again stymied by her quick sense that she is playing the 
good patient: “[S]o easily she would have the feeling that she had 
fitted in […], and this would be followed by maximal protest and 
a return to the fixity of fantasying” (33–35). 
If one were to trace this patient’s life one could see the ways 
in which she attempted to bring together […] parts of her 
personality, but her attempts always had some kind of protest 
in them which brought a clash with society. (29)
Winnicott must bring the protest to the end in its dead end on a 
schedule with the analysis. 
In Freud’s lexicon, dissociation steers clear of psychosis, mean-
ing that the subject both knows and does not know what’s really 
happening. At this point of impasse or crossover, Winnicott’s 
patient provides the breakthrough that gets past the impasse of 
Winnicott’s didacticism and its dyadic logic. She remarks: “We 
need another word, which is neither dream nor fantasy” (32). 
Linking/thinking back to the prior session, she was pondering 
their last discussion in which the analyst again drew a distinction 
between daydreaming and night dreaming. That night she woke 
up suddenly and saw herself busily carrying out a task. But was it 
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a night dream she woke upon or a bout of early-morning fantasy-
ing? Winnicott can’t answer, but notes that just when he thought 
they could discern that fantasying interferes with dreaming (or 
living), she brings to the session the breakthrough recollection 
of a dream or fantasy that places them “on the borderline in any 
attempt one might make to differentiate between fantasying and 
dreaming” (32).43 What follows is that Winnicott learns quickly 
from his patient’s dismantling of his former strategy to redirect 
the coordinates of his bias to fit the transference.
Was her dream of cutting out a dress upon which she awoke 
in fact a fantasy that defended against dreaming? “‘But how is 
she to know?’ Fantasying possesses her like an evil spirit” (33). 
This moment of possession is probably a close paraphrase, which 
by slipping out of the boundaries of quotation already performs 
the slippage at this border. A fantasying of fantasy begins to pry 
loose the poetic omnipotence from its stuck place within the dis-
sociated daydreaming and the analyst’s didactic approach.
Eventually she remembers that the cutting out of the dress 
pattern was a waking fantasy. That’s why, Winnicott says, it’s 
“simply about making a dress. The dress has no symbolic value” 
(ibid.). But in a dream, he adds, “the same thing would indeed 
have had symbolic meaning” (ibid.). Winnicott in effect asks her 
to conjure through fantasying a night dream about her cut-out 
dress. They are able to carry back into the fantasy a word that 
belongs to the transitional state or start she was never given: 
“formlessness, which is what the material is like before it is pat-
terned and cut and shaped and put together” (33). At this border 
of transferential breakthrough, a session is productive: 
43 Winnicott earlier interpreted two night-dream fragments that the 
patient had been able after years of analysis to bring to session, which 
concealed incest wishes. After two hours, they begin approaching affect 
and we learn that she hates her mother, could murder her, while her 
wish for her father means that the mother already murdered her. This 
bumpy ride through an heir pocket from his Kleinian/Freudian past 
into the patient’s emotional recognition of illicit unconscious fantasy 
isn’t of the same quality as the changes that commence once they are at 
the borderline between dreaming and fantasying.
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She gave a very good example of a tremendous lot happen-
ing all of a sudden in fantasying which was of the kind that 
paralyses action. I took this now as the clue that she could give 
me towards the understanding of dream. The fantasy had to 
do with some people coming and taking over her flat. That is 
all. The dream that people came and took over her flat would 
have to do with her finding new possibilities in her own per-
sonality and also with the enjoyment of identifications with 
other people, including her parents. This is the opposite of 
feeling patterned and gives her a way of identifying without 
loss of identity. (35)
After the re-start around formlessness, Winnicott wraps dissocia-
tion in distinctions that he charges transferentially. “I said that 
fantasying was about a certain subject and it was a dead end. It 
had no poetic value. The corresponding dream, however, had 
poetry in it, that is to say, layer upon layer of meaning related to 
past, present, and future, and to inner and outer, and always fun-
damentally about herself” (35). Winnicott extends his working 
distinction to include poetry, because the patient prized her own 
creative efforts, which she had already given at the inner office 
of her Gesamtkunstwerk, her dissociation. He also switches from 
the opposition between the night dream and the daydream to the 
work of interpretation, which in the analytic session takes two. 
There is nothing to interpret in the daydream; it is about doing 
something, in other words, nothing at all.44 The night dream, 
like art, adds the symbolism that makes interpretation possible. 
And so, he continues working with the didactic distinction, but 
redirected from within the transference, even making her the 
transference gift of adding a further equation between the night 
dream and poetry. Now she’s listening when he says that he can-
not interpret her fantasies, but if she presented them as dreams, 
he could. Together they begin fantasying poetic dream versions 
of her fantasies. 
44 Winnicott lets us know: “I do not even try to use the material of fan-




The analytic understanding of the night dream reflects a ther-
apeutic valuation that Winnicott demonstrates with his patient’s 
able assist. Night dreams, not daydreams, are in session by the 
detour of their transference interpretation the royal road to 
the unconscious. The ascendancy of omnipotent wishing unto 
art is a hierarchy for which the patient must be initiated in the 
transference. Winnicott summarizes for the reader the impasse 
that he and his patient worked through: “It is this poetry of the 
dream that is missing in her fantasying” and renders “meaningful 
interpretations about fantasying” “impossible” (35).
When she asks him to interpret her ongoing game of patience, 
he transferentially lodges his complaint against fantasying by 
judging that the prospect of his interpreting it is a “dead end.” 
Then he continues spinning the record of dissociation, fantasy-
ing a poetic night dream version. He assures her that if she were 
telling him her dream of playing patience, then he could say that 
she is struggling with God or fate, now winning, now losing, 
with the aim to control the destinies of four royal houses (36). 
In the earlier essay on the manic defense, Winnicott must 
overcome an obstacle and offer a check on the flight away from 
inner reality prior to any formulation of transference interpreta-
tion. In the treatment of this case of dissociation, the transfer-
ence comes to occupy the foreground by following the patient’s 
insight that a new term, neither night dream nor daydream, was 
needed. It is a tentative claim to authorship, which cannot but 
risk her protest, the negative-transferential recoil sprung by her 
conviction that he’s right, she is only “playing at” being his good 
patient. After registering a “profound effect” on his patient of the 
work in the session before, Winnicott realizes “the great danger 
of becoming confident or even pleased” (36–37). “The analyst’s 
neutrality was needed here if anywhere in the whole treatment. 
In this kind of work we know that we are always starting again, 
and the less we expect the better” (37).
Auguste Müller of Karlsruhe
Mesmerism was the premier therapy fad, the first in the series 
that circumscribed a concise prehistory of psychoanalysis, its 
dialectic of Enlightenment. The inaugural role of Mesmerism in 
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the settlement of inner space was evident in the social network-
ing it provided to those patients whose own mediumistic talent 
was triggered by the magnetic treatment. If Mesmerism proved 
a vehicle for the patient’s own clairvoyance, then the patient 
participated in their own assessment because they were able to 
see into bodies. Through the laying on of hands the clairvoyant 
medium could then also diagnose and treat other patients in the 
community.
In the course of his treatise on paranormal waking-dream 
states, Schopenhauer refers five times to the documentation of 
the sessions with Auguste Müller in Karlsruhe. With the onset 
of puberty, Auguste was sorely afflicted, symptomatic, desolate, 
and alone. Upon contact with magnetic treatment, Auguste 
turned out to be clairvoyant, which meant in her case that she 
could also discern if anyone in town was calling her gift into 
question. She rose to the occasion of making room in inner space 
for herself, for her omnipotence. Her personalized spirit guide, 
her recently departed mother, supplied the clairvoyant know-
how that allowed Auguste to choose just the right treatment to 
prescribe in her new community of patients. 
In his preface to Wilhelm Meier’s document, Carl Christian 
Klein calls those who doubt Auguste’s art of healing “zero-
people,”45 meaning people with zero tele-capacity, which in this 
setting also means that they lack empathy. But by this blank 
charge he also projects into them the empty and withdrawn state 
that the magnetically enriched patient was able to overcome 
both in her self and for others. Schreber’s rights to a shared reality 
were restored, once he could empathically accept the coexistence 
of zero-people, which, earlier in the course of rebuilding a world 
from his own ground zero, he took to be “miraculated-up” fig-
ments or simulations. 
Her dead mother occupies the telecommunications hub 
above, while in her own tele-state on earth (which she passes 
into through undeath) Auguste must corral her witnesses, col-
45 Wilhelm Meier, Höchst merkwürdige Geschichte der magnetisch 
hellsehenden Auguste Müller in Karlsruhe (Stuttgart: J.B. 
Metzler’schen Buchhandlung, 1818), iv. Page references are to this 
edition and are given in the text.
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laborators, and detractors into a network (coextensive with the 
published document). She tests this network by her own turbu-
lence, and then calls it to order. In the season of her clairvoyance, 
Auguste enlists and mixes together a recognized therapy, occult 
knowledge, and fairy-tale fantasy. The mix gives her back a con-
trolling interest in her life, which was shattered by bereavement 
and repression. The interest is upheld by the intrigue that she 
detects in those who doubt her role as medium (or prove lax in 
keeping to her schedule). 
At one point the magnetiseur was unable to keep an appoint-
ment, and Auguste nominates the missed session just the one in 
which the cure for her ailment was to be revealed. But since she 
is unconscious during these transmissions, only the conversation 
with the magnetiseur could have secured the prescription’s con-
tent. During the next session after the appointment that wasn’t 
kept she again enters the magnetic sleep-waking state.
In this highly unusual state she resembles a marble statue, 
someone who has just lapsed into lifelessness. All vital col-
oring is gone. Not the slightest sign, not the least breathing 
indicates life. […] After some time, in this state, she folded her 
hands and prayed for 2 minutes. Suddenly there followed a 
deep and long inhalation, and with it, life, color, and move-
ment returned. (13)
The magnetiseur, who alone can speak to her at this point, 
addresses several questions to her. 
Question. Do you know the means for your rehabilitation?
Answer. Now I no longer do. […] If only you had been here! 
[…] My God! Now I have to wait 14 days. (13–15)
Repeated entreaties to find the relief ahead of this schedule 
Auguste rebuffs. She does know the cause of her illness: cat whis-
kers she somehow swallowed. Her therapist calls this possibility 
into question, but she won’t budge: She sees them! 
In Séance on a Wet Afternoon, 1961 novel and 1964 movie, 
the medium Myra’s talent builds on basic telepathy up through 
gradations of paranormal waking-dream states to the wished-for 
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apex of the profession, seeing and communicating with ghosts.46 
While, as I showed in The Devil Notebooks, Arthur C. Clarke 
and Alan Turing placed belief in telepathy and traffic with ghosts 
on a continuum, the author and director of Séance on a Wet 
Afternoon remained closer to Schopenhauer, giving credence to 
paranormal awareness and communication on the live side while 
pulling up short before the last step, contact with the ultimate 
paranormal address, ghostliness. 
Myra also relies on the paranormal talent brought to her 
séance table for a contact heightening. Myra’s wish, which the 
notoriety around the kidnapping and her clairvoyant assist 
should make possible, is to enter into contact with the great-
est mediumistic talents of her day. The law brings along the 
president of the Society for Psychical Reasearch to engage in a 
fact-finding session led by Myra. Her mind shifts through the 
neutral gear of fantasying into heightened paranormal states, 
but the last step or leap to contact spirits is fraught with aber-
rations of the superego. She imagines an interior decoration for 
her mediumistic progress, like the mnemotechnic architecture of 
niches that was prescribed in antiquity for training recollection, 
like the memorial stations of scenes from a life spent with the 
now deceased, which the reality-testing mourner, according to 
Freud, visits, at once rerecording and erasing. 
She stopped, and her heart stopped too. Her soul yearned for-
ward, straining, pleading. Then the white knob began to turn 
slowly. […] She went forward, into a dusky light and a protec-
tive motherly warmth, and immediately her being soared to 
an ecstatic perfection. […] She had never been that far; she had 
never been farther than the spot she now occupied. But, as 
she looked, she found herself moving again, moving forward 
toward the window […]. With a sudden release that sent her a 
46 In The Psycho Records, I skewered a series of spiritualist medium 
fictions (film adaptations and novels) upon the trait of psychopathy 
hiding out in the paranormal milieu. Myra’s empathy is eclipsed, 
when she and her husband abduct a child to fake the evidence of her 
paranormal abilities and speed up her overriding wish to work with the 
great talents in her field.
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leap’s length forward she was out in the mist. […] A tree trunk 
loomed in front. […] She put out a hand and touched it, and 
immediately her other hand was grasped and a convulsion ran 
through her.47
And then the girl who died on her watch starts speaking through 
her and she turns herself in. 
The sliding scale of paranormal experience projected by 
Schopenhauer and adapted by Freud can be watched in The 
Haunting (1963). The movie is based on Shirley Jackson’s 1959 
novel The Haunting of Hill House, which opens with the epi-
graph: “No live organism can contrive for long to exist sanely 
under conditions of absolute reality; even larks and katydids are 
supposed, by some, to dream. Hill House, not sane, stood by 
itself against its hills, holding darkness within.” The supposition 
to dream covers fantasying and waking sleep, which Hill House, 
built with near-miss right angles, every corner and closure askew, 
excites and deranges. The director of The Haunting, Robert 
Wise, employed a new, yet untested lens (which he had to sign off 
on to absolve the company of any responsibility) for the distor-
tion he was after. He wanted to demonstrate what he had learned 
while apprenticed to Val Lewton: horror as sight unseen. 
Together with Günther von Fritsch, Wise directed the sequel 
to Jacques Tourneur’s Cat People (1942), The Curse of the Cat 
People (1944), his debut. The curse is daydreaming that afflicts 
Amy (daughter born of the second marriage of dead Irena’s 
Oliver) and triggers madness in the mother’s daughter next door. 
Because Amy’s daydreaming verges on dissociation (according to 
the reports of her alienation at school), her father is determined 
to drive the predilection out of her. She has one friend in the 
neighborhood, an older actress who fears her own daughter 
Barbara; she must be a spy. When Amy finds a picture of Irena, 
the dead woman she never knew, Irena begins appearing to her 
and they form an imaginary friendship. When one day Irena says 
that she has to go now for good, Amy runs away to the neighbor-
ing mother. While a snowstorm keeps her there, the daughter is 
47 Mark McShane, Séance on a Wet Afternoon (New York: Mysterious 
Press, 2013), 170–72.
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so jealous she could just strangle Amy. But Amy sees the sign of 
Irena’s face on Barbara and embraces her, averting a dire ending. 
Now her father promises not to interfere again with her fantasy-
ing.
In The Haunting, Eleanor, whose unacknowledged talent is 
telekinesis, joins the paranormal researcher Dr. Markway and the 
other talent, Theo, a telepath. The nephew and future inheritor 
of the house has also come along to keep an eye on his future 
property. In the final round, the paranormals witness the effects 
of haunting upon awakening together battened down in the 
drawing room. The earlier haunting episode in the rooms of 
Eleanor and Theo also began with their awakening there. The 
ghost effects are picked up by the dream organ in the environs of 
the will or the unconscious while awakening into the ideality of 
sense perception. The participants in the paranormal investiga-
tion of the house are waking dreaming in each other’s psyches 
because the unconscious that is the same in every one of them is 
foregrounded by the flexing of the death wish (which also holds 
the attention of the heir). 
The first family living in the house that Crain built no longer 
did when the surviving heiress, Crain’s daughter, an old invalid, 
kept knocking on the wall until she died. That the companion 
who was in charge was too preoccupied with a date from the vil-
lage to pay attention means she had to pack away the recoil of 
the wish. The first spell of haunting at Hill House left her hang-
ing from the circular stairway in the library. That’s why Eleanor 
ends up staying. She spent her young adulthood caring for her 
bed-ridden mother. Did she not heed the knocking one night, 
whereupon her mother died, or is it an excess of self-recrimina-
tion, which Freud observed in the most devoted caregivers,48 that 
lowers the doom because she couldn’t help wishing that there 
might be an end to her service? Relief makes murderers of us all 
on death watch/wish.
When Eleanor follows the summons to join the paranormal 
experiment, she in reality escapes her family situation. Wise 
shows the flight when Eleanor scans the areas she drives through, 
48 This observation is basic to the projection argument in the section 
“Taboo upon the Dead” in Totem and Taboo.
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spinning off scenarios of omnipotent idealization according to 
which she has, for example, an apartment of her own with lion 
statues on her mantle, like the larger lions at the entrance to a 
driveway she just passed. Her run of fantasying stops at the gate 
to Hill House, but then she rises to the occasion and dismisses the 
insolent caretaker. She has been training in daydreaming to be a 
lady. When the view of the house, ominously caught in infrared 
film, comes around the bend, the soundtrack riffs off the music 
going into the shower scene in Psycho, while we watch Eleanor 
through the windshield driving. The film begins fantasying 
scenes from Hitchcock’s film. The Schauer scene – the ultimate 
exercise in the horror of sight unseen that Lewton’s production 
line rehearsed or presaged – becomes in The Haunting, in this 
run of fantasying, a potentiation of fantasy, a fantasy of fantasy 
in the spotlight of cinematic self-reflexivity. 
A similar flight attends the film’s ending, skidding into a 
denouement that reprises Hitchcock’s stabbing skewering of eye 
and drain. But ambiguity averts the untenable omnipotent wish 
to profit from the last will and testament. Did Eleanor drive into 
the tree, or did the car, the Auto, the self, telekinetically turn the 
steering wheel? A formal affinity between film perception and 
fantasying leads the way away from the one dark wish’s monop-
oly over wish fantasying. On the unlikely tracks of Psycho, Wise’s 
film formally engages fantasying and allows its momentum to 
enter pictures. 
The Haunting of 1999 goes on the update with digital special 
effects. Whereas in the 1963 film there was one haunting effect 
that wasn’t son et lumière – the wooden door to the drawing 
room undulating with a ghostly pressure to enter – it overruns 
the 1999 movie, making the walls morph with nonstop digital 
ease and expense. Wes Craven was scheduled to direct this film 
but decided to go ahead with Scream instead, a far better choice 
aligned more with the Lewton intention and the Psycho introject 
in Wise’s film. Jan de Bont made a film that reflected the pull of 
the fantasy genre’s arrival in the realm of verification of its predic-
tion or rather predilection. The phantasmagoria of special effects 
served up in The Haunting allies it with Christian fantasy movies 
like Devil’s Advocate (1997). This time Eleanor discovers that she 
was to the haunted manor born. By family romance she is related 
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to the master of the house of child abuse, and becomes the hero-
ine leading into the light the ghosts of the children trapped in 
the house’s walls. The death she risks claims her. Her heroism 
reverses the suicidality of her earlier incarnation as death-wish 
depressed and dissociated daydreamer with nowhere to go.
Fantasy Island
Presiding over the underworld in which Sibyl Vane flits through 
the collected words of Shakespeare like a spirit, the Jewish theater 
manager stands in Dorian’s way on the day of his last visit to the 
nether realm. Dorian wants to see Sybil, his own Miranda he 
feels, and, again drawing on the Shakespeare play that was not 
part of the underworld repertoire, name-calls him Caliban.49 
On the eve of the divide between Dorian and his portrait we are 
thrown back upon the fantasy island of The Tempest. 
Most agree that the bard said his farewell in Prospero’s parting 
words that relinquished magic in favor of the separate interests 
of his daughter Miranda, Shakespeare’s Judith. Formerly her 
father’s companion, Hamnet’s twin sister was stepping out 
into matrimony. Issuing from the encryptment of Hamnet in 
Shakespeare’s corpus, Caliban, the injured and complaining 
ghost to whom love has been denied (in the recoil of thwarted 
substitute care), charges Prospero’s magic with the future import 
of slavery in the new world. 
The temporal paradox of the crypt is with us: Isola is a name 
that means “islander.” It is ensconced in a word, “isolation,” 
which was first used in French to refer to a method of quaran-
tine: seclusion on an island of all those infected by contagion. 
Sibyl Vane’s sailor brother, in the service of the colonial empire, 
immediately recognizes in the isolating constraint of Dorian 
Gray’s courtship of his sister the man’s wish to “enslave” her (76). 
In the Preface to The Picture of Dorian Gray, signed Oscar 
Wilde, Caliban is introduced twice as test subject into the mir-
ror cage of the novel’s literary experiment. Each time Caliban 
looks into the mirror, he flies into a rage, once because he does 
49 Wilde, The Picture of Dorian Gray, 91. Subsequent page references are 
given in the text.
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see himself, the second time because he doesn’t. He performs 
in short order the nineteenth century’s dislike of Realism and 
Romanticism. By his reflex responses, Caliban bears, then, the 
burden of the nineteenth century’s limitations in letters. 
It was as White Man’s Burden, the guise in which the theory 
of evolution took hold of the globe, Gertrude Stein emphasizes 
in Wars I Have Seen, that the nineteenth century kept malinger-
ing on for so long. It was at last coming to an end, Stein writes in 
1943, the war killing “it dead, dead dead.”50 To orient themselves 
during the American invasion of Fortress Europe, Stein and her 
friends spent Friday afternoons together reading Shakespeare’s 
Julius Caesar, Macbeth, and Richard the Third (the other works, 
other than Hamlet, that host ghosts): “[I]t is all just like what is 
happening now” (105). And again: “[T]he extraordinary thing 
about this war it is so historical not recent history but fairly 
ancient history” (135). Stein considers the end of the nineteenth 
century also in terms of developmental history. During child-
hood and latency everyone is “legendary.” But “at fifteen there 
comes to be a realisation of what living was in medieval times 
and as a pioneer. It is very near. And now in 1943 it is here” (16).51 
Along the seafaring trajectory of Elizabethan England that 
Carl Schmitt saw depart from the other history of the European 
50 Gertrude Stein, Wars I Have Seen (London: B.T. Batsford Ltd., 1945), 
51. Subsequent page references are given in the text.
51 Stein transfers the end of the nineteenth century to the Teen Age in 
developmental history by including midlife crisis and criticism, like 
the input of Lord Henry in the work of prematurity that Dorian 
becomes. “This is more like the beginning of middle living” (12). This 
resonates with what follows, namely living in the Middle Ages (which 
she juxtaposes to the pioneer on the frontier). Stein’s American sense 
of “medieval times,” moreover, like the fairs that became popular in 
the 1960s in California, like the future in outer space of The Skies 
Discrowned (1976), written by Timothy Powers, one of P.K. Dick’s aco-
lytes in Southern California, places the Renaissance in the foreground. 
In Westworld the recognizable medievalism of the robot lady’s outfit 
(last time I checked it was the favorite historical costume for dressing 
up Barbie) is a match with the squire attire of the role player, which, 
however, looks renaissance.
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continent,52 a stopover should be added. English interests (or 
letters according to Stein’s “What Is English Literature,” one of 
the lectures of her US tour, as famous in its day as Wilde’s earlier 
junket) could not get past their basic insularity, and the empire 
got stuck like an island peg in a square world. The new world in 
The Tempest is viewed island to island. All the changes that Stein 
recounts in the history of English letters wrap around the steady-
ing content of a daily island life. With the onset of sea power and 
then colonization, this content grew to include owning not only 
living a daily island life but also, by the nineteenth century, the 
rest of the world outside: “[O]utside and inside had to be told 
something about all this owning, […] and so there was invented 
explaining.”53 By the nineteenth century, then, phrases of expla-
nation and sentiment filled the word count of English literature.
They thought about what they were thinking and if you 
think about what you are thinking you are bound to think 
about it in phrases, because if you think about what you are 
thinking you are not thinking about a whole thing. If you are 
explaining the same thing is true, you cannot explain a whole 
thing because if it is a whole thing it does not need explaining, 
it merely needs stating. And then the emotional sentiment 
that any one living their daily living and owning everything 
outside needs to express is again something that can only be 
expressed by phrases, neither by words nor by sentences. (51)
As the end of the nineteenth century neared, the insular econ-
omy of the phrase began to capsize: “[T]he daily living was ceas-
ing to be quite so daily and besides that they were beginning not 
to know everything about owning everything that was outside 
of them outside of their daily living. […] And so the phrase no 
longer sufficiently held what a phrase had to hold” (53–54). 
52 This “Brexit” genealogy goes into Schmitt’s monograph on Hamlet, 
which was a mainstay of my study SPECTRE. 
53 Gertrude Stein, “What Is English Literature,” in Look at Me Now and 
Here I Am: Writings and Lectures 1909–45, ed. Patricia Meyerowitz 




And so, it was time for the paragraph to put a period to the 
end of Stein’s sentencing of English letters. American literature 
alone came to be imbued with a future feeling. The word had 
caught up with the new world setting, which “was so completely 
not a daily island life that one may well say that it was not a daily 
life at all” (53). When Henry James, like his English colleagues, 
needed a “whole paragraph” “his whole paragraph […] detached 
what it said from what it did, what it was from what it held, and 
over it all something floated, […] floated up there” (57). 
[T]he form was always the form of the contemporary English 
one, but the disembodied way of disconnecting something 
from anything and anything from something was the 
American one. […] It is a lack of connection, of there being 
no connection with living and daily living because there is 
none, that makes American writing what […] it will continue 
to become. (ibid.)
The Tempest counts as terminus for narratives of magical omnip-
otence harnessing spirits on the stage of discovery of new worlds. 
The black magic that summons ghosts from their graves, which 
Prospero admits to commanding but which we never witness, is 
the gist of what’s new for the seculars according to Christopher 
Marlowe’s The Tragical History of Doctor Faustus, the other 
bookend across from Hamlet on the Elizabethan shelf or horizon 
line addressing new means of steering through the secular after-
math (while setting sail for the colonial empire).54 In his version 
of the Faust legend, Goethe infused his inheritance of the only 
literary Faust with Hamlet, and offered a stay to the vengeful sib-
ling ghosts that he had come to recognize in the Werther Effect of 
copycat suicides.55 Marlowe’s Faustus turns to magic to raise the 
dead with conscious deliberation and put them at his disposal, 
carrying out at the speed of thought his every wish (which is their 
command). But watching out what you wish for, the lesson that 
54 I am reprising my reading of these bookends in SPECTRE where it 
belongs to the setting of a quarrel I ventriloquate between Klein and 
Lacan (27ff). 
55 See Rickels, Aberrations of Mourning, 84ff.
between a crypt and a datemark
146
unconscious or disowned wishing teaches, enters the uncanny 
prospect of Doctor Faustus’s own death. The next in line with a 
magic book will order around his ghostly afterlife. To die is to be 
enslaved, a secular hell. 
In Hamlet, Shakespeare offered mourning in lieu of magic 
as the new medium of orientation in the secular world. An 
inner world of haunting is ensconced within the greater setting 
of succession where every act is delivered on schedule and is its 
own reward. The inner profoundly adolescent drama stages not 
only an alternative inheritance but also another next genera-
tion. Giving grief is the unfinished business of adolescence. The 
father’s ghost would rob Hamlet by giving him a first job finish-
ing what’s at loose ends in the father’s legacy, the grief a father 
has to give. Instead of ending up as his father’s agent and heir, 
however, Hamlet becomes a ghost, which is his business, and 
charges his BFF Horatio to write down the story of his haunt and 
inaugurate the non-Oedipal delegation of double occupancy. 
That the insularity of empire broke upon the frontier would 
be the counterpart on the map to the paragraph’s breaching of 
the phrase. Wilde’s alternate internal dismantling of the phrase, 
his phrasing it out on the spit of wit, at once dispenses the phrase 
and dispenses with it, redistributing it and its cargo hold as 
resolutely as the Jamesian paragraph (with its ectoplasmic float-
ers). Lord Henry, the representative of Wilde’s conversational 
career as male carrier of an encrypted girl, extends his “influence” 
not only to his creation, Dorian. At the outer limit of a novel 
steeped in the idea that everything can be expressed, it inflects the 
unidentified, unseen narrator’s discourse on the many occasions 
in which the reader must wonder, who is speaking? 
Wilde’s novel supplies the disconnect in Stein’s view that 
American letters remain closer than an insular literature that’s 
always being updated to the Elizabethan modus of choosing 
words to be placed next to each other. The disconnect is haunt-
ing, and it is up to Lord Henry to recognize that the afterlife that 
Shakespeare staged with ghosts has gone West. “It is an odd thing, 
but everyone who disappears is said to be seen at San Francisco. 
It must be a delightful city, and possess all the attractions of the 
next world” (232). Implicit here is the reservation that Alfred 
Hitchcock would resoundingly confirm.
making a wish
147
The onset of B-genres in the late nineteenth century coincides 
with the invention of cinema, which responds to the ununder-
stood in letters, like time travel, within a relay of visual and spe-
cial effects. Reading through Shakespeare’s delegation of haunt-
ing, the ascendancy of the B-genres belongs to the modern Teen 
Age that Stein saw commence toward the end of WWII between 
the continuous medievalism of fantasy and the pioneer explora-
tions of science fiction. And so, the conditions were ready and 
set to go for Star Wars to redraw the horizon line and become 
our oldest cultural memory. Lucas’s 1977 film illuminated the 
borderlands of the fantasy and science fiction genres folding out 
of and staggering the duel challenged by J.R.R. Tolkien and C.S. 
Lewis when they introduced their genre in running contrast to 
the science fiction of H.G. Wells. The resulting borderland of the 
B-genres counts today as the Heimat of the blockbuster culture 
industry.
If we tarried in A-culture it was also because a B-picture, 
Forbidden Planet (1956), took The Tempest to the final frontier.56 
The 1956 SF film, introducing Robby the Robot, internalizes 
and in part reverses The Tempest. Although a refugee, Prospero’s 
roundtrip outlines in advance the colonialist signature. When 
the insular new world is reprojected into outer space, coloniza-
tion already extends across interstellar distances jumped by 
hyperdrive. The philologist Morbius on Altair 4 exchanges vows 
with his new habitat and benefits from studying the artifacts left 
behind by the long extinct indigenous civilization of the Krells. 
By the surprise intrusions of his own disowned death wishes, 
Morbius discovers that the techno-animism of the Krells, which 
was capable of realizing wish fulfillment at the speed of thought, 
overlooked what the screenplay names the id – and a civiliza-
tion technologically far in advance of humanity’s space age was 
undone. The science fiction movie issues a warning against any 
realization of omnipotent fantasy that overlooks unconscious 
wishing. 
56 This as much as the dew that Prospero ordered Ariel to bring him from 
the Bermudas shows that, in spite of the Mediterranean location off 
the coast of North Africa, Shakespeare’s fantasy island belongs to the 
new world.
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The warning will be updated. Techno-fantasy cannot outfly 
the shortfall and recoil of science fiction’s predictive service. The 
history of the contested borderlands of both B-genres marks 
changes that arose in expectation of what the new media held 
in store, changes realized (but outside the box of what had been 
projected) upon the arrival of the unanticipated digital relation, 
which at last seemed to award the fantasy genre the contest prize. 
When in 1991 Peter Greenaway adapted The Tempest for his first 
digital film, Prospero’s Books, a new magic that the director lets 
go on and on leads to fantasying paintings as tableaux vivants 
and books as the concise history binding the printing press to 
the apparatus lying within the digital film medium’s prehistory. 
Greenaway looked past the Christian focus on surveillance in 
anticipations of the digital relation to highlight instead the 
upsurge of archival citation of every name, event, form, and 
medium in history, but each time as an entry removed from its 
former setting upon opposition.
The unmooring of fantasy from its belief system occurred in 
tandem with the revaluation of the science fiction genre. Once its 
future orientation was “history,” the genre indwelled the ruins 
of its faulty forecasts. Science fiction began supplying captions 
of legibility for deregulated fantasy. As Freud stipulated via the 
datemark stamping its denied trigger in the present, fantasy is 
historicization waiting to happen, the mortal recoil of its flight. 
Science fiction, the allegory of fantasy, also lies in wait. By its 
salvos of right or wrong extrapolation, it is grounded in the 
present tense and, within the borderlands it shares with fantasy, 
illuminates ongoing tensions and encrypted contents. If the 
netherworld of supernatural afterlives is, already according to 
Immanuel Kant, the ultimate occasion and setting for fantasying 






Following the success of The Autobiography of Alice B. Toklas 
(1933), Gertrude Stein suffered a bout of writer’s block. Over 
and again, she recorded that “It has not happened,” until she 
was visited instead by W.B. Seabrook.1 We don’t know what 
exactly they talked about for three days. Seabrook was also only 
recently a famous author. His 1929 The Magic Island, about 
the occult practices he encountered on Haiti, introduced the 
zombie to American popular culture. White Zombie (1932), 
which was in part an adaptation of his book, had just joined the 
new Hollywood franchise of occult horror in talking pictures. 
Bela Lugosi, already famous for his leading role in Browning’s 
Dracula (1930), played the zombie master, whose given name was 
Murder. Stein knew that she would be going back soon to tour 
in the train of the success of her novel and would surely have 
been curious about America today. 
Both Stein and Seabrook were known for the frank intensity 
of what they were willing to talk about. The topics in Seabrook’s 
repertoire of great interest to Stein as well counted sadistic sex 
practices (binding and hanging) and cannibalism. But the author 
of The Magic Island was also hurting from his earlier success, 
scrambling to hitch his subsequent efforts to his 1929 star. After 
1 I am relying on John Herbert Gill’s Introduction in Gertrude Stein, 
Blood on the Dining-Room Floor: A Murder Mystery (Mineola: Dover 
Publications, 2008).
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the exchange, Seabrook went directly to the States, entered a 
psychiatric hospital for treatment of his acute alcoholism, and 
documented the sojourn in his ethnographic journalism style a 
year later in Asylum (1935), which enjoyed the self-fulfilling suc-
cess of the celebrity memoir. Following Seabrook’s departure, 
Stein wrote her one and only murder mystery, Blood on the 
Dining-Room Floor, which, though she never saw it through to 
publication, was the “block-buster” that allowed her to compose 
a series of celebrity-memoir novels in which she rewrote history 
as the killing off of undead centuries. 
Stein reckons in Wars I Have Seen that it took Napoleon to 
kill off the eighteenth century he epitomized.2 Then came the 
Big One, the nineteenth century, kept going by the theory of 
evolution it spread across the globe: “The nineteenth century is 
taking from 1914 to 1943 to kill” (9). Evolution can also mean that 
it takes but one advance in machine technology to redraw the 
map of adaptation, ultimately to war.
Although Hitler was the quintessential avatar of the nine-
teenth century who destroyed it and himself in the setting of 
Europe, Stein also argued that the Civil War already ended the 
nineteenth century in the US, which was why for quite some 
time to come it was the oldest nation of the twentieth century: 
“The American civil war was the prototype of all the wars the 
two big wars that I have completely lived” (4). Stein’s contrast 
between the World War One doughboys hanging out bashfully 
or dully post-victory in Europe and the self-possessed GIs at 
the end of World War Two, who owned their every setting in 
which they were conversant, suggests that the vault into the new 
century left the denizens of its new world behind to catch up 
with the overturning of the old century, which happened when 
it replayed in Europe.3 When a European author delivered the 
first bona fide science fiction of rocket flight in 1865 (Jules Verne’s 
From the Earth to the Moon), he was on target in ascribing its 
2 Gertrude Stein, Wars I Have Seen (London: B.T. Batsford Ltd., 1945), 
8. Subsequent page references are given in the text.
3 What also animates the GIs for Stein is that they know who she is. It is 
by the light of the fame of her unblocked writing that Stein reads the 
zombie wars carrying out the old and ushering in the new.
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invention to the Baltimore Gun Club, which applied the techno-
benefits picked up in the testing grounds of the Civil War.4 At 
the opening of Gone with the Wind (1939), as parchment pages of 
medievalist fantasy turn, we are introduced to an era long gone, 
in which representatives of European tradition still held court 
down South. With the borders opposed during the Civil War, 
modern spiritualism, which was the afterlife adapted to science 
fiction, went directly from the Northern States to Europe. Once 
the last ties to Europe in the New World were liquidated with the 
Confederacy, the import of globalization reached the South, too, 
which yielded its occult stores to science fiction. 
In the Professor Challenger novels by Arthur Conan Doyle, 
the protagonist, more a detective than an adventurer, passes tests 
posed by fantasy and science fiction before meeting his greatest 
challenge of all, belief in spiritualism.5 In The Lost World (1912), 
the professor visits a surviving pocket of prehistoric nature and 
wildlife. In The Poison Belt (1913), he is one in a locked-room 
circle of witnesses to the world’s engulfment by a poison cloud. 
In The Land of Mist (1926), the figments of fantasy and science 
fiction give way before the contemporary phenomenon of spiri-
4 See my Germany: A Science Fiction (Fort Wayne: Anti-Oedipus Press, 
2014), 101–4. 
5 In Mille Plateaux, Deleuze and Guattari drew out of a couple of 
Professor Challenger science-fiction short stories an assembly line for 
their body without organs. In “When the World Screamed” (1928), the 
professor exacts from the earth a Schreberesque bellowing miracle by 
skinning one part of the Earth like an animal and piercing its nerve. 
The professor, who wants to be the first and only human the earth 
recognizes, journeys, in effect, to the animist view of the world as a 
single organic being. In “The Disintegration Machine” (1929), another 
scientist has tapped a secret power he can aim through a machine. He 
can disintegrate organic beings and then, by putting the machine in 
reverse, reassemble them. That a destroyed being returns as the same, 
in spite of the molecular flow released in the breakdown, prompts 
the inventor to analogize the power he wields with teleportation in 
Western occultism. Professor Challenger is a bystander whose accep-
tance in the end does not enroll him in the company of the committed. 
But then he checks out the machine and makes the inventor disappear 
forever. 
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tualism. Professor Challenger is its most celebrated antagonist, 
but his resistance to reports and demonstrations of ghost-seeing 
gives them the traction of testable hypothesis and his acceptance 
follows suit. Here we see the work of detection characteristic 
of Conan Doyle’s Sherlock Holmes mysteries already at work 
in the receiving and conceiving area of modern spiritualism. In 
French letters, too, for example the novels by Gaston Leroux and 
Maurice Renard, we observe the affinity between the new detec-
tion plot and modern spiritualism.6 
In Ubik (1969), P.K. Dick projected a techno-realization 
and refinement of the historical artifact of modern spiritu-
alism. Unlike the philosophical “spiritualism” that Kant, 
Schopenhauer, and Freud rejected, the cult of modern spiri-
tualism, even if certain adherents sought to reconcile it with 
Christianity, was constitutively a secular-mediatic enterprise that 
kept to a span of extended finitude, lodged between the recent 
past and the near future. The admittedly fantastic summoning 
of spirit guides from all the eras and places in history wasn’t 
really a contradiction. It testified to the renewal of the planetary 
scope of animism, which regional civilizations had consigned to 
the border as superstition. 
Ghost-seeing has undergone many updates, but what draws it 
onward since the Enlightenment is that it hypothetically explores 
what counts in the main as unseen communication that never 
really materializes as proof. Creaturely occult relations pose a 
different challenge. When the epidemic outbreak of vampirism 
occurred in eighteenth-century Central Europe, all the stations 
of recording and transmission available under the newly secular 
aegis of the Enlightenment turned this iteration of a recurring 
prospect of too much life in death into a primal scene. Over the 
ages, in settings of rapid burial in sites already used and now 
reused, like during cholera epidemics, those who witnessed the 
metabolic changes in a corpse early on in the course of decom-
position – including the freeze-frame of somebody struggling 
against the frequent mistake of burial alive – could not rely on 




religion or science for an explanation. They turned instead to 
superstition, the warping reverb of repressed animism. 
At the so-called vampire courts set up during the eighteenth-
century outbreak of undeath, corpses were examined for evi-
dence of the charges brought against the recently deceased. If the 
skin seemed too ruddy, too fresh, the body too bloated like after 
a feeding, or the hair and nails still growing, the dead body was 
sentenced to death.7 These court proceedings were recorded and 
their gist thus circulated in news reports. In no time, the docu-
mented event of the epidemic entered the scholarly apparatus 
in Germany and France, resulting in a number of dissertations 
and treatises. The corpses to be tried and examined for undeath, 
however, were in short supply and could not support the fasci-
nation with something as close to home as mourning the dead. 
In other words, unlike the prayerful contact with the departed 
in ghost-seeing, vampirism could not continue as a hypotheti-
cal construct. The relationship to vampirism became, instead, 
psychic, at first by entering literature. It started with a couple of 
German poems in which the beloved returns from the grave to 
consummate the relationship in undeath. They made such an 
impression throughout the language cultures into which they 
were quickly translated, that as late as in Jane Eyre (1847), the 
surprise co-tenant is taken to be the “German vampire.” 
7 These special effects would in time be known to belong to the natural 
process in the early phase of decomposition. The skin tightens, dries 
out, sloughs off leaving “fresh” skin and showing the apparent growth 
of hair and nails. The build-up of gas and its displacements plumped 
up bodies, even making a corpse jolt upright like Nosferatu rising 
up from his coffin. The freeze frame of the struggles of those buried 
alive presented the most memorable portrait of the vampire. In 
Aberrations of Mourning: Writing on German Crypts (Detroit: Wayne 
State University Press, 1988) and The Vampire Lectures (Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota Press, 1999), I argued that the Enlightenment 
replacement of the skeletal representation of death by a more natural, 
even beautiful figuration borrowed from Antiquity (the twin brother 
of sleep) was just waiting for its co-optation within the new secular 
scenario of an uncanny doubling between sleep and waking up buried 
alive. 
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English authors were able to turn the relationship to the 
vampire into narrative. There is one early German vampire 
story, E.T.A. Hoffmann’s “Der Vampir” (1821), which is a docu-
fictionalization of an episode that refers to (and looks like it’s on 
the record of) the vampirism epidemic. That it concludes, how-
ever, with a full body shot of cannibalism, rather than the more 
discrete drips and pricks of blood lust, reflects the pull of the 
German inclination to make book out of doubling. The double 
was the sole occult figure to transfer intact into the environs of 
the science-fiction genre, which explains the German head-start 
so spectacularly illustrated in Fritz Lang’s Metropolis. The psy-
chic and the hypothetical trajectories conjoin in the double. Its 
material immateriality is as close or far away as are mirror and 
media. In treatises on ghost-seeing, seeing double becomes a 
form of communication with the yet living that comes as close to 
contact with the dead as their authors can allow. And yet it is the 
un-provability of ghostly communication with the departed that 
draws all psychic research onward.
In “The Confidences of a ‘Psychical Researcher’,” William 
James, philosophy’s representative in the experimental setting 
of spiritualism, applied a self-help exercise to organize his own 
undecided stance with regard to occult phenomena that are 
“inwardly as incoherent as they are outwardly wayward and fit-
ful,” like the “stray vestiges of that primordial irrationality, from 
which all our rationalities have been evolved”8: 
Try, reader, yourself, to invent an unprecedented kind of 
“physical phenomenon of spiritualism.” When I try, I find 
myself mentally turning over the regular medium-stock, and 
thinking how I might improve some item. This being the 
dramatically probable human way, I think differently of the 
whole type, taken collectively, from the way in which I may 
think of the single instance. I find myself believing that there 
is “something in” these never ending reports of physical phe-
nomena, although I haven’t yet the least positive notion of 
8 William James, “The Confidences of a ‘Psychical Researcher’,” in 
Writings 1902–1910 (New York: Library of America, 1988), 1259.
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the something. It becomes to my mind simply a very worthy 
problem for investigation.9  
In Telepathy and Medical Psychology, Jan Ehrenwald, an author 
P.K. Dick read closely, reflects on the paradox that during the 
Cold War era of modern spiritualism the new discipline of para-
psychology adopted the statistical method not to document the 
reliability of experimental results, but to demonstrate the very 
existence of extra-sensory perception.10 It was the only reliable 
standard for determining the extra-chance nature of the scores. 
In countless experiments, in which images were transferred by 
thought alone, the percipient being tested rarely reproduced 
the whole of the testing agent’s mental content but tended to 
score “near misses” scattered around the target idea (69). While 
a “‘near miss’” is “certainly less convincing than a fully correct 
guess,” it proves of “even greater psychological interest” (29). It 
is what the agent does not think of transmitting which is most 
successfully transmitted to the test subject (31). And there is a 
tendency for the percipient’s guess to slip from the essential to 
the accidental (ibid.). There is nothing to prevent thoughts, 
ideas, or expectations that are not immediately concerned with 
the proposed test from entering the subject’s mind. That’s what 
telepathy is all about: “telepathic leakage” (32). 
The spatio-temporal dislocation in the telepathic reception 
of thought processes in another person’s mind – reflecting them 
either after the event of presumed contact or ahead of time – can 
give the transmission a semblance of prophecy (197). Only by 
setting a period of time in the course of an experiment could the 
operation of hetero-psychic experiences be tracked. Otherwise, 
Ehrenwald concludes, “there would be no limit set to the range 
of telepathic scatter” (139). The science fiction of a psychophysi-
cal grid, according to Williamson according to Günther, com-
pletes the technologization of the opposition which Ehrenwald’s 
telepathic scatter begins to breach.
9 Ibid., 1261. Emphasis in the original.
10 Jan Ehrenwald, Telepathy and Medical Psychology (New York: Norton, 
1948), 34. Further page references are given in the text.
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In The American Apocalypse, Günther argues that the 
thought of the regional civilizations opened and entered the 
exceptional series of causality to secure the highest degree of 
probability. The eventuality of the next step was thus practically 
certain. To this end, so-called degrees of freedom had to be kept 
out. Günther ascribes “the serial theory of magic” to the animism 
of primitive culture. It groups together events under one specific 
perspective, which is all that they have in common, yielding a 
“virtual significance.”11 Logically, the components are causally 
independent of one another. The shorter the magic series, the 
more degrees of freedom are involved. One omen doesn’t mean 
much; two omens are way more meaningful; but too many 
omens no longer give the forecast since it is already happening 
(128). The exclusivity of causality conceals that cause reflects only 
one tendency in universal processes, one world-series. In addition 
to the general progression from improbable to more probable 
world conditions, there is also the “individualizing progression 
from probable chaos to improbable Gestalt and order” (159). 
Günther puts it evocatively: Freedom is the “third” between 
true and false (130). “Series with a random measure of degrees of 
freedom are theoretically as controllable and calculable as simple 
causality series” (153).
Ehrenwald’s study proposes a telepathy connection fomenting 
the outbreak of schizophrenia in adolescence, which fits Dick’s 
construction in The Martian Time-Slip (1964) of the rapport 
between Jack Bohlen, the recovering adult schizophrenic, and 
the autistic-schizophrenic teen Martin, who wields paranormal 
powers. Adolescence, according to Ehrenwald, is the season for 
the onset of the psychotic illness, because it is the period when, 
for the sake of group bonding and couplification, the teen is 
challenged to renounce the isolation enjoyed in latency, the inde-
pendence won toward the end of childhood proper from merger 
with the minds of the parents (193). Paranoia and megalomania 
are last stands of coherence before the full disintegration into 
schizophrenia sets in. It marks the end of the subject’s struggle to 
11 Gotthard Günther, Die amerikanische Apokalypse, ed. Kurt 
Klagenfurt (Klagenfurt: Profil, 2000), 121–22. Subsequent page refer-
ences are given in the text.
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maintain their personality against the impact of sadistic aggres-
sion conveyed through the hetero-psychic crossover of thoughts 
and wishes (147).
Dick’s half-life system in Ubik is violated, when a teen delin-
quent among the ghosts starts consuming, depleting, and liqui-
dating all ghostly others. But the life suck brings up the arrears in 
testing, and carries out the sentencing of finitude in the afterlife: 
the second death, which is murder. Modern spiritualism turned 
absence of proof into a promo for testing, which by testing for 
it confers more and more hypothetical reality. That’s its science-
fiction aspect. But spiritualism also faces toward horror fantasy. 
The planetary animism that spiritualism updates to allow for 
the hypothetical reality of ghostly correspondents via media gets 
subsumed, according to Freud’s Totem and Taboo, by the psychic 
reality of the living dead moving against us. 
The Psychopathy Test
One turning point in my longstanding reception of horror 
between occult and technical media, which my 2016 book 
The Psycho Records documents,12 was my 2009 invitation by 
Artforum International to interpret the updating of vampirism. 
A new integration of the vampire seemed to be offering a stay 
against the thrill-a-kill consumerism of the unidentified dying 
zombie that had been in the ascendant since 9/11. 
I concluded, however, that what was left lurking in the divide 
between undeath and living death was the psycho, our most 
uncanny double at close quarters: there, but for the grace of the 
good object, go I. Since psycho violence, which was carried for-
ward, but without agency as zombieism, upon the termination 
phase of slasher film therapy, could be renewed intact in the Saw 
franchise through a compact with the Devil, I also concluded 
that what we were watching in mourning’s light was more a 
shake-up than a succession. Psycho murder, infernal instruction, 
zombie killing, and vampiric replication are split-off phases of 
the mourning process awaiting integration. 
12  See Record One of The Psycho Records. 
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A close look at the argument of Freud’s essay “Mourning 
and Melancholia” shows over and again how elimination loops 
through preservation. The mourner tests for the reality of the 
loved one’s absence in every port of recall. Rerecording erases, 
but reality testing’s eviction notice extends the afterlife of the 
departed. In the android test for the human ability to mourn, 
which P.K. Dick introduced in his 1968 novel Do Androids 
Dream of Electric Sheep?, the parameters of the text – I mean 
test – are empathy and psychopathy. These positive and nega-
tive outcomes of Dick’s version of reality testing also served in 
the novel that he published the year before, The Zap Gun, as 
reversible manipulations going into the invention of ultimate 
weapons. 
In his contribution to philosophical ethics, Schopenhauer 
argued that empathic identification, which can only gain traction 
in response to the other’s suffering, must somehow get past the 
complete difference between the self and every other on which 
basic egoism rests.13 The will can be moved by the well-being or 
being-in-pain of self or others, to which, therefore, the motive 
for every action must relate. The address of every action is any-
one who can benefit from the experience: the one who acts, the 
recipient, or even a passive bystander. 
What counts high on the scale of morals is compassion – 
Mitleid in German, literally “suffering with,” which is real and 
not dreamed up. Happiness is nice, but who cares? To sympa-
thize with the other directly, the requisite is the other’s suffering, 
because Mitleid cannot be extended to the other’s well-being. 
We might care if the happiness followed a sorry state. At the same 
time, we never confuse ourselves with the object of our empathic 
identification. We feel the other’s pain, but it is his or her pain, 
not our own. Schopenhauer gives us the grid that Dick turns into 
a game in which the standoff between empathy and psychopathy 
is manipulated unto the player’s self derangement. 
According to the 1974 interview with Arthur Cover, Dick set 
his compass to the alternate realities of science fiction by turning 
13 Arthur Schopenhauer, “Preisschrift über die Grundlage der Moral,” 




up the contrast with fantasy, the genre in which he first tested his 
decision to write. Dick explained: “In fantasy, you never go back 
to believing there are trolls, unicorns […] and so on. But in sci-
ence fiction, you read it, and it’s not true now but there are things 
which are not true now which are going to be someday. […] It’s 
like all science fiction occurs in alternate future universes.”14 Five 
years later, Dick took up the contrast again in his afterword to Dr 
Adder, the first novel by K.W. Jeter, at the time one of his So-Cal 
acolytes. Writing about Jeter’s novel, which was completed in 
1972 but not published until 1984, Dick defended bona fide 
science fiction against the fantasy hybrid: “Endless novels about 
sword fights and figures in cloaks who perform magic – in other 
words clones of the Hobbit books – have been cranked out, pub-
lished, sold, and the field of science fiction has been transmuted 
into a joke field.”15 And then, making the pitch for Dr Adder: 
“[A]ren’t you tired of reading about magic and wizards and 
little people with turned-up fuzzy feet?”16 What had intervened 
between the interview with Arthur Cover and the afterword was 
Star Wars. Just the same Dr Jeter like Dick’s The Zap Gun mixes 
with fantasy to stage a postmodern heroic saga. The Zap Gun, 
which counts as a James Bond spoof, cites from the German 
Wagnerian and Anglo-American traditions of superheroism.17 
The Cold War opposition between Wes-Dem and Peep-
East is a front for what’s really a division of labor in one media 
operation. The protagonist, Lars Powdery, works for Wes-Dem’s 
weapons fashions design industry, which stretches “subsurface 
14 Philip K. Dick, The Last Interview and Other Conversations, ed. David 
Streitfeld (Brooklyn and London: Melville House, 2015), 8.
15 K.W. Jeter, Dr Adder (London: Grafton Books, 1987), 248. For a more 
complete account of the figuration of psychopathy and its integration 
in Jeter’s complex novel, see my Germany: A Science Fiction (Fort 
Wayne: Anti-Oedipus Press, 2014), 134–38.
16 Jeter, Dr Adder, 249.
17 In I Think I Am: Philip K. Dick (Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota Press, 2010), 301ff, I read the novel through the protago-
nist’s desire to be with the dead. This time my emphasis shifts to 
address its conclusion, which tests for the psychopathy in successful 
mourning.
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from San Francisco to Los Angeles.”18 The weapons are props 
in demo films that simulate their efficacy in staged tactical opera-
tions against localized threats, like criminality in one’s own soci-
ety. Many designs are then turned into toys or adult gizmos, for 
example Ol’Orville, a talking head that answers questions, like a 
party game or an oracle. 
The gadget Ol’Orville, which consists of all the parts that 
were to go into the original weapon that Lars once designed, 
gives therapeutic forecast and counsel. First, it diagnoses Lars’s 
castration anxiety, namely, his dread that after going under in 
a mediumistic trance he could bring nothing back. The pros-
pect of being, even in fantasy, waffenlos (without weapons) like 
Parsifal, says Ol’Orville, brings to a crisis point the lack of real 
weapons in his line of work. Lars’s partner, Maren Faine, hovers 
over this exchange punctuating the counsel with jabs of her own 
that bring the castration home. 
Alternating between the lingo of Wagnerian heroism and the 
plain text of successful mourning, Ol’Orville steers Lars clear 
of suicide and picks up what the Cold War opposition holds 
in store for Lars: the way out of his impasse by substituting for 
ol’Maren Lilo Topchev, the Peep-East main medium. Although 
Lars has only glimpsed his rival in blurred surveillance photos, 
she in fact already occupies the foreground of his wish fantasying 
(something Maren, a telepath, picks up). 
Lilo and Lars are brought together by an actual threat from 
outer space. Rockets from Sirius are targeting whole territories 
and beaming their populations into slavery. Together Lilo and 
Lars work to project a real weapon to be used in Earth’s defense. 
But their trance states prove capable of communicating and 
picking up only fantasy constructs. It turns out that the weapon 
designs that Lars and Lilo were fashioning all these years on their 
different shores of the faux Cold War opposition originated 
in the same fantasy space to which a certain Oral Giacomini, 
the author and artist of the ongoing adventures of “The Blue 
Cephalopod Man from Titan,” had equal access. Their weapons 
were featured at the same time on the pages of the comic-book 
18 Philip K. Dick, The Zap Gun (London: HarperCollins, 1998), 155. 
Subsequent page references are given in the text. 
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superhero series, whose creator, an ex-inventor, would be but 
for electroshocks and thalamic-suppressors in complete autistic 
schizophrenic withdrawal. Telepathically, without knowing it, 
the designers were party to a superhero space fantasy comprised 
of “worthless, grandiose, schizophrenic delusions of world-
power” (135). 
The saving device that is delivered after all proves to be a 
toy prototype that one of Lars’s colleagues at the design plant, 
Vincent Klug, considered a teaching tool. By telepathy-enriched 
identification with the little critter in the maze, a child playing the 
game of torment and escape would understand the significance 
of empathy. Klug’s toy, however, was never produced. When 
Klug returns from a roundtrip to the future that he took to get 
his invention noticed, he’s an ancient veteran from a world that 
survived the outer space attack. He finally attracts attention, but 
he can’t by dint of an abstruse fiat of time travel impart anything 
from the future. All he can do is point to something already in 
the present environment. Only by guessing games can Klug show 
Lars the way to the toy prototype existing now, which contains 
the kernel of the future weapon. 
Upon abandoning a project with androids that were “really 
human-like,” Klug developed the game of critter identification 
within the labyrinth of animal testing. “The psychiatric theory 
is that this toy teaches the child to care about other living organ-
isms. […] He wants to help the creature, and that stud on the 
right permits him to do so” (168). Lars points out, however, that 
there is the stud on the left, too. Although the game can’t foster 
sadistic tendencies, because the telepathic empathy circuit makes 
the player the victim who must win against all odds, “to keep 
the game going, you stop pressing the decrease stud and activate 
the increase, and the maze-circuitry responds by stepping up the 
difficulty which the trapped creature faces” (ibid.). By increas-
ing the output of the telepathic empathy circuit and altering 
the controls so that both studs augment the difficulty the maze 
victim undergoes, the modified toy cannot but induce “a rapid, 
thorough mental disintegration” in “any life form that was intel-
ligent enough to receive the emanations” (169).
The happy outcome of Lars and Lilo’s search for the best 
defense against the invaders from outer space is followed by 
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Lars’s second consultation of Ol’Orville, this time in the set-
ting of substitution. The success of substitution and mourning 
would appear to have wrecked Lars. Because Lilo and Lars were 
coupled while working on a functioning weapon, Maren, the 
odd woman out, killed herself on or off purpose. It looked like 
she was gunning for Lilo or for Lars, but then blew herself up by 
accident. It is up to Ol’Orville to remind Lars that already prior 
to her exitus he had substituted Lilo for his ex. The close quarters 
of empathy and psychopathy, in which the game that is a lethal 
weapon is played, match the tight spot in which Lars, to keep his 
game going, must apply psychopathy to secure the prospect of 
living on in substitution.
Lars wants to harness time travel to remembrance: “I just 
don’t understand where the past goes when it goes. […] Where 
is she? Where’s she gone?” (173). He would come right back to 
Lilo following the visit with Maren in alternate reality. It is an 
itinerary within the mediatic mortuary circuit often booked in 
Dick’s novels. This sci-fi death cult is the mediatic application of 
the ambivalence toward the dead staggered through a letting go 
that keeps the ghost going, which Freud elaborated in Mourning 
and Melancholia. When Lilo responds that if he goes, he should 
stay gone she pronounces the paralyzing injunction that Freud 
attributed to the onset of mourning. The survivor must choose 
either to let the dead go or to join them. 
Lilo heads Lars off at the impasse of his underlying funereal 
fantasy of waiting around until time travel becomes available in 
forty years, so he can go back to visit her in the past. She considers 
Lars’s unmourning fixation – the question, where do the goners 
go – a hysterical symptom, a faux incorporation that must yield 
precedence to the substitute or go one-way like the goner. Lars 
at first resists the intervention, the death-wish scenario and its 
psychic quality, which he aptly identifies, thus coming closer, 
however, to the substitute’s truth: “That simple. That simple, 
anyhow, to the easy scene-fabrication faculty available within the 
psychopathically-glib human mind” (175). Although psychopa-
thy is the logical counterpart to the empathy for which Dick 
ceaselessly tested, the term is almost never used in Dick’s fiction. 
This is the spectacular exception.
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The oracle supports Lilo’s paradoxical intervention – her 
encouragement of his suicidality – and then prescribes that Lars 
go have sex with her. If this devaluation of melancholia in Dick’s 
oeuvre seems unique, it is so in tandem with the perspective of 
the substitute, which is brought to bear outside the melancholic 
atmosphere of suspicion of murder. The parameters of psychop-
athy and empathy working together in The Zap Gun describe 
the close quarters in which the mourner must follow out and 
surpass the death wish to secure the innovation of living on. 
All You Vampires
The innovation of survival follows a new line on the geopoliti-
cal map. According to Günther in The American Apocalypse, it 
is the departure fundamental to science fiction and it draws 
us onward: “one lived in a world dimension that had no fixed 
proportions organizing a unitary, physiognomically familiar 
landscape, but rather one that by a natural process kept expand-
ing westward and in which the dominant psychic category was 
the new.”19 While in Der Untergang des Abendlandes (The 
Decline of the West, 1918), Oswald Spengler forecast that the 
final “Faustian” phase of regional civilization was phasing out 
without the prospect of succession, Günther counters that the 
future was already upon us of a new civilization that would be 
planetary, the launching pad for an intergalactic civilization that 
would no longer be earth-bound. While so-called primitive cul-
ture has always been a planetary phenomenon, the high cultures 
that hailed from the East were tied to specific geographically cir-
cumscribed areas, which they required, according to Spengler, as 
their Mutterboden or “mother earth.” The visions of outer space 
presuppose a universal planetary civilization – and condition or 
determine a new non-classical conception of reality. 
The relay of frontiers leading up to the final Terran frontier, 
Günther agrees with Stein, was guaranteed by the outcome of 
the American Civil War. In the south, Günther writes, “the 
cultural tradition of European history was always incomparably 
19 Günther, Die amerikanische Apokalypse, 108. Subsequent page 
references are given in the text.
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stronger than in the north,” a connaisseurship of European cul-
tural traditions without “any creative spark to carry it forward” 
(193). The belief that European history and culture were to be 
continued on the American continent was dominant prior to the 
Civil War. “The outcome of the civil war […] is one of the most 
powerful factors in the psychic isolation of the American indi-
vidual and the atomization of the continent’s population” (194). 
Waiting around for outer space following the separation from 
Europe with no other end or purpose in sight can be lonely and 
empty. “Everyone looks around and sees only larvae and talking 
automata” (195). 
The metaphysical hierarchy of landscapes no longer holds: 
every landscape has the same historical value (117). Once he 
too had followed out the westward trek to the final frontier up 
against the Pacific, Günther saw that the switch of the frontier 
to a vertical axis was already underway. The wide-open layout 
of neighborhoods in Southern California, which relied on and 
reflected the car as sole means of transport, comprised the address 
rehearsal for life on foreign planets (184–85). 
In his Haitian memoir The Magic Island, W.B. Seabrook 
responds to his interlocutor’s occult etiology of zombieism: 
“[I]t is a fixed rule of reasoning in America that we will never 
accept the possibility of a thing’s being ‘supernatural’ so long as 
any natural explanation, even far-fetched, seems adequate.”20 In 
his 1942 reflections on the occult, Witchcraft: Its Power in the 
World Today, Seabrook considers supernatural figures, such as 
the vampire or the werewolf, to be “hallucinated” within a three-
way subjective reality, in which the creature, the victim, and the 
witness participate simultaneously.21 When his study extends to 
academic parapsychology, in particular research into clairvoy-
ance and retrocognition, Seabrook, impatient with the plodding 
neutrality of the experiments underway in his day, switches to 
the possibilities of outer space: 
20 William B. Seabrook, The Magic Island (New York and Tokyo: Ishi 
Press, 2015), 102.
21 William Seabrook, Witchcraft: Its Power in the World Today (London: 




If you were somewhere out there, and could see light carried 
there from here, bringing you visual images, what you would 
see in the light-waves would be our ancient stone age with its 
cave men, Pharaoh building the first pyramid, Caesar’s legions 
marching – depending on how many light-years distant you 
stopped off – all occurring as images in the present nick of 
time. (170) 
And: “[I]f you could travel through space with a speed greater 
than light, you […] could likewise go scooting into the future” 
(171). In sum, “telepathy and clairvoyance, including the read-
ing of the future, would become as simple as television and the 
radio” (ibid.). 
While Seabrook splits off such psy-fi prospects from vampiric 
undeath, his own introduction of the zombie entertained the 
reality-tested prospect of capitalization of PTSD victims as auto-
mated unremunerated labor. The TV extravaganza The Walking 
Dead that took off in 2010 triggered recognition in critics that 
the zombieism set in Atlanta disclosed its voodoo significance 
as slavery, the European history of the New World. But its 
twentieth-century significance was also already legible in the 
first episode. The outbreak of living death led to a reprisal of the 
hospital yard scene in Gone with the Wind. Identification with 
lost causes enlivens the south.22 But what rises again can be killed 
off again. The rise and the fall can be played out with zombies 
and with vampires. In Quentin Tarentino’s Django Unchained 
(2012), the antebellum South makes a good last resort for undead 
“European” aristorcrats. That Tarentino selected for the role 
of his white hero an actor hailing from another shore of crimes 
against humanity fits a cinema of integration, in which time-
traveling interventions skewering together traumatic histories go 
22 See the section of Germany: A Science Fiction, “The Identification 
with Lost Causes,” in which the reversal with losses is developed in the 
setting of Freud’s study of those wrecked by success. The reading of 
this popular encryptment, which the placement of the Trojan War at 
Rome’s origin exemplifies, also inflects Stein’s insight that through the 
civil war the United States became the oldest country of the twentieth 
century. 
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to the future of wish fulfillment and, for the present, change the 
past.
In the sci-fi setting of alternate history, vampires can come 
out of hiding to rule over mankind. In one scenario,23 their 
control is history following the inadvertent invention of the first 
lenses of magnification, by-products of the official task assigned 
human mechanicians to design interesting playthings for their 
rulers. Vampires don’t need a break from primary narcissism, 
the break you get with machines, which separate the body from 
itself to avert the crisis in uncanniness that the zombie embodies. 
In Jim Jarmusch’s Only Lovers Left Alive (2013), the vampires 
judge inventiveness by standards of collectibility, and contain 
the uncanny by calling humans zombies. And because vampires 
inhabit a relay of museum exhibits secured against death or loss, 
as Freud argued was the European condition prior to World War 
One,24 they lack the innovation enzyme. Once undeath can be 
conceived of as a germ viewed under a microscope, either the 
undead die or the living contract undeath en masse, a.k.a. living 
death. Either way, what the undead are good for in a science fic-
tion setting is the dress rehearsal for what Stein understood to be 
history: killing the century that has overstayed its welcome.
In American letters, beginning with A.E. van Vogt’s 1941 
story “Asylum,” vampirism underwent a remake. Upon coming 
to the New World, vampirism traveled through outer space. In 
“Asylum,” earthlings have known space travel for about one hun-
dred years. But humanity on Earth is one of several intergalactic 
races and the human vampires were created by an accidental sun 
blast one million years ago. The Galactic Observer, who alone 
has powers greater than the couple of vampires that suck blood 
23 I am recalling Brian Stableford’s “The Man Who Loved the Vampire 
Lady,” which I discuss in The Vampire Lectures (Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota Press, 1999), 108-10.
24 Sigmund Freud, “Thoughts for the Times on War and Death,” in The 
Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund 
Freud, Vol. XIV (1914–1916): On the History of the Psycho Analytic 
Movement, Papers on Metapsychology, and Other Works, ed. and trans. 




and life force, splits off the majority of his powers to assume the 
guise of a mild-mannered reporter. When he rises to the occasion 
of defending earth against the thoroughly modern or American 
high-IQ-boasting vampires it turns out that he holds a far higher 
score.
Thirteen years later, in Richard Matheson’s novel I Am 
Legend, the science-fictionalized vampires in van Vogt’s story 
could be readdressed as terrestrial masses of the living dead. These 
then are the opening tracks of vampirism in the New World: 
either European refugees lost in space or zombies. According to 
Matheson’s 1954 novel, the main text behind George Romero’s 
Night of the Living Dead (1968), it was an epidemic spread of 
undeath that massified the object relations of vampirism unto 
zombie-like consumerism. When there’s just not enough blood 
to go around, retrograde mutation promotes fracking of what’s 
left of life. In Daybreakers (2009), the running out of blood 
reserves causes vampires to mutate, a process accelerated by self-
feeding. The first mutants we encounter are leathery, winged 
creatures with long tails, demonic gargoyles from the edifice of 
Christianity (or the props department of fantasy). But after the 
German blood substitute fails and the crisis goes viral, the former 
vampires are the decaying living dead. 
The paradoxical intervention in vampirism that spawned the 
living dead, first identified by Romero as zombies in the sequel 
Dawn of the Dead (1978), undergoes its reversal in the strong-
hold of the sole survivor in I Am Legend, where the recent past 
is recycled melancholically. Through the science fiction of an 
apocalyptic war’s transmission of infectious undeath, vampirism 
in fact replaces the bulk rate of humanity. The traditional vam-
pire is at home, however, in sole survivorship. 
The vampire served Freud in Totem and Taboo as model 
for the transformation that the deceased loved one undergoes 
through the projective realignment of mixed feelings during 
mourning’s opening season. But it is Freud’s turn to the taboo 
restrictions placed upon contact with the dead, all the dead, 
which corresponds to the first group portrait of the vampire. 
According to Matheson’s origin story, his undead masses supply 
the missing link between the occult creatures of the night and 
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the secular prospect of what is announced in Night of the Living 
Dead to be an “epidemic of mass murder.”
In I Am Legend, the protagonist Robert Neville pitches 
his last stand against his own destruction, but in the first place 
against the siren wailing of the undead babes in the front yard, 
which he puts on mute by turning up the volume on the orches-
tral music his mother taught him to appreciate. Secured against 
the taboo bust of happy-hour substitution, the basic needs and 
supplies in Robert’s household and psychic economy reserve 
places for absence. His fortress home is the columbarium of his 
recent past, conserved between the closet of cans (and cannots) 
and the canned music of his habitat. 
Robert doesn’t want to be like his scientist father, who died 
denying the existence of the vampire. His recollection of the 
father’s denial is the first reference to “the vampire” in the novel.25 
The vampire that Robert believes in is not that of “the B-film fac-
tories” (29). His belief is rather the precondition for fighting the 
vampire for real. He doesn’t let sleeping vampires lie, but tests 
them by driving the point home. Then a no longer human survi-
vor discloses to Robert that she belongs to a new group of living 
vampires who have learned to regulate and defer the course of 
the infection by taking pills that combine blood with a drug pre-
venting multiplication of the vampire germ. Robert recognizes 
that the metabolic regulation really means that a mutation has 
already taken place. At the end, Robert doesn’t recognize in the 
clean-up elimination of the non-mutated vampires by vigilantes 
of the new order his own testing of subjects. His identification 
instead is now with the vampires, who are as vulnerable as only 
the dead can be: “With a sense of inward shock he could not 
analyze in the rush of the moment, he realized that he felt more 
deeply toward the vampires than he did toward their execution-
ers” (158). Before the mass prospect of living, dead, dead dead, 
and mutating revenants human mourning becomes the vampire.
The post-apocalyptic science-fiction setting in I Am Legend 
drives a split in undeath between one side that will come to be 
identified as zombieism and the side of survival that is allied to 
25 Richard Matheson, I Am Legend (New York: ORB, 1995), 29. 
Subsequent page references are given in the text.
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mutation. Sometimes a human survivor identifies his dead in a 
zombie that is still trying to come home. This trace element is 
what mutates into the new object relation embodied by Bub in 
Romero’s Day of the Dead (1985). On a feeding schedule and 
plugged into the earphones of the maternal Sensurround of 
music, Bub contains his violent tendencies. He also recognizes 
his research lab mentor as his father, whose death at the end of 
the film he will mourn. 
The corporeality of mutation, its dependency upon a constant 
milieu consisting of reproduction and death, is secondary to its 
acceleration in time, the sudden changes that bypass a cumula-
tive prehistory of evolutionary adjustment. Mutation, the fast 
track in the theory of evolution, sponsored among the earliest 
psy-fi conceits the prospect of any species, natural or artificial, 
fast-forwarding into survival of the fittest. Already in Samuel 
Butler’s Erewhon (1872), the ultimate fit was seen to be with 
technology, which reverses the prosthetic relationship and does 
the evolving for us. The first historical scheme that could address 
the impact of machine technology was, therefore, a byproduct of 
evolution. Time travel is the corollary in narrative form and the 
psychic pendant to this techno-history.
As fantasy, time travel spins the denial of irretrievable loss 
by rendering generational time trans-parent (like in the Back to 
the Future franchise, 1985–1990). I underscored in Germany: A 
Science Fiction that in P.K. Dick’s The Simulacra the technique 
of time transport forever falls short of changing traumatic his-
tory and provides, instead, training in the reality of loss. But not 
only fantasy is stowaway in time travel; evolutionary prehistory 
also hitches a ride. That the science fiction of travel in time can 
overtake and remake the evolutionary machine history that turns 
on mutation and breach its controlling interest in the future is 
conveyed by Robert Heinlein’s short story “All You Zombies…” 
(1959). The alternate realities and histories branching off from 
each stopover in double time inscribe time travel’s other legibility 
within its staging area – addressing both the expansion of the 
recording surface of finite remembrance and the innovation of 
survival. 
In “All You Zombies…,” a time-travel device dated 1992 secures 
the future of the species by multiplying sole survival.. The 
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unnamed protagonist is an agent in a secret service that travels 
in time to reverse damages at their onset. However, the “Mistake 
of ’72,” which belongs to the near future that Matheson’s 1954 
novel also inhabits, can’t be undone. It “either is, or it isn’t.” And 
“there won’t be another like it.”26 At the bar that the secret agent 
protagonist is tending in 1970, a customer tells his story, a shaggy 
dog that the 2014 film adaptation Predestination couldn’t leave 
lie. But boring, like Doubting Thomas’s finger, enters and exits 
a wound. 
On a dare, then, the customer tells the bartender his history, 
which will be unlike any story he has ever heard. He is an intersex 
unwed mother, Jane, who was turned upon giving birth into a 
man. Next their daughter was snatched from the hospital. The 
storyteller assumes it was the baby’s father who betrayed Jane 
and then ruined her thoroughly. After awarding the prize to the 
storyteller, whose day job is authorship of romance fantasies 
under the name “the unwed mother,” the bartender offers an 
alternate ending to the sorry story. They can travel into the past 
to get back at the man who abandoned them. Their stopovers in 
the past, in 1945, 1963, and 1964, reenact Jane’s story. But in truth 
the bartender-protagonist is following out through alternate 
histories his own story. 
By rewinding the historical or mythic past around him – he 
is father, mother, and child – he skips the Mistake of ’72 in the 
near future and delivers instead another version of himself as 
new recruit for time service in 1985. When he gives his report (in 
1993), he counts forty recruitments in the course of this stint of 
his time service. “Then I glanced at the ring on my finger. The 
Snake That Eats Its Own Tail, Forever and Ever […] I know 
where I came from – but where did all you zombies come from?” 
(46). In real time, he, like Robert Neville, is sole survivor of a 
plague of living death. Heinlein’s protagonist doesn’t cede the 
future of survival to mutation. But by the time paradox, or, as 
Count Dracula characterizes his advantage, the time that is on 
26 Robert A. Heinlein, “All You Zombies…,” in The Best from Fantasy 
and Science Fiction, ed. Robert P. Mills (New York: Ace Books, 1964), 
45. Subsequent page references are given in the text.
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his side, he populates multiple alternate realities with matching 
versions of himself. 
In Predestination, the protagonist’s loop, which fits Heinlein’s 
story, has an added significance. It is the prize agency of the tem-
poral bureau, which aims to prevent crime before it takes place. 
What singles out the bartender-agent (who keeps recreating him-
self out of John and Jane) is that he is devoid of external ties to 
time and history. But his agency proves most successful when he 
becomes psychotic from obsessive unauthorized use of his time 
traveling device and ends up adding the Fizzle-Bomber to his 
loopy retinue of multiple personalities. Rather than the single 
traumatic event that in Heinlein’s story can only be time-trip 
circumvented through the multiplication of sole survival, there 
is the terrorist in Predestination who over a span of decades deto-
nates bombs. It turns out that the bombings prevented worse or 
more crime. The perfect temporal agent projected himself into 
the utilitarian terrorist, giving supernatural assist to the temporal 
agency. Each act of terrorism can be accounted a lesser loss than 
what would have transpired if the Fizzle-Bomber hadn’t acted. 
Countdown
“All You Zombies…” was a remake of Heinlein’s 1941 novella “By 
His Bootstraps,” a backstory of horror fantasy that Heinlein 
reduced to the 1959 title’s clue or MacGuffin. Together with the 
protagonist Bob Wilson (and his time-travel doubles), the reader 
of “By His Bootstraps” returns over and again to what began 
with one person (in a locked room) who was completing his the-
sis titled “An Investigation into Certain Mathematical Aspects of 
a Rigor of Metaphysics.”27 We attend as Wilson types up reflec-
tions on time travel, its plausibility and impossibility: “Duration 
is an attribute of consciousness and not of the plenum. It has no 
Ding an Sicht” (40). This typo, which is internally shored up in 
the edition I read by its intact repetition (51), spells out the “in 
itself” of the Ding as a metaphysical “thing” about “seeing” or 
27 Robert A. Heinlein, “By His Bootstraps,” in The Menace from Earth: 
Eight Stories from the Grand Master of Science Fiction (London: Corgi 
Books, 1973), 40. Subsequent page references are given in the text.
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“viewing,” which does not hold for consciousness. An encysted 
sight or Sicht interrupts the assurance that nothing is unmedi-
ated by and unknowable to the duration of consciousness.
It is possible to assign the Ding an Sicht to a realm between 
literature and film, which the conceit of time travel occupies and 
cathects. Fredric Jameson identified the requirement of what he 
terms a “transcendental hyperspace” for the narrative render-
ing of time. It serves as the descriptive normality of space-time, 
which can be occupied like any other narrative scenery, as well 
as allowing the positing of this space-time as the real milieu of 
the reader. Jameson makes the camera pivotal to modernism’s 
invention of a hyperspace “from which to observe the observer,” 
which both film and time travel thematize.28
As byproduct of temporality’s fictionalization in terms of 
travel in a machine, which begs the update of cinema, the Ding 
an Sicht raises the philosophical question of the status of the 
special effect. H.G. Wells first inscribed in The Time Machine 
the proto-cinematic effect of the ununderstood: 
Night followed day like the flapping of a black wing […] I 
saw the sun hopping swiftly across the sky […] as I went on, 
still gaining velocity, the palpitation of night and day merged 
into one continuous greyness; the sky took on a wonderful 
deepness of blue, a splendid luminous color like that of early 
twilight, the jerking sun became a streak of fire, a brilliant 
arch, in space.29
For every temporal paradox that literature gestures toward, 
film can supply the approximation via visual and special effects, 
the specialized department of filmmaking that subsumes the 
medium when fantasy is in the ascendant. 
In Heinlein’s story, what can’t be seen or recognized frames 
the mounting recognition of the double in the first stranger’s 
28 See the last two paragraphs of Jameson’s review article “In 
Hyperspace,” London Review of Books 37, no. 19 (September 10, 2015), 
https://www.lrb.co.uk/v37/n17/fredric-jameson/in-hyperspace.




appearance in the room. He says he entered through the circle 
over there, which looks to Wilson like “a great disk of noth-
ing” (41). The stranger has “something familiar about the face” 
(ibid.), which is all that Wilson musters upon first contact with 
his double. The stranger urges Wilson to step through the disk, 
identified as “Time Gate,” whereupon a third man arrives to dis-
suade Wilson from following the lead of the first stranger. “The 
two looked a good bit alike, he thought, enough alike to be broth-
ers. Or maybe he was seeing double” (43). I argued in Germany: 
A Science Fiction that time-travel fantasy can be seen, although 
it’s a struggle for Wilson, to be a subgenre of Doppelgänger fic-
tion. The double, according to Freud and Günther, starts out a 
resounding confirmation that the self stands in interchangeable 
relation with its own content. If you meet your double, unique 
like the golem, you meet yourself. Forever. But then for Freud 
the double crosses the dividing line and becomes the harbinger 
of death. A multitude of doubles, however, fits a broader picture 
of humanity, which accords, says Günther, with a new planetary 
going on intergalactic civilization.30
The ensuing altercation among the three men knocks Wilson 
through the disk portal. The invitation to enter willingly was his 
chance “for high adventure” (43). Upon regaining consciousness 
following his knocked-out arrival in the future, Wilson finds 
himself in fantasy, I mean in primal time, that is, in the “Hall 
of the Gate in the High Palace of Norkaal” (46). Time tripping 
in “By His Bootstraps” mixes up B-genres according to the early 
recipe or tendency of American heroic fantasy/science fiction 
to decorate the future and remote planets in the style of time-
lessness with bric-a-brac from the Medievalist-to-Renaissance 
fairgrounds. 
The light show that first attended Wells’s evocation of trans-
port by machine across eons of time returns in Heinlein’s second 
description of the disk, again leading up to the typing of the 
sentence that there is “no Ding an Sicht”: “a simple locus hang-
ing in the air, its flat depth filled with the amorphous colors and 
shapes of no-vision” (51). At this point Wilson begins to recog-
30 On time travel as a subgenre of Doppelgänger fiction see the section 
“Double Time” in Germany: A Science Fiction. 
between a crypt and a datemark
174
nize the strangers as his doubles (ibid.). What’s more, the return 
to the scene of writing sparks Wilson’s recognition of another 
level of doubling: “[T]his was not simply a similar scene, but the 
same scene he had lived through before – save that he was living 
through it from a different viewpoint” (52).31 This could be, then, 
the Ding an Sicht: a POV unavailable to consciousness (of time 
and causality).
Diktor, the ruler in primal time, appears to be the only out-
sider who manipulates Wilson and his doubles. Wilson tries to 
displace Diktor by traveling to the time before his regency to 
establish an alternative government. He arrives ahead of time 
with the knowledge Diktor entrusted to him, including a reading 
list of four books, Machiavelli’s The Prince and three alleged self-
help books (including Mein Kampf). Because it didn’t fit inside 
the focus of the disk at takeoff, Hitler’s tome arrives cut in half 
(73). Not such a loss, Wilson reflects; but this was the first time 
he became aware of the bodily risk involved in time tripping. He 
also comes equipped with Diktor’s vocabulary sheet for commu-
nicating with the indigenous people of the future. They are the 
“Forsaken Ones,” who are on a line of descent from the extinct 
“High Ones.” They comprise another introjection of Wells’s The 
Time Machine. What they share with the Eloi is the lack of “the 
competitive spirit,” in other words, “the will-to-power” (78). 
Wilson seeks to shore up his preemptive ploy by going back 
in primal time to encounter the “High Ones.” When he sees 
“it,” he flees: “It had not been fear of physical menace that had 
shaken his reason, nor the appearance of the creature – he could 
recall nothing of how it looked. It had been a feeling of sadness 
infinitely compounded which had flooded through him at the 
instant, a sense of tragedy, of grief insupportable and unescap-
able, of infinite weariness” (81). He awaits Diktor’s arrival – until 
31 The unseen gives way before doubling, in which the unnamed inheres. 
There’s always a homoerotic rub in Heinlein. This time around Bob 
Wilson is miffed that he was forced by his double to participate in 
the scenario of doubling: “[Y]ou butted me in and tried to queer the 
pitch” (56). And again: “[W]hat was the idea of shoving me into that 
[…] that daisy chain without warning me?” (58). 
new vampire lectures
175
he must recognize that he himself has grown into Diktor, his 
older double, his older self. 
Between “By His Bootstraps” and “All You Zombies…” 
Heinlein updated his doubling fantasy via Matheson’s science 
fiction of a global vampire epidemic. In “By His Bootstraps,” 
Bob Wilson and his doubles try to reroute or improve upon what 
they in the end nevertheless inherit: evolutionary and colonial 
rule over a collective my “Man Friday” (77). “All You Zombies…” 
integrates a post-war world rather than double back to govern 
the nineteenth century. Heinlein goes further inside the new era 
than does Matheson at the close of I Am Legend. Sole survival 
in “All You Zombies…” does not end with the missing link, the 
legend to the map of evolutionary mutation, but deploys the 
quintessential science fictions, travel in time and alternate reality, 
to orbit the moment of irreversible catastrophe. 
The blank checkout lane that is the American way of life or 
death cannot pick up the lack of metaphysics, as Günther argues 
in The American Apocalypse: 
For the time being the experience that man isn’t capable in the 
long term of living without a metaphysics of his own – and 
that he therefore cannot produce history – has not yet been 
made or registered in the new world. The local carriers of the 
history to come have not yet suffered metaphysically. The 
epoch of this suffering, however, lies ahead. It is the inescap-
able consequence of human aloneness.32 
The aloneness and emptiness belonging to the period of transi-
tion, the waiting around for the conquest of space, is the negative 
historical aspect of the decline of traditional supports, which also 
has positive implications: “This ambivalence of the spiritual situ-
ation is a necessary precondition for a positive historical future 
of the new world. Mere suffering drains, reduces, and makes 
sterile as long as it isn’t able to transcend itself into something 
Other” (200). Günther registers the zombie as the identifiable 
32 Günther, Die amerikanische Apokalypse, 199–200. Subsequent page 
references are given in the text.
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symptom of the onset of a suffering that could supply a restart of 
consciousness to match the prospect of outer space. 
A starting point for an American metaphysics of death, 
the idea of the zombie, as it stands, is nothing other than “a 
mythologization of the tendency to separate out all elements of 
death from the life of the soul or psyche” (251). Any content of 
the psyche, however, can be objectified and attributed to what is 
factual or dead. The consequence of the tendency for which the 
zombie is a mascot, therefore, is that all phenomenal life can be 
assigned to the realm of death. Perceived life, then, isn’t life but 
a walking corpse. 
Günther identified the mechanical brains already being 
designed and built in the United States in the 1950s as the 
technological version of the idea of the zombie (251). The equa-
tion, although it was never part of any text he saw through to 
publication, illuminates by its twilight his commentary on The 
Humanoids. Günther underscores in The American Apocalypse 
that so much that earlier epochs considered spiritual was really 
only matter of fact (sachlich) – in fact mechanical (249) – and that 
the mechanical brain is the technologization of what the zombie 
mythologizes: the overcoming of finitude by getting it over with 
already, by excluding it until that’s all there is. The American way 
of death follows by breaking with the old view of death as inter-
vention from some transcendental realm and guidance out of 
this world. The American has unlearned dying a personal death; 
its eventuality is at most an unfortunate work-related accident 
(218). The Old-Testament life spans that Günther sees already 
arriving from the future will render death truly free, accepted 
and self-administered by the more tired than tried (ibid.). 
Günther sees the zombie rebound from a logical impasse 
into aftermath that doesn’t sound like it computes: “A zombie 
is a walking corpse in possession of a second and dead life and, 
because he has already died and thus left death behind, is immor-
tal. But death is absolutely unique. You cannot die twice” (250–
51). The zombie, however, updates the commandment or conun-
drum by its function of walking target. Knock it over and the 
truth of the unique death, that is, second death, shines through. 
Target practice with zombies is assigned in the American spirit 
of demolition, which, according to Günther, necessarily comes 
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before the world religions can begin to become one and cosmic 
(251–52). The split between personal and impersonal versions of 
the absolute can only be negotiated by someone “who for him-
self has undergone a heretofore unknown process of separation 
from subject and object, in which every trace of what belongs 
to objectivity’s realm of the dead, the realm controlled through 
thought, is removed from the realm of the subject” (252).
In The Humanoids, as we saw, the service plan sets each robot 
apart from human agency and thus from the vicissitudes of 
willing and wishing. The “real perfection” of the humanoids is 
that they are “protected from human manipulation”33 Günther 
follows Hegel to a point where cybernetics shall overcome the 
impasse between will and reason by reconsidering them as energy 
and information, allowing them to be but different perspectives 
on the same activity of the spirit for which each is just another 
expression.34 The brain is the organ of subjective consciousness 
and repeats in itself the relationship between I and You, which 
has been mediated through the physical environment (240). 
The subjectivity of the You can be grasped and observed by us 
as an event of willing – the expression of a subjective will, which 
isn’t our own and remains for us completely out of reach (239). 
Günther decides to bracket out the You, therefore, and reenter 
solipsism, but including the life or death of the observer (240). 
To remain within the near future of reading and address plan-
etary mourning within the onset of a new metaphysics of science 
fiction, I follow the You that Günther was ready to leave behind.
Aligned with I Am Legend, Heinlein’s “All You Zombies…” 
showed that human sole survival worked through the melan-
cholic profile of the vampire, while the inheritance of the Earth 
is split between zombieism, science-fictionalized vampirism in a 
mass consumer setting, and a new form of immunity to the fatal 
course of the epidemic, either by time travel or mutation. Time 
travel in Heinlein’s story keeps looping through, around, but 
33 Günther, Science Fiction als neue Metaphysik?, 171–72.
34 Gotthard Günther, Das Bewusstsein der Maschinen: Eine Metaphysik 
der Kybernetik (Baden-Baden: AGIS Verlag, 2002), 237, 260. 
Subsequent page references are given in the text.
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never past the countdown to the second death (the accident or 
loss that cannot be undone). 
Since the Age of Discovery, mourning has required running 
up against Günther’s summary dictum: you cannot die twice. 
But if the “you” is conjugated between you there, the other, and 
double you, the psycho, then we can count two deaths. This 
countdown is the secular world’s afterlife in finitude. During 
World War One, Freud argued that primal man had no problem 
killing off enemies, rivals, anyone who was in the way, but that 
this killing spree was pulled up short before the loss of a loved 
one, a good object.35 Primal man lives on in psychic reality as the 
death wish. In the course of mourning a loved one, the untenable 
admixture of murderous feelings, which underwent emergency 
projection, must be integrated, which doesn’t mean neutralized. 
In the end, the mourning process requires that the double you, 
the psycho in you, attend the prospect of the deceased’s second 
death. This does not necessarily entail a sentencing by your 
agency or acknowledgment. Alone the mourner’s entry upon 
substitution suffices to curtail, displace, or subsume the extended 
scenarios of identification.
That outer space is big enough to admit indeterminacy in 
clocking the finitude between two deaths is the underlying 
conceit of the 2014 film Interstellar. The astronaut-protagonist 
Cooper recalls his deceased wife’s words in contemplation of 
their young children: “Now we’re just here to be memories for 
our kids.” But there isn’t enough room in generational time to 
avert the disaster of loss that afflicts the near future of Earth. 
Cooper risks a mission impossible to secure more time and 
resources for the dying planet or a double of Earth for start-
ing over. After a succession of failures there are two survivors, 
Cooper and Amelia, the daughter of Cooper’s former professor 
and father figure, who designed the two-pronged rescue attempt. 
Amelia is jettisoned off to a habitable planet, the backup goal of 
the original mission, while Cooper struggles to transmit to his 
daughter Murphy, now an established scientist, the saving mes-
sage, the formula for restoration of life on Earth via integration 
within the multiverse. 
35 Freud, “Thoughts for the Times on War and Death,” 298–99.
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The father-and-daughter bond, an Enlightenment intro-
ject, was all along outside linear time. A child when her father 
departed, Murphy was already attuned to Poltergeist-like 
aberrations imparting themselves in her bedroom. This com-
munication from the other side held the place for the paternal 
transmission of rescue from outer space, which she later receives 
and carries out. Cooper, who like his co-survivor Amelia has 
remained unchanged inside the bubble of relativity, arrives at 
last in the multiverse in time for his aged daughter’s dying. She 
sends him away, however, to join Amelia on her lost planet and 
enter upon the substitution that can reabsorb the mother of 
memories, like the multiverse Earth. Cooper departs once again, 
this time to traverse the span between the beloved daughter’s first 
death, which she won’t let him witness, and a second death that 
is at once certain, given, but equally far away on a compass that’s 
cosmic.
In a flashback, Robert Neville breaches among the cans of 
sole survivorship the “cannot” in Günther’s death sentence. 
In rehearsal since the onset of secularization, together with its 
byproducts haunting and mourning, the suffering that alone, 
according to Günther, can give a new history and a new meta-
physics to the planetary civilization to come percolates through 
I Am Legend. After his dead daughter Kathy was taken away 
and consigned to mass cremation, he is determined to provide 
proper burial for his wife Virginia, who goes next. But then it 
is two in the morning, two days after he buried her.:“Two eyes 
looking at the clock, two ears picking up the hum of its electric 
chronology, two lips pressed together, two hands lying on the 
bed. He tried to rid himself of the concept, but everything in the 
world seemed suddenly to have dropped into a pit of duality.”36 
And then he discovered, upon Virginia’s return from the grave, 
that there are two deaths. The objective of mourning straddles 
the pit of duality – not only semantically through the injunction 
organizing mourning’s opening season to join or let the dead go, 
a decision that in the time of mourning’s altering alternations 
between projection and identification can in turn be let go, but 
36 Matheson, I Am Legend, 75–76. 
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also syntactically and more effectively through the sentencing of 
two deaths.
In I Am Legend, the sole survivor derives a legibile legend 
to the experimental mapping of his impasse from two texts, 
Dracula and Hamlet, in which mourning is on a schedule of two 
deaths. Between the evidence of elimination and the pages of 
Dracula, the reality of vampirism’s mortality can be addressed. 
It is the symptom picture of an infectious disease to which he 
applies himself as experimental scientist, like father like son. He 
obtains thus a greater containment of the scream memories from 
his recent traumatic past. The treatment is second death.
Vampires unacknowledge the second death because they are 
masters. Already the idea of the second death liberates ghosts 
from the magic book of endless slave time. In Interstellar, we saw 
the resolution to count down buffered by the temporal paradox 
of outer space transport. From the vantage of I Am Legend, the 
first science fiction to extract the happy end of zombie second 
death from the vampire’s deferral position, the emphasis falls far 
more resolutely. Early in the movie Last Action Hero (1993), we 
attend school with the fanboy who watches, in place of Laurence 
Olivier as Hamlet, his superhero Slater (Arnold Schwarzenegger). 
Hamlet in the role of action figure chooses “not to be,” which is 
now the transitive sentencing of the rot, the lot he eliminates in 
the fortress he detonates. Only thus can the malingering on of 
the lapse into lifelessness give way to innovation.37
What crosses Robert’s mind when he visits the grave of his 
wife is on the same page with Hamlet’s paternal ghost: “I’m here, 
he thought. I’m back. Remember me” (37). Although he speaks 
the injunction of a father’s ghost, he’s not commanding or ask-
ing, but, rather, he remembers a line that resonates differently 
inside him.38 He’s not a ghost nor is his wife (he saw to that). 
37 I have been revisiting and at times reprising my extensive reading of I 
Am Legend in The Psycho Records, but the focus is shifted away from 
the attempt to track the underlying psychopathic violence, while at this 
juncture I reverse the sense of my Hamlet reading in SPECTRE (Fort 
Wayne: Anti-Oedipus Press, 2013) to resituate psychopathy within the 
success and succession of mourning and substitution.
38 In Hamlet, as I argued in SPECTRE, the father’s ghost is double occu-
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And he is not another Hamlet. Since his wife brought home the 
realization that there are two deaths, Robert has not hesitated 
to carry out the unfinished business of putting the already dead 
to rest. Robert Neville’s sole survivorship becomes the legend 
for a new planetary civilization, which, fully theorized by Freud 
in Totem and Taboo, has been in preparation since the Age of 
Discovery in the occult margins of mourning’s compass between 
life and death.
pancy and “Remember me” can be reread with the quavering lilt of the 
child Hamnet asking if he is remembered. Robert’s citation resonates 





Where the Dead Are
Fantasia
The “music of the spheres,” the wrap of music in mathematics 
and astronomy, can also mean that when the music plays we wish 
upon the stars. Going into the “Pastorale,” his Sixth Symphony, 
Beethoven took along Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s Reveries of the 
Solitary Walker. A run of works of Romantic program music fol-
lowed the stroll through the countryside. In 1940, the “Pastorale” 
entered Walt Disney’s Fantasia, a title that also designates a 
form of musical composition that harnesses improvisation. 
Beethoven, who composed in the form, was according to legend 
better even than Mozart at improvisation on the piano, the 
performance called in German Phantasieren. In order that such 
legends might also be mapped, pianographs, melographs, and 
Phantasiermaschinen were designed to transcribe an improvised 
performance into a repeatable score. In a 1956 Disney comic book 
made in West Germany, the local engineer Düsentrieb invites the 
Duck family to try out his newly invented Phantasiermaschine, 
and Donald promptly takes along his nephews on a fantasy trip 
to Jupiter.1 In Walt Disney’s original design for the main building 
of CalArts, the art school he founded in 1961 as tribute to his 
Gesamtkunstwerk Fantasia, there was an amusement-park train 
circling close to the ceiling, guiding visitors through the complex, 
allowing them to gaze down upon the artists busily at work in 
the Phantasiermaschine, the happiest place on earth.
1 “Der freie Lauf der Phantasie.”
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In early fragments, Benjamin formulated and reformulated a 
brief theory of color that was specific to fantasy, that of German 
Romanticism to be sure, but which already indicated the predi-
lection he would realize in his outright appreciation of Disney’s 
art of animation: “The rainbow is a purely childlike image. […] 
The color is […] moist in nature, the medium of changes and 
not symptom.”2 Like in a rainbow and the laterna magica, too, 
“the color is completely contour.”3 What is typical of fantasy (in 
contradistinction to the “fantastic”) is an intrinsic Entstaltung, 
de- or un-formation: “All fantastic forms have in common a 
constructive moment – or (from the perspective of the subject) a 
moment of spontaneity. True fantasy in contrast is unconstruc-
tive, purely un-forming – or (from the subject’s vantage point) 
purely negative.”4 The vibe of fantasy coloration draws on the 
phospherescent, scintillating spectrum of decay – and the violet 
of violence.5
Because he turns the palette into a container, Benjamin’s 
theory of fantasy coloration is on the same page with the day-
dream and Tolkien’s genre: “Fantasy can be kept under control 
only through such contemplation of colors and fully developed 
and satiated in relation to them.”6 The rapport with the nuances 
and transitions of wet color keeps the antisocial tendencies in 
post-childhood fantasying (which according to Tolkien stain 
the elves) under control. By including a happy end, although his 
2 Walter Benjamin, “Die Farbe vom Kinde aus Betrachtet,” in 
Gesammelte Schriften, Band 6: Fragmente, Autobiographische 
Schriften, eds. Rolf Tiedemann and Hermann Schweppenhäuser 
(Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1991), 110. My translation.
3 Ibid.
4 Benjamin, “Phantasie,” Gesammelte Schriften, in Gesammelte 
Schriften, Band 6: Fragmente, Autobiographische Schriften, eds. Rolf 
Tiedemann and Hermann Schweppenhäuser (Frankfurt am Main: 
Suhrkamp, 1991), 115. My translation.
5 The Disney production Mary Poppins (1964) gave in one scene full 
visualization and manipulation of the contours of color, drawing 
animation out of it to shape a kind of cartoon environment for the 
live actors. Mary un-forms a street-art landscape to enter its big-screen 
sensurround where she and her charges spend the day with the painter. 
6 Benjamin, “Phantasie,” 115.
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formulation is half empty rather than half full, Benjamin sup-
plies what for Tolkien reforms wayward fantasy. The un-forming 
tendency of true fantasy upends the sense of an ending, which 
“never leads into death, but rather renders the decline it sum-
mons eternal by an endless relay of transitions.”7 We saw that in 
“On Fairy-Stories” Tolkien responded to a dilation of the sense 
of an ending by identifying “the good catastrophe, the sudden 
joyous ‘turn’” that anticipates a happy ending in the Gospel, 
not in the works themselves since “there is no true end to any 
fairy-tale.”8 End phrases like “and they lived happily ever after” 
or “And if they have not gone away they are there still” are like 
the margins and frames of pictures,9 which flex the enigmatic 
force of upending or unhinging. From within the walls of the 
world, the eucatastrophe gives a fleeting/fleeing glimpse of joy, 
“poignant as grief.”10 
In the future highlight of glass architecture shining through 
Paul Scheerbart’s craft hovering over an unidentified playing 
field between science fiction and fantasy, Benjamin recognized 
the coloring scheme on which he had brooded earlier in his frag-
ments on fantasy. In Scheerbart’s “asteroid novel,” Lesabéndio: 
Ein Asteroiden-Roman (1913), the coloration dabs yellow on the 
brown skin of the alien creatures; violet across the sky; green 
upon the stars; blue on assorted mountain ranges.11 Gray is 
daubed once in the recurring descriptions of the array of colors 
in the alien environment. A little dab will do it. Scheerbart’s 
next novel puts on gray as the experimental foundation for an 
architecture of colored glass. The first German translations and 
samplings from Oscar Wilde’s oeuvre appeared in collections 
that included work by Scheerbart. And Scheerbart was a close 
reader of Goethe’s Theory of Colors, as was his major influence, 
7 Ibid.
8 J.R.R. Tolkien, “On Fairy-Stories,” in Tree and Leaf / Smith of 
Wootton Major / The Homecoming of Beorhtnoth (London: Unwin 
Books, 1975), 68. 
9 Ibid., 78.
10 Ibid., 68.
11 Paul Scheerbart, Lesabéndio: Ein Asteroiden-Roman (Scotts Valley: 
CreateSpace Independent Publishing Platform, 2017), 32.
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G.T. Fechner, who continued Goethe’s afterimage experiments. 
Fechner was the first to characterize as “subjective” the different 
colors seen by each observer whenever the rotating discs covered 
with black and white circles turned slowly.
In Scheerbart’s Das graue Tuch und zehn Prozent Weiß: 
Ein Damenroman (The Gray Cloth and Ten Percent White: A 
Ladies’ Novel, 1914),12 the color gray that is applied is part of the 
pitch for a Swiss architect’s mission of mixing color into glass and 
steel construction. That is why he contractually binds his wife to 
wear only outfits of gray and ten percent white. His better half 
will serve to guarantee the architect’s simplicity of taste in col-
oration, and, inducing a sense of color against a gray backdrop, 
allow him to fulfill the wishes of his clients as his own. 
The realistic novel that follows the architect and his wife 
around the world wherever his multi-hued glass architec-
ture is under construction was composed in tandem with 
Glasarchitektur, a non-fiction work also manifesting the advan-
tages of a new transparency in building. Bruno Taut was a fol-
lower and in 1914 built a glass pavilion in Cologne that displayed 
on each of its fourteen sides text by Scheerbart. The two-pronged 
plug for an environmental change in the near future operates like 
reality testing, which like mourning, however, is not a match for 
the march into total war. 
In the 1933 essay, Benjamin seeks a silver lining in the fact 
that experience didn’t come back from the First World War. He 
makes room for outright affirmation of the arrival of Mickey 
Mouse. But then, he ends the essay, which pitched Scheerbart’s 
Lesabéndio to future readers, on the war that’s next after the last 
one that did Scheerbart in. True fantasy, Benjamin argued early 
on in his coding of color, is deformative, endlessly transitional, 
and inimical to the sentiments of creativity and spontaneity (the 
old barbarism). Benjamin doubts that survival of the next war 
will get out of its retrenching. The posttraumatic structure of 
Benjamin’s reflections on Scheerbart’s novel peforms the rein-
stallation of the Gray crypt in the tower rising above the as yet 
uncontested playing field of fantasy and science fiction. That the 
afterimaging of the colored glass architecture circling the future 
12 Benjamin acquired a copy in 1920. 
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against a neutral backdrop transpires between novels is unavoid-
able since unlike Oscar Wilde Scheerbart wrote more than one 
novel.
In “Erfahrung und Armut” (“Experience and Poverty,” 1933), 
Benjamin introduced Scheerbart as the poster boy of the new 
lease on thinking fantasying heralded by the popular revival of 
astrology and ghost-seeing. The interior that the revived ideas 
address is not inwardness but amounts instead, says Benjamin, 
to a new barbarism that supplants Faustian creation. The pov-
erty of experience allows the new barbarian to start anew in the 
stricken sentencing of the past. Unlike the gentlemen of leisure 
who continue to travel through the cosmos of Jules Verne, for 
example, the passengers that Scheerbart describes are human 
beings transformed by telescopes, airplanes, and rockets into 
lovable and interesting creatures.13 Scheerbart projected citizens 
of the future longing for a world in which they can make pure 
and decided use of their poverty – their outer poverty, and ulti-
mately also their inner poverty. All that’s required, according to 
Scheerbart according to Benjamin, is a simple but ambitious plan 
(734). Encased in Lesabéndio is a plan for a Leseabend, an evening 
of reading. The name Lesa nicks the imperative to read, lese, as 
one might use it lovingly to encourage a child. 
Mickey Mouse, says Benjamin, is contemporary man’s wish 
dream, pulling out of his animated critter body miracles that 
both surpass the wonders of technological progress and make 
light of them. Scheerbart’s aliens are salamander-like Gumbo 
figures that can pull and push themselves into miniaturization 
or magnification. In keeping with the theme of tentacular other-
ness that regularly introduces first contact with aliens in science 
fiction, they move about with suction feet, and their scalp is a 
rubbery surface that can be opened like umbrellas. The details 
of their sensorium are collectibles that skip the prosthetic history 
of technology on Earth and reflect a habitat that science fiction 
tends to project beyond, but which was never, in Lesabéndio, a 
13 Walter Benjamin, “Experience and Poverty,” in Selected Writings, 
Volume 2: 1927–1934, trans. Rodney Livingston et al., eds. Michael 
Jennings, et al. (Cambridge: The Belknap Press of Harvard University 
Press, 1999), 733. Subsequent page references are given in the text. 
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historical setting of this alien species on the planet Pallas. Their 
eyes resemble telescopes that can be turned into microscopes. 
They can tune in to a form of wireless telegraphy (as it is identi-
fied by the narrator) using their bodies as receivers by dint of their 
own electrical aspect.14 They resemble the fantasy-reprogrammed 
robots that sidle up to our empathic identification in the manner 
of pets, like R2D2 and the protagonist of Wall·E (2008).
Their only external technology is photography, which is the 
means of fabricating the tiny books they wear around their necks 
and which they can read only by turning their eyes into micro-
scopes. Early on in the novel, we read the book of one alien’s 
sojourn on Earth. The earthlings could pass right through the 
alien’s body without notice, which might describe a not recog-
nized ghost. The author of the mini volume comments: “What 
was most terrible was that they killed other lifeforms, spliced and 
diced them and stuck the parts and clumps into their mouths; 
they had stone-hard teeth in their mouths with which they 
ground everything up.”15
To carry isolation can mean relating to your dead as to sibling 
playmates in childhood. If of one kind, how much easier to be 
kinder to them. According to Melanie Klein, all the unborn 
siblings lead the way to this happy interface of undeath.16 For 
the child survivor there’s not that much difference between the 
many who are never born and those who existed only to exit. 
The death wish, especially one so early and automatic as the wish 
to be an only child, can be a pioneer in pacifying new frontiers 
for the identified (with) dead. The indigenous people of Pallas in 
Lesabéndio hail from both genres. They are pet-like cyborgs, the 
other Hobbits.
Hobbitness, the hippie magnet that brought the countercul-
ture to Tolkien’s Shire, started out as fellowship among orphans, 
fatherless heirs to the fairy story, always a mother’s bequest. As 
14 Scheerbart, Lesabéndio, 82.
15 Ibid., 7–8.
16 Melanie Klein, “On Identification,” in Envy and Gratitude and Other 
Works: 1946–1963 (New York: The Free Press, 1984), 158–59. That P.K. 
Dick’s twin sister Jane died on him meant that he could see better how 
we live with our dead. 
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a philologist and inventor of timeless fictive but functional lan-
guages Tolkien surveyed the singularity and iterability of myths 
finding a pattern and a path. One variant, the fairy story, always 
gestured toward a happy end and gave consolation. It wasn’t 
until I addressed this in German for a radio special about the 
2019 movie Tolkien, that I realized the significance of Tolkien’s 
consolation packaging of his genre fantasy. Trost is a big word 
in German and by its lightening shows the depression, indeed 
the hole out of which the Hobbit first arose. One of his Oxford 
students left a page unintentionally blank in the written assign-
ment Tolkien was correcting. In a sudden place for absence 
Tolkien wrote automatically: “In a hole in the ground there lived 
a Hobbit.”17 
That the draw of a language for Tolkien was the beauty of 
its sound world means that he lost and found a specific emo-
tional situation there. The topography of Tolkien’s fantasy epic 
inscribes an affective pathway from the hole to the Hobbit in the 
Shire. The Elven idealization is for the memories. Tolkien saw his 
young bride Edith dancing and singing in the glen of the Elves 
and, biding their time together, already knew he would inscribe 
her idealizing Elf name onto her gravestone.18 But the more 
immediate bond of the fatherless duo who lost their mothers in 
early adolescence was Hobbitness. When sitting on the balcony 
of their favorite tea shop, the kids delighted in dropping sugar 
lumps into the hats of the passersby.19 
Tolkien underscored that one fantasy (his adult translation 
of fairy story) was the Gospel truth, and that the Christian 
fantasy, because it had entered history, vouchsafed the imma-
nent Christianity of fantasy’s parallel worlds in which the 
word Christianity need not be known. Each fantasy setting 
nevertheless abuts on the European Middle Ages north of the 
Alps. That’s where Christianization rather than demonization 
17 Humphrey Carpenter, Tolkien: A Biography (New York: Ballantine 
Books, 1977), 172. All my references to Tolkien’s life can be found in 
this biography. 
18 J.R.R. Tolkien, The Letters of J.R.R. Tolkien, ed. Humphrey Carpenter 
(London: HarperCollins, 2006), 340.
19 Carpenter, Tolkien, 40. 
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altered the content and not the practice or forms of paganism. 
Christianization is an ongoing practice. To this day German 
readiness to go naked is heathen (and not the Roman bathhouse 
kind), but the sacrificial content has been displaced. When get-
ting dressed again, the German is at the Christian address. 
Secularization that showcases continuities with Greek and 
Roman antiquity, which must first be cleansed of demonization, 
is not at home in the Shire (the Medieval continuity shot up 
north in Europe). That’s why Tolkien was genuinely uncompre-
hending when it came to allegory. But even if The Lord of the 
Rings wasn’t influenced by the rise of Nazi Germany and didn’t 
refer to it, World War Two got an allegorical rise out of Tolkien’s 
novel. Allegory happens.
Tolkien’s other bout of denial concerns Wagner, whose con-
tribution to the Nibelungen saga was the ring of power secreted 
away in the gold in the bed of the Rhine river. The repressed 
returns at a tilt. When Californian fans called Tolkien at three in 
the morning (what’s the time difference?!) to share their experi-
ences reading The Lord of the Rings on acid,20 he was confronted 
with both coasts (and extremities) of the teen age. The Hobbits, 
like Tolkien, like being tipsy on an occasion. Wagner mixed hard 
drugs into the reception of the Middle-Ages crisis. Tristan, an 
orphan, takes Isolde’s potion and puts himself at her disposal. 
They toast to reconciliation, and she knows they’re both gon-
ers. But then they don’t feel numb and number. OMG! That 
handmaiden replaced my poison with love potion number 
nein! But Tristan later affirms that it’s all the same. What they 
want is P.K. Dick’s Substance D, the drug called Death. Tristan 
and Isolde’s withdrawal from their names and the words that 
link and separate them swaps the little death for the Big One. 
Wagner’s drug-addled unio mystica, the Liebestod, the mutual-
daydreaming administration of the Werther Effect, falls flat 
between Tolkien’s incomprehension and Freud’s dismissal of 
regression to in fantasy. Today, Freud quips, we have neuroses in 
lieu of monasteries!21 
20 Tolkien, The Letters of J.R.R. Tolkien, 368.
21 See Sigmund Freud, “Five Lectures on Psychoanalysis,” in The 
Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund 
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Freud declares that to speak of “chemistry” or “metabolism” 
on the same page as “sexuality” is without content. At least until 
we know more about the body’s chemistry. In other words, 
Freud allows that the day will come when science opens up more 
and more prospects for drug intake. Then he writes:
The popular mind has from time immemorial paid homage 
to hypotheses of this kind on the nature of sexual desire, 
speaking of love as an “intoxication” and believing that falling 
in love is brought about by love-philtres – though here the 
operative agent is to some extent externalized. And for us this 
would be an occasion for recalling the erotogenic zones and 
our assertion that sexual excitation can be generated in the 
most various organs.22
Add together all that variety and you can again be the body geni-
tal of infancy. That’s what the libido toxin is good for but this 
kind of autonomy cannot enter the community of libidinization 
since too busy masturbating or being suckled with substances. 
Only the Californian orgy, according to Herbert Marcuse, a 
Frankfurt Schooler exiled to the Coast, could break through this 
impasse and enter utopia.23 
The other Hobbits, the cyborg aliens that Scheerbart visited 
on the planet Pallas in 1913, make room in their cozy corner 
for Fechner’s theorization of a universe that is animate, even 
conscious, in all its parts and partings. The eponymous pro-
tagonist, Lesabéndio (or Lesa for short) adheres to a “theory” of 
Ergebenheit (devotion and, more literally, submissiveness) that 
Freud, Vol. XI (1910): Five Lectures on Psycho-Analysis, Leonardo da 
Vinci and Other Works, ed. and trans. James Strachey with Anna Freud 
(London: The Hogarth Press, 1957), 50.
22 Sigmund Freud, “The Common Neurotic State,” in The Standard 
Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, Vol. 
XVI (1916–1917): Introductory Lectures on Psycho-Analysis (Part III), 
ed. and trans. James Strachey with Anna Freud (London: The Hogarth 
Press, 1963), 388.
23 Herbert Marcuse, Eros and Civilization: A Philosophical Inquiry into 
Freud (Boston: Beacon Press, 1955).
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posits the “Great,” “our second nature,” which is always invis-
ibly near.24 On other stars or planets, millions of life-forms per-
ish every second. The big dying teaches the survivors the grand 
horror (Schauer) of Ergebenheit. They call it religion (ibid.). The 
“Great” encompasses a cosmic animism. Stars are life-forms, 
too, but they don’t value the fixing of or fixation upon thoughts 
(107). The cloud ceiling of the planet Pallas conceals and makes 
secret the “Great.” This animate cloud of spiderweb filaments, 
in which critters dwell, is not the only secret on this planet that 
Lesa’s tower project will penetrate. There’s reproduction, too, its 
nuts and bolts. To bust a “nut” is to secure a new generation, 
a labor force for the tower’s construction (33). Each new being 
coming out of the nut has been in “other worlds” (34).
In Zend-Avesta, Fechner follows memory, the more spiritual 
form of understanding, into an exchange with the “circles of 
memory,” which the higher spirit absorbs or reabsorbs (like god 
the nerves in Schreber’s system) from all human beings upon 
their passing.25 Just as we are in life the perceptions of the higher 
sphere, so we are after death this sphere’s memories (174). Like 
the spheres rolling within and around all the other spheres in 
Fechner’s famous analogy for the fourth dimension’s wrap of the 
other three dimensions,26 our life and afterlife are on a roll within 
24 Scheerbart, Lesabéndio, 42. Subsequent page references are given in the 
text.
25 G.T. Fechner, Zend-Avesta: Gedanken über die Dinge des Himmels 
und des Jenseits vom Standpunkte der Naturbetrachtung (Leipzig: Insel 
Verlag, 1919), 171. Subsequent page references are given in the text. It 
was hard enough to obtain this copy through interlibrary loan while I 
was guest professor at NYU. Unhappily I received an adulterated and 
abridged edition: “Frei bearbeitet und verkürzt herausgegeben von 
Max Fischer.”
26 Fechner’s essay “Der Raum hat vier Dimensionen” (“Space Has Four 
Dimensions,” 1846) culminated, Wolfgang Hagen argues, in the 
“transcendental physics” and outright occultism of his colleague J.F.K. 
Zöllner. What Fechner propagandized was the discourse that Daniel 
Paul Schreber was given to recognize, in concert with the work of 
academic psychologists like Carl Du Prel, Eduard von Hartmann, and 
Zöllner, as hard science. See Wolfgang Hagen, Radio Schreber: Der 
“moderne Spiritismus” und die Sprache der Medien (Weimar: Verlag 
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the greater existence of planetary bodies and stars, including the 
Earth, of course, in particular the Earth’s animate surface, which 
is under development like our evolving brains: “The life of a per-
son acts in this life beyond his own body upon the entire body of 
the earth” (201) and Fechner can recognize the “will” of the earth 
along with its sense organs and organs of motility (97). 
Before an alien creature on Pallas dies in Scheerbart’s asteroid 
novel it begins drying up, becoming increasingly transparent. 
The dying alien expresses the wish to be sucked up into a living 
friend, who fulfills the wish by extending to maximum height 
and thus widening the pores to absorb the goner into this 
metabolic afterlife.27Several friends pass into Lesa, who upon the 
tower’s completion, which scrapes away the cloud cover and gives 
access to the Kopfsystem, the head or brain system that is more 
than an analogy for the “Great,” merges with the upper region 
while sending to the surviving friends by thought transference 
the message of the significance of suffering for all the transfers 
that comprise the theory of Ergebenheit (143–44). Leading up to 
ascension, there was a span of time for Lesa in which dreaming 
and waking were one (131). “Submission is the greatest. Dying, 
too, is in fact only submission” (139). 
Memory serves Fechner well in Zend-Avesta to designate 
that which crosses over from the mind into the beyond.28 Our 
memory life here and now can be seen as the test and germ of our 
memory life in the next world (184). Reunion awaits us: “We will 
be able to reconnect in the afterlife with all the relationships to 
our loved ones in this world” (187). Ghosts don’t give up their 
old areas of activity, although they aren’t limited to them: “They 
work in us and with us continuously on the projects to which 
they dedicated themselves in this life, carrying them forward” 
(194). The labors of the past are just points of reference for a 
continued and extended labor (ibid.). In the afterlife we com-
municate, but without mouth or ear, “just as now in the realm 
of memory and fantasy there is a pure inwardness of speech with-
und Datenbank für Geisteswissenschaften, 2001), 28.
27 Scheerbart, Lesabéndio, 27. Subsequent page references are given in the 
text.
28 Fechner, Zend-Avesta, 177.
between a crypt and a datemark
194
out a mouth, of hearing without an ear” (220). Much that we 
take to be our own derives already from the spirits of the beyond: 
memories play into our perceptions; they help us interpret our 
sense impressions in a certain way. Nature, Fechner concludes, 
would be a marbled palette of paints if memories did not jog our 
perceptions (193). A signal familiar to us from Schopenhauer’s 
treatise keeps the traffic going one-way. We feel the proximity of 
the ghosts or spirits, but we don’t feel that they feel anything in 
exchange (194).
Scheerbart was the eleventh child, the last-born. Nine of his 
siblings died in childhood. When he was thirteen years old he 
decided to become a missionary. Instead he joined Fechner in 
exploring the great, greater, or greatest, the cosmic animistic 
afterlife he set on the borderlands of fantasy and science fic-
tion. But when the Great War broke out Scheerbart stopped 
eating and died in 1915. How could the protector of so many 
related deaths acquiesce before the prospect of human material, 
Menschenmaterial? In “Experience and Poverty,” Benjamin rips 
through time to nominate Scheerbart a new barbarian survivor 
of “some of the most monstrous events in the history of the 
world,”29 namely the Great War that caused him to ascend, 
like Lesa, into the Kopfsystem. But he left behind a saving loop 
inside the fall that etymologically indwells the German word for 
mourning, Trauer. In Lesabéndio, he foresees and reverses the 
condition of the Gefallenen, the term that would come to signify 
those lost in the war. In the novel, the aliens who have literally 
fallen discover that gravity in this particular shaft is neutralized. 
They fall without sinking down.30 The accident that proved an 
experiment made the assembly of the tower to last at last pos-
sible. It is the monument to the Gefallenen. 
In the language of dreams at least, at last, to build upward 
can mean to build down there, in the underworld. Tolkien 
averred that it was the First World War that had dug his hole or 
depression in which the Hobbits dwelled. But he needed the 
sequel, a wish for another postwar period that he didn’t watch 
out for. The European traditions of continuity with Medieval 
29 Benjamin, “Experience and Poverty,” 731.
30 Scheerbart, Lesabéndio, 84.
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Christendom came to an end, when enthusiastic soldiers 
crowded into no-man’s-land like heroes going to a joust and laid 
siege at hell’s mouth. That they were reduced to human mate-
rial was certainly nihilistic but there was neither good nor evil 
on this level dying field. That changed with the Second Coming 
of the war to end all wars. While the rockets, atom bombs, air 
raids, and computers of the second war challenge the contours 
of Medieval continuity (but qualify as science-fiction props), 
evil was openly installed in Nazi Germany and, what is more, 
first had to be believed in. Hitler was adept at manipulating the 
fake-news guilt of the first war’s victors, but then the good people 
believed and they rose to the occasion like Hobbits to fight pure 
evil and re-secure the inheritance of the meek. The fantasy genre 
could come back or re-start at the border to science fiction (Nazi 
Germany was the first realization of a science fiction), and by 
occupying the edge of the present that belongs to science fiction 
by its hit and miss extrapolations of future worlds forestall the 
end of history. Once fantasy was propped up by both coasts it 
could, through the mediation of Star Wars, go global. As it goes 
the rounds the fantasy that is true is no longer the Gospel but 
digitization. 
Wish upon the Stars
For both the secular and the religious mindsets that Günther 
allows in his commentary on The Humanoids, the starry heavens 
are the beyond. The space-time continuum available to secular 
science in 1950 is, just the same, finite. The question what lies 
beyond still applies: In what space is our outer space installed?31 
Outer space contains a metaphysical secret, a characteristic it 
shares with the spiritual heaven of believers. However, when we 
travel to the outer planets or even outside our solar system, we 
will not in fact arrive at the absolute limit of human conscious-
ness: “The end of the world” in either sense. Here Günther raises 
the question whether there are relative limits of consciousness, 
31 Gotthard Günther, Science Fiction als neue Metaphysik? Dr. Gotthard 
Günthers Kommentare zu “Rauchs Weltraum-Büchern,” ed. Dieter von 
Reeken (Lüneburg: Verlag Dieter von Reeken, 2015), 56.
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which can be expanded in the course of space travel. Earth-bound 
consciousness would be, then, one such relative limit. Unlike 
Arthur C. Clarke in Childhood’s End, Williamson doesn’t sum-
mon the Second Coming from outer space, but focuses instead 
through the inclusion of psychophysics on qualitative and 
relative expansions of consciousness that follow upon all the 
quantitative changes that the future will bring.32 While Clarke’s 
Overmind expunges mourning from the human horizon, 
Williamson’s mechanical brain targets an illogic of unhappiness 
that means to be dead-wrong wrongs the dead. For this protocol 
of its treatment, the mechanical brain in The Humanoids admits 
the integration of psychophysics. 
In contrast once again to the Christian repurposing of evolu-
tionary mutation that in Childhood’s End resolves or suspends 
the occult predilection of mankind, in The Humanoids the gift 
of the psychophysical grid is Enlightenment in provenance. 
Psychophysical functions, which are “normally unconscious,”33 
can be integrated via “the perfected paramechanical grid” (237). 
Delivered of the “interfering internal conflicts” in human agents 
(275), its “creative” “energy,” which represents “the driving 
power of organic evolution” (276), “can even mend the decay of 
time” (238). The “real function” of the grid is education and its 
power will be “completely democratic” (287): “[I]t is just a tool 
to unite the unconscious minds of all people in whom love had 
displaced hate” (288). 
The 2016 film Arrival touched down with an introject of the 
Enlightenment in the mixed-use development between fantasy 
and science fiction. The aliens impart a lessening of grief, a lesson 
learned through the mediation and alienation of their other-
worldly mode of inscription with precognitive loops. The gift 
that the aliens communicate awakens in the protagonist, Louise 
Banks, her own talent for simultaneity, which recalls the frequent 
32 My reading of Childhood’s End in The Devil Notebooks (Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota Press, 2008) was central to my understanding 
of the relationship Freud almost posits between the Devil and the 
death drive. 
33 Jack Williamson, The Humanoids (New York: Orb Books, 1996), 275. 
Subsequent page references are given in the text.
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byproduct of the Enlightenment therapy of animal magnetism. 
Contact with the magnetiseur regularly led to certain patients 
showing all the same clairvoyant abilities, which conferred on the 
gifted client the status of therapist’s assistant in a social network 
of awareness. 
Because their exchange cannot be out in the open, the parties 
to the conference are kept in separate environments on board 
the alien vessels and must communicate through the big screen 
between them. For the duration of the interdisciplinary summit, 
which leads to an understanding of the alien trace against time as 
the truth for the ages, we are ensconced in a classroom lab space 
that functions up against the screen as a transcription and trans-
lation machine – a complete Phantasiermaschine. 
Twelve alien spaceships land at divergent points across the 
globe to impart a life-changing lesson in two parts. First, the 
planet must unite to coordinate and receive the contact stag-
gered across twelve installments. The second bestowal unfolds 
in the course of learning their written language. Getting to know 
the alien language means getting to know all about time, which 
doesn’t exist in the terms of an inexorable declension of past, 
present, and future. 
The first translations of what the aliens are communicating 
seem to be announcing that there’s no time like the present for 
a conflagration among the superpowers, which Banks alone real-
izes is a misreading that fills in like an ellipsis the message that 
there’s no time as we know it – that time, tout court, doesn’t 
exist. Projected into the alien visitation and communication is 
a strategy lifted from a concise history of White Man’s Burden. 
It is likened to what was done by “the British with India, the 
Germans with Rwanda.” After she tells her favorite anecdote 
about Captain Cook securing “kangaroo” from the locals as the 
new animal’s name, unwittingly using the word in the name 
meant to signal in the exchange “I don’t understand,” the US 
commander chides her that she must never forget what hap-
pened to the aborigines of Australia. In their dealings with the 
alien visitors, the humans could become the victims of a superior 
civilization. 
At the end, a moral majority interprets the alien visitation as 
planting a weapon-tool in twelve settings to lead the way into 
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the twilight of suicidal conflict. When Banks goes up alone after 
the vigilante American soldier bombing that brought the “death 
process” into the alien ship, she, like Ellie Arroway in Contact, 
is the heroic champion rising above Christian right-wing media 
politics. And she is CGI-enhanced, fantasy-tweaked as she ascends 
to receive the gift, mistranslated as weapon-tool. She is also at 
this instant given the ability to read fluently and immediately the 
complex message in which the alien gift is bestowed. 
When she returns, she learns that China is leading the way 
toward a battening down of the local stations of alien visitation, 
a retrenchment of national interests that in blocking the confer-
ral of the gift will lead to war. In possession of the ability to open 
time, she calls the Chinese commander and pronounces his wife’s 
dying words to him. While no tense is given and intuitively the 
words belong to the recent past, the logic of the film and of the 
traditions coursing through it also suggests that Banks initiated 
the commander into clairvoyance by his recognition of the 
future parting words of his wife. An American and a Chinese 
would then be the two equal bearers of the gift. Either way, what 
follows is that the commander immediately understands what 
“no time” means and guides the world in the other direction, 
toward unifying communication of contact. 
Only since 1900, Günther underscores in his commentary 
on the novelty of the stories comprising his edited collection 
Überwindung von Zeit und Raum (Overcoming of Space and 
Time, 1952),34 could the question even be raised whether there are 
habitable planets outside our solar system.35 In American science 
fiction, the abstract considerations and calculations concerning 
the habitability of vastly distant planets occupy the foreground. 
Günther takes off for the abstract possibilities of American sci-
ence fiction from an Enlightenment datemark. When he dips 
into the probability of life on these planets, Günther advances 
34 Günther’s collection of German translations of American science-
fiction short stories is the readymade that I unpack in the second 
volume, reading the stories in alternation with comps, fantasy contrasts 
(notatbly works comprising and influencing Lewis’s “Space Trilogy”), 
hybrids between the B-genres, and film adaptations.
35 Günther, Science Fiction als neue Metaphysik?, 81.
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an argument that is the byproduct of an absurd improbability, 
namely that there could be an alien life-form so continuous 
with our own capable of composing Mozart’s The Magic Flute. 
However, the less likely it is that we are going to encounter in 
outer space the folks from back home in Europe, the more the 
probability increases that remote planets in fact fulfill the condi-
tions for generating basic life.36 
To emphasize that the development going into and through 
American science fiction commenced only very recently indeed, 
Günther turns to and cites from Kant’s pre-critical study 
Allgemeine Naturgeschichte und Theorie des Himmels (General 
Natural History and Theory of the Heavens, 1755), in which the 
philosopher of the Enlightenmet assessess the possibility that 
dwellers on the outer planets are “more perfect creations.” 
Should the immortal soul remain forever attached to this 
point in space, to our earth for the whole infinity of its future 
duration, which is not interrupted by the grave itself, but only 
changed? […] Who knows whether it is not intended to get 
to know at close quarters those distant spheres of the solar 
system? […] Perhaps some further spheres of the planetary 
system will form around them in order to prepare new places 
for us to reside in other heavens, after the completed passage 
of time prescribed for our stay here.37
36 Ibid., 83.
37 Immanuel Kant, Allgemeine Naturgeschichte und Theorie des 
Himmels oder Versuch von der Verfassung und dem mechanischen 
Ursprunge des ganzen Weltgebäudes, nach Newtonischen Grundsätzen 
abgehandelt (Königsberg and Leipzig: Bey Johann Friederich 
Petersen, 1755). I cite the English translation by Olaf Reinhardt from 
Peter Szendy’s Kant in the Land of Extraterrestrials: Cosmopolitical 
Philosofictions, trans. Will Bishop (New York: Fordham University 
Press, 2013), 51. Szendy gives as the source from which he took off 
Geoffrey Bennington’s Kant on the Frontier: Philosophy, Politics, and 
the Ends of the Earth (New York: Fordham University Press, 2017). 
It originally appeared in French under the title Frontières kantiennes 
(Paris: Éditions Galilée, 2000).
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Kant concludes his study with the inside view of its makeup. His 
mind filled with the scientific knowledge of his day, the author 
enjoys the view of the starry heavens on a clear night, which 
he explores in a state that we can consider reverie, but which 
he ennobles further as manifestation of “the immortal spirit’s 
hidden faculty of cognition,” which “provides undeveloped con-
cepts that can certainly be felt but not described.”38 
At this juncture of its citation by Günther, Kant’s Theory of 
the Heavens exemplifies the European cosmos that American sci-
ence fiction must leave behind in its own preliminary probing for 
a completely new mythic fairytale, a new plain text suitable even 
for children. Günther writes that in these reflections Kant is still 
projecting the alien in analogy with human life. Still? Kant’s view 
of the solar system bears the date stamp of the Enlightenment. 
It was an innovation of this period to view the Christian afterlife 
as the at once secularized and personalized reunion with loved 
ones.39 Werther’s outbursts to Charlotte about loving the dead 
and reuniting with them beyond the grave belong to this changed 
relationship to the afterlife. It followed that our dead went to the 
outer planets to pursue their perfectibility, the striving on which 
the highest value was placed (Kant’s most important “imperfect 
duty”) and which fell short in one life span (see Goethe’s Faust). 
Beginning in the Enlightenment, there was continuity 
between the living and the dead and the matching prospect of 
38 Quoted in Szendy, Kant in the Land of the Extraterrestrials, 52.
39 Diethard Sawicki, Leben mit den Toten: Geisterglauben und die 
Entstehung des Spiritismus in Deutschland 1770–1900 (Paderborn: 
Schöningh, 2002). The opening chapter addresses the change in 
earlier theocractic conceptions of the afterlife in the course of the 
Enlightenment. His time span leaves out the late arrival of this 
secularization of the heavens in Daniel Paul Schreber’s Memoirs of 
My Nervous Illness, the bible of psychosis studies, which, however, 
as Benjamin first pointed out, was originally published as a contribu-
tion to modern Spiritualism. See Hagen’s Radio Schreber for a more 
complete exploration of this setting of Schreber’s memoirs, although 
the new history he develops of the psychotic break as specific to this 
era demonstrates the shortfall of all resistance. In Kant in the Land 
of Extraterrestrials, Peter Szendy doesn’t recognize this milieu in his 
assessment of Kant’s turn to the firmament of secularization.
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contact. But the immaterial dead relied on alternate media/
mediums to get across. What made spiritualism modern was that 
communication with the other side was analogized with tele-
communications media. These media were not used, however. 
Instead, disabused of function, they were turned into allegories, 
endopsychic perceptions, animism props, or alternate means of 
transmission hiding out in the recording. Between the input and 
output of the message sent by electric live transmission, there 
was immaterial mediation that bordered on the unknown and 
infinite. 
What could be bent to function for live communication 
among the living was open wide for immaterial contact of the 
other kind. Photographs of ghosts could be taken with the lens 
covered. The tape recording of the noise between radio sta-
tions picked up spirit voices that upon incessant replay could 
be discerned. To reverse film, tape, and vinyl record means to 
undo function for the outside chance of an alternate message. 
Christianity rides reversal as the plain text of the Devil. That’s 
one way to stop the all-out secularization that commands the 
thought of continuity and contact with the known and knowing 
dead. 
In The Devil Notebooks, I approached Clarke’s Childhood’s 
End through Alan Turing’s admission that if the compartments 
used for testing recognition of the difference between human 
and artificial intelligence had to be telepathy-proofed, then one 
would need to factor in ghosts as well. Telepathy among the liv-
ing is child’s play and is raised up into the pre-Enlightenment fir-
mament of the Overmind, transformed, mutated beyond object 
relation or recognition, while the Enlightenment generation on 
Earth is blasted to excise the cancer of its modern-occult spin on 
telepathy.
The preamble to modern spiritualism’s science fiction of the 
afterlife saw the dead perfecting themselves beyond the limitation 
of lifetime. Although the cultural A-list doesn’t take the direct 
hit, Diethard Sawicki finds the tendency confirmed in popular 
works of the day, like Elpizon oder Ueber meine Fortdauer im 
Tode (Elpizon or On My Duration in Death). Published in 
1795, it is the ostensible document by one returned from the 
grave reflecting on the circumstances of his continued existence. 
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Critical of the conditions obtaining on Earth, the author cannot 
imagine mankind’s perfectibility in the light of this sun.40 It fol-
lows that the divine providence of reason sees to it that we are 
transferred after death to another star system. And he is sure that 
his own “transplanted” father is citizen of this divine realm.41 By 
an illumination of influence chosen from column B, the setting 
of the conclusion of Goethe’s Faust II in an academy of striving-
in-reverse can be seen to inherit the Enlightenment program of 
perfectibility in which our dead are enrolled. Once the impact 
of the first era of discovery and colonization of a new world hit 
home, the dead could be sent on ahead to colonize inner/outer 
space.42
Instead of entering upon the conceit of continuing education, 
Kant speculates that the development of our soulmates on other 
planets in the light of the sun folds out a scale of spiritual prog-
ress according to which earthlings occupy the middle position. 
In his commentary on “Desertion” by Clifford D. Simak, the 
first story in Overcoming Space and Time, Günther concludes 
that what Kant tries to get around through the balancing act of 
pros and cons remains motivation enough for deserting one’s 
own species. Kant: 
If the idea of the most sublime classes of sensible creatures 
living on Jupiter or Saturn provokes the jealousy of human 
beings and discourages them with the knowledge of their own 
humble position, a glance at the lower stages brings content 
and calms them again. […] On one side, we saw thinking crea-
tures among whom a Greenlander or a Hottentot would be a 
40 This is the lead that I owe Sawicki. I pursued it to check his claims, 
which check out. I looked at the first edition, published anonymously, 
of Elpizon oder Ueber eine Fortdauer im Tode, Erster Theil (Danzig 
bei Troschel, 1795), 148. The author is C.Fr. Sintens.
41 Ibid., 151.
42 Paul Scheerbart claimed that he wrote for an eighteenth-century 
readership. Paul Scheerbart, “Autobiographisches,” in Paul Scheerbart: 
Bibliographie mit einer Autobiographie des Dichters, eds. Kurt 
Lubasch and Alfred Richard Meyer (Scotts Valley: CreateSpace 
Independent Publishing Platform, 2013), 14.
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Newton; on the other side, we saw people who would admire 
Newton as if he were an ape.43 
“Desertion” spells out the truth in what the title advertises. 
Merger with life forms that are spiritually more intense and 
advanced than the human species prompts the wish to desert 
from mankind. Günther: “It is the categorical duty of conscious-
ness to realize in itself the highest form of experience of which it 
is capable.”44 The morality of the story is that from the vantage 
point of our future in outer space a “terrestrial concept of man 
cannot be exported” (ibid.). In a unique concession to the date-
mark of his composition of “On Fairy-Stories” and The Lord 
of the Rings, Tolkien rescues the escape in escapism by transfer 
to the political situation of “departure from the misery of the 
Führer’s or any other Reich” (61). He also closes ranks with the 
war effort and draws the line between escape and desertion. 
Although he wrings the concession to his revalorization of escape 
from “stories of Science fiction” “the most escapist form of all 
literature” (64), he also lands in range of Günther’s affirmation 
of desertion when he concedes a contrast between fantasy escape 
and the quintessential trait of the other genre. The imperative to 
desert, a better defense than escape, underscores the genre differ-
ence. “Seen from the perspective of the Neanderthal, Caesar […] 
and Beethoven are already deserters” (ibid.). 
Our contact person in Arrival, Louise Banks, belongs to the 
SF retinue of grief-stuck deserters who roll back their blind spots 
to see better what the future brings. (As we saw, the film brings 
Ellie Arroway of the 1997 film Contact to mind.) Her loss lies in 
the future, but its stations are shown at the start of the film. She 
is the narrator of this preamble, which is the container in which 
her cry to her doomed daughter resounds: “Come back to me.” 
Then the film restarts around the arrival of the spaceships. Banks, 
a professor of linguistics, is one of the experts soon summoned to 
facilitate contact with the ship that landed in the US. While she 
decodes the characters of the alien script (with the assistance of 
43 Quoted in Szendy, Kant in the Land of the Extraterrestrials, 53.
44 Günther, Science Fiction als neue Metaphysik?, 87. Subsequent page 
references are given in the text.
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a physicist, her future husband), she flashes on fragments of the 
traumatic souvenirs belonging to the future, which augment her 
recognition of the writing on the screen. 
This summoning of the future to confound the chain of 
wishing grounded in the past turns up a contrast with the deliv-
erance from/of the recent past in M. Night Shyamalan’s 2003 
film Signs. Peter Szendy wrapped the film’s opening crop circles 
in a late arrival of Kant’s pre-critical reach for the stars, namely 
his proposal in the Critique of Judgment that if “someone were 
to perceive a regular hexagon drawn in the sand in an appar-
ently uninhabited land,” he could not ascertain its ”nonrational 
cause.”45 In his summary of the film’s opening, Szendy covers the 
range of responses of the Hess family members awakened by the 
barking dogs to witness the immense geometrical figures cut out 
on the field. The young boy Morgan is immediately convinced 
that “God did it,” which his father, Graham Hess, refuses to 
believe. The prospect that local delinquents did it has to be aban-
doned. While consulting with the police officer, Hess himself 
concedes that the figures are too perfect to be made by human 
hand. Then the TV news that crop circles have manifested world-
wide together with commentary on alien visitation beliefs dating 
back to the 1970s introduces a new causation and agency. 
In the film, the arc from God to science fiction must make the 
detour around an unmournable loss, which Szendy leaves unat-
tended before proceeding to touch, however, just this once, on 
the underworld in Kant’s star-gazing treatise: “In his conclusion 
to his Theory of the Heavens, Kant imagines in a […] conjectural 
way if not exactly a future epoch for interstellar journeys, then at 
least the possibility of staying in other worlds after death.”46 In 
Signs this straying into other worlds is brought down to Earth. 
In the course of the alien visitation, the complete scene of the 
mother’s/wife’s dying catches up with her last words, fragmen-
tary messages that the father/husband cited early on, but readily 
explained away as static from misfiring nerve endings. When the 
scene is restored just in time for the showdown with the alien, 
45 Quoted in Szendy, Kant in the Land of the Extraterrestrials, 49. 
46 Ibid., 51. The “philoso-fiction” that Szendy pursues has little in com-
mon with what I named “psy fi.”
where the dead are
205
her clairvoyant command comes through. To her husband she 
said: “See!” And then: “Tell Merrill to swing!” 
Merrill, her brother-in-law, once played baseball, earning all-
time records, but, because he was unable not to swing, scoring as 
many strikes. Swinging is his faith – and the seeing that is believ-
ing has to be renewed in his older brother. Graham Hess was a 
Father of the church who defrocked himself in the wake of his 
wife’s fatal accident. Merrill asks his brother to give comfort like 
he used to. Graham instructs that there are two types of people: 
those who credit everything that happens to luck, meaning that 
whatever happens they’re on their own, and then there are those 
who see signs and hope to know that someone is there. Then he 
recites his wife’s dying words, for him the echo of her hatefully, 
meaninglessly destroyed body. 
The father makes a comeback when Morgan suffers an asthma 
attack down in the battened-down basement while the medica-
tion is upstairs with the aliens. He tells his son to believe the air is 
coming, coming into his lungs; he tells him to believe and breathe. 
Upon learning that the aliens have retreated, leaving behind only 
the wounded, the family goes back upstairs. A wounded alien 
seizes Morgan and starts poisoning him. The father sees and 
commands Merrill to swing. Merrill takes his trophy bat off the 
wall and starts swinging. Because she dreads contamination of 
the water in her glass, Graham’s young daughter has left half-full 
glasses all over the place. Merrill hits the alien but his swinging 
also knocks over the water glasses and douses his antagonist with 
the natural element that repelled the invasion. One child’s water 
phobia matches her brother’s asthma on the symptom trail of the 
father’s aberrant mourning. After the ordeal, the father injects 
Morgan’s inert form to jumpstart breathing, although the others 
are convinced it’s too late. But Graham is sure that the asthma 
shut down his boy’s lungs and kept the poison out. He sees the 
signs of his wife’s death protecting them. The air/heir does come 
and Graham is restored to fatherhood.
More than the direct combat with the alien, it is the collateral 
dispatch of the family’s two dogs that enacts the violence going 
into second death. The redemptive happy end leaves this vio-
lence unaddressed. When we see the first alien on television it 
looks like the female mannequin upstairs in the dead woman’s 
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sewing corner still modeling a half-finished blue dress like the 
princess dress her little girl wears. The alien is the mother’s ghost. 
Graham’s acceptance of his wife’s death as “meant to be” elides 
the death-wish traffic between first and second deaths by raising 
the countdown to Heavenly powers. At the close of the film, 
Graham Hess is again a Father of the church. The snow on the 
ground is a commemoration on ice of the termination of the 
injured alien–evil mother. 
Fantasying and Haunting
In Träume eines Geistersehers (Dreams of a Ghost-Seer, 1766), 
Immanuel Kant takes several running starts to suggest affinities 
between ghost-seeing and philosophy’s love affair with meta-
physics. It is an ironic text that withstood the test of time not 
only because Schopenhauer rewrote it, but also because Kant’s 
relationship to Emmanuel Swedenborg’s thought was as serious 
as this text’s irony. The Nebular Hypothesis that Kant advanced 
in his General Natural History and Theory of the Heavens, and 
which came to be associated with Laplace, who worked it out 
independently, was in fact rehearsed in Swedenborg’s cosmologi-
cal oeuvre, which Kant indeed knew thoroughly – and not just 
as a recent purchase obliging him to write a fresh monograph 
on it.47 This commitment, I submit, is what in Kant’s prediction 
that the readers, who don’t shrug or laugh the whole thing off, 
will simply not understand.48 
Benjamin took from Swedenborg’s universal theory of 
communication with spirits what he found in Baudelaire. 
Swedenborg: “I have been allowed to know that there is no 
way that such a heaven with all its correspondences could have 
come into existence without drawing on the inhabitants of very 
many worlds.”49 In a footnote, Daniel Paul Schreber urges upon 
a fourth dimension the task of maintaining the Kant/Laplace 
47 Immanuel Kant, Träume eines Geistersehers erläutert durch Träume 
der Metaphysik (Berlin: Verlag Lambert Schneider, 1925), 6–7.
48 Ibid.
49 Emanuel Swedenborg, Life on Other Planets, trans. John Chadwick 
(West Chester: Swedenborg Foundation Press, 2006), 6. 
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Nebular Hypothesis side by side with his belief in God.50 
Schreber concludes the Enlightenment tradition that subtends 
Kant’s dream text. Kant allows, for instance, that we tend to 
misconstrue the heavenly seat of departed souls as a vertical con-
trast based on the centrality of planet Earth. But what about the 
“inhabitants of other worlds,” who for the same reason could 
assume the planet above them to be the heavenly home for the 
eternity awaiting them.51 
Swedenborg leaves unexplained how humanity came to 
occupy diverse planets, which we know about only once we have 
passed on into the spirit realm through the direct contact that we 
then enjoy with the spirits and angels of the once living inhabit-
ants of Jupiter or Mercury. An ambiguity in the translation that 
I consulted (Life on Other Planets) reflects the bottom line of the 
Enlightenment tradition that Swedenborg came to symptoma-
tize when he turned to theology upon his father’s death in 1735:52 
“It is a very well-known fact in the next life that there are many 
worlds inhabited by human beings, and there are spirits and 
angels who have come from them.”53 When I read it too quickly, 
I slid the “that” like a cursor to scan “that in the next life,” which 
would conform to the view that the disparate nations of humans 
living on other planets hail originally from the Heimat of fini-
tude on Earth. As noted earlier, the Enlightenment A-list slips 
and slides away from the B-list, which is resolutely plain-text 
about the outer space disposition of the afterlife.
Kant’s treatise is a series of hypothetical scenarios that allow 
for a possible argument in favor of ghost-seeing. For one scenario 
of possibility, Kant turns to the spirit world inherent in morality. 
50 I discuss Schreber’s note in I Think I Am: Philip K. Dick, 39.
51 Kant, Träume eines Geistersehers erläutert durch Träume der 
Metaphysik, 27n.
52 That it was a case of deferred obedience on the part of the stutter-
ing son would seem confirmed by an initial hallucination during 
the breakup of his scientific career. Out of the murky corners of a 
restaurant a man emerged who told Swedenborg not to eat so much. 
Karl Jaspers, Strindberg und van Gogh: Versuch einer vergleichenden 
pathographischen Analyse unter vergleichender Heranziehung von 
Swedenborg und Hölderlin (Munich: R. Piper & Co, 1949), 109ff. 
53 Swedenborg, Life on Other Planets, 4.
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Moral feeling is a portmanteau word like gravitation in Newton’s 
science.54 When we refer external things to our needs, we feel 
bound or constrained by the sense that in us an alien will is 
operative and that our own inclination is constituted and condi-
tioned by its external confirmation (29–30). This is the source of 
the moral drives turning us away from self-service by the strong 
law of obligation (Schuldigkeit) and the weaker law of benignity 
(Gütigkeit). We are dependent, then, upon the ruling of a general 
will, which maintains moral unity and systematic constitution 
according to spiritual laws (30). “All morality of actions can by 
the order of nature never have its complete effect in the bodily 
life of man but instead in the spirit world [Geisterwelt]” (31). An 
afterlife of inseparable community with and within the spirit 
world seems a natural continuation. Present and future would 
be of one piece (32). 
Although Kant tried to keep ghost-seeing, a dream of reason, 
separate from fantasying or waking-dreaming, which is a dream 
of sensibility (40), he could not get around finding them com-
bined in his monograph’s topic, Swedenborg’s occult system of 
communication with the other side. Swedenborg is, in Kant’s 
estimation, at once the premier ghost-seer among all ghost-seers 
and the premier fantast among all fantasts (56). Swedenborg 
communicates at will with departed souls and reads in their 
memories the condition in which they view themselves. He sees 
it all clearly as with bodily eyes (68): 
Even the immense distance separating the reasonable dwellers 
of this world from the spiritual world amounts to nothing at 
all, and it is as easy for him to speak to a dweller on Saturn as 
to a departed human soul. It all depends on the relationship 
of the inner state and on their interconnection according to 
their conformity with the true and the good. (68–69)
The problem remains that the human soul’s contemplation of 
itself as a spirit in conjunction with beings of a similar nature is 
radically removed from human consciousness. One subject is not 
54 Kant, Träume eines Geistersehers erläutert durch Träume der 
Metaphysik, 30. Subseqeuent references are given in the text.
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the same persons: “What I think as spirit, cannot be remembered 
by me as human, and vice versa, my condition as a human can-
not at all enter the consideration of myself as a spirit” (34–35). 
A footnote drops here to address a sliding scale between the 
night dream and conscious memory. We enter upon the grounds 
for Schopenhauer’s sequel, his closer reckoning of the ranging 
of the dream. Sleepwalkers have forgotten what was otherwise 
their rational condition upon awakening. If you remember your 
dream, then you weren’t completely asleep: with clear senses the 
dreamer has interwoven his spirit activities with the impressions 
of the external senses (34–35n). 
Because the ideas of fantasy and those of the external senso-
rium were mixed up together, the dreamer remembers the dream 
in part and in the other part encounters wild chimeras (ibid.). 
Someone given to fantasying is aptly termed a waking dreamer. 
If the impression of his senses were further reduced, he would 
be asleep and the chimera would be a true dream (41). When the 
dreamer awakes, the images continue to preoccupy him, but no 
longer deceive him. Although we carry in the brain a sense of 
self and body in relation to which the fantastic images situate 
themselves, the real sensation of the body through the external 
senses provides a decisive contrast that enables our identification 
of a chimera. Asleep, the sense of the body dissolves, and only the 
self-inventions remain, in relation to which the other chimeras 
can be thought of as external (41). They will deceive the dreamer 
as long as he is asleep. 
How, then, do the waking dreamers do it? Kant offers an opti-
cal POV model based on the manipulation of perception of rays 
of light. The point that fixes the POV is effectively one of distrac-
tion, but, in the imagination, it is a point of collection of the 
directional lines according to which the sensation is imprinted 
(42–43). Kant entertains the example of the “spectrum of the 
body” perceived in the air and projected by a concave mirror 
(ibid.). It is the special effect that’s a wrap with the ununder-
stood. Kant applies his sharpener to Aristotle’s maxim – that the 
world is held in common in waking reality and that countless 
realities arise in dreaming – to make a pointe: “When among 
diverse people each has a world of his own, then we can assume 
that they are dreaming” (39–40). 
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Toward the end of the monograph, Kant acknowledges 
that there is one bias that he would never want to shake: ghosts 
weigh in on the scale of hope (50) – the hope, as he deposits in a 
footnote on the next page, that death is but the upbeat of meta-
morphosis. Writing from within the biographical precincts of 
Goethe’s Werther,55 Johann Georg Schlosser composed a dialogue 
on a variant of metamorphosis: Ueber die Seelenwanderung (On 
the Transmigration of Souls, 1781). Through transmigration, 
the “inner man,” not separable, however, from the aggregate 
of physical organs and mental faculties, goes to the “school” of 
countless lives or incarnations, but without accumulating the 
burden of remembering former lives or maintaining a greater 
all-subsuming personality. The influence of experience is more 
important than its recollection.56 As the spirit becomes more and 
more refined no memory is needed. He sees in every object the 
whole succession of its determination in time (I.30). 
At the end of eons of transmigration, when all the incarna-
tions are together again, the pursuit of one’s own perfectibility 
can be attained (I.37–38). This schooling takes place in earthly 
existence. But then through the closing Indian parable, the expo-
nent of transmigration instructs his interlocutor that there are 
two exits from the recycling, from the ongoing afterlife brought 
down to Earth. A divinity in the office of the creator evaluates 
the degree of refinement that a soul attains after thirty thousand 
years. If there has been no improvement worth mentioning, 
the soul is deleted, while the appreciably refined soul is “trans-
planted” to “another planet” for the ultimate upgrade (II.23). 
Transmigration was the method of schooling and cleansing 
adopted for starting over. Man, the depositing of spirit in animal 
life, flunked both paradise and the world of work. The malig-
55 More pressing upon the Werther grave plot than the two cases of near-
miss adultery, I would think, is the marriage of Goethe’s sister Cornelia 
to J.G. Schlosser in 1770. Her death seven years later confirms Goethe’s 
later reservation that the Werther Effect haunted him like unquiet dead 
siblings. 
56 Johann Georg Schlosser, Ueber die Seelenwanderung: zwey Gespräche, 
2 vols. (Basel: Serini, 1782), I.30. I worked with the facsimile edition by 
Nabu Press, 2012. Subsequent page references in the text.
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nancy upon the spirit had to be excised, but the father–creator 
didn’t want to give up on human being once and for all. And 
so, he opened the school of transmigration (with post-graduate 
programming in outer space). It takes that much time to experi-
ence fully what’s good and evil – to the point of recognizing the 
durability of the good (I.29).
Arrival Time
In underscoring that the limitation of analogical extension 
of human existence to alien lifeforms fits the other limitation 
retrofitting the universe to our solar system, Günther awards 
Kurd Laßwitz the distinction of reaching as far as the moons of 
Neptune.57 Alongside Jules Verne and H.G. Wells, Laßwitz is 
a founding author of science fiction in Europe. Of course, his 
range of forecast “still” didn’t go further than this solar system. 
Indeed, in Laßwitz’s On Two Planets, the Martians “still” arrive 
to teach the Germans Kantian philosophy and shape them into 
their representatives on Earth.
In Arrival, to know the writing from outer space is to know 
what’s going to happen, that it has already happened, and to 
enter upon a categorical imperative of fulfillment before the 
wish. The alien written language sentences lifetime according to 
our concise history of continuity and contact with the dead. The 
message that the alien written language conveys to Banks (in the 
beginning and at the end, the film is her narration) reverses the 
hierarchy of time and memory.
In Ted Chiang’s 1998 “Story of Your Life,” which the film 
adapts, the new written language learned from the aliens is the 
beacon of a literature truly to be, in Kafka’s terms, autonomous. 
In the story, the remembered death in the future is more ambigu-
ously fateful. Banks’s daughter dies while mountain climbing, an 
“accident” inflected by the suspicion of suicidality lurking in the 
constitutively reckless and “contrary” child. It is the ambiguity 
basic to science that must admit alongside the sequential view 
carried forward by spoken languages (which is post-traumatic) 
57 Günther, Science Fiction als neue Metaphysik?, 81.
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the imperative of autonomous writing, a sense of the future to 
come, a wish fulfillment independent of will or intention. 
The scientists make no progress in their exchange until the 
aliens recognize the Fermat principle of light refraction first 
discovered in the seventeenth century. Because even our written 
languages refer to speech, we are committed to a sequential form 
of understanding, which in turn led to the centrality of causality 
in science. Thus, when Banks wonders why the breakthrough 
principle doesn’t sound like a law of physics, her scientist-partner 
explains: 
You’re used to thinking of refraction in terms of cause and 
effect: reaching the water’s surface is the cause, and the change 
in direction is the effect. But Fermat’s principle sounds weird 
because it describes light’s behavior in goal-oriented terms. 
It sounds like a commandment to a light beam: “Thou 
shalt minimize or maximize the time taken to reach thy 
destination.”58 
The variation on causality shows Banks that the “physical 
universe was a language with a perfectly ambiguous grammar. 
Every physical event was an utterance that could be parsed in 
two entirely different ways, one causal the other teleological, 
both valid, neither one disqualifiable no matter how much con-
text was available” (133). Alongside the volition basic to human 
consciousness, which in the celebrated form of free will forgoes 
knowing the future, there is a “sense of obligation” arising with 
knowledge of the future, “a sense of urgency” to act precisely as 
you knew you would (132). 
Transferred to Freud’s account of the drives in Beyond 
the Pleasure Principle, we can recognize in the imperative to 
minimize or maximize the route to the known end the sense 
of urgency driving the death drive and the sense of obligation 
prompting the life drive to cut in and allow room for the slack of 
deferral. The death drive minimizes the route to the end, which, 
however, must be your proper end, the one that in the alien lan-
58 Ted Chiang, “Story of Your Life,” in Arrival (New York: Vintage 
Books, 2016), 124. Subsequent page references in the text.
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guage is already known. The life drive, which cannot contradict 
the overall alignment with the known future according to the 
alien script, maximizes the time of awareness of the sense of cer-
tainty of the ending.59 
One big change from page to screen lies in the valorization 
of memory. In the story, when Banks looks across the epoch 
to be remembered and lived, she only occasionally achieves the 
alien view of “simultaneity.” She likens the glimpse of “past and 
future all at once” to “a half-century-long ember burning outside 
time” (140–41). Otherwise she remembers, but without the one-
way prospect of “real combustion”: “[M]y consciousness crawls 
along as it did before, a glowing sliver crawling forward in time, 
the difference being that the ash of memory lies ahead as well 
as behind” (140). The change in her view of time and memory, 
which comes through learning the alien written language, is 
that she sees all that transpires within her allotted lifetime: the 
half-century-long ember burning outside time. “After I learned 
Heptapod B, new memories fell into place like gigantic blocks” 
amounting to “a period of five decades” (ibid.). While the aliens, 
Banks suggests, think big, making their actions “coincide with 
history’s events” and “their motives” “with history’s purposes,” 
in effect acting “to create the future, to enact chronology” (137), 
their lesson plan for their prize human pupil fits the secular 
schedule of mourning.
In the movie, it is by the import of memory attuned to the 
simultaneity of arrival and return that the affective turbulence 
attending the deadlines in one’s lifetime shall be overcome. This 
is a strategy we can identify by its Enlightenment datemark: the 
benign introjection of haunting secularizes and personalizes 
heaven, which comes down to earth via outer space. In Chiang’s 
story, the alien script changes the way Banks thinks. Rather than 
follow out the “train of thought,” which she associates with an 
59 See my discussion of Freud’s “Devil’s advocacy” in The Devil 
Notebooks. After he has run through a speculation that self-preserva-
tion might also only serve to keep us on the track of our proper death, 
Freud reassures his readership that he has been playing Devil’s advocate 
who doesn’t intend to sign up with the Devil of a definition of the 
death drive.
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inner voice speaking silently aloud, she can in certain “trance 
moments” see writing with her mind’s eye “sprouting like frost 
on a windowpane” (127). But Banks’s initiation isn’t complete, 
only fleeting, leaving her to wade in the surf of the necessity of 
events (144). The first marriage doesn’t last, but not because she 
tests him with the future. In fact, she vows that knowing the 
future means never letting the uninitiated know the writing 
on the wall (137). The alien writing, which in human systems 
appears comparable to mathematical equations and notations 
for music and dance (110), cannot overcome the speed – the 
speech – of thought is brought home by the screen test. After 
her solo exchange with the surviving alien, Banks in Arrival reso-
lutely actualizes what is to come. Just the same, what makes for 
an ill fit in the movie is that she is unable to close ranks with her 
daughter’s father in the face of her foreknowledge. She lets him 
in on their daughter’s deadline and he can’t live with them for it. 
Banks recalls how in the future she explains to her daughter 
why the estranged husband and father moved out. She told him 
about an “unstoppable” rare disease, she tells her daughter, but 
doesn’t conclude the sentence announcing the girl’s verdict. 
What’s unstoppable, her daughter asks. Banks withholds the 
truth and affirms life: “unstoppable” like her daughter, like her 
daughter’s poetry, her drawing. “I’m unstoppable?” Yes! 
The moral education that seeks to bring up the arrears of wish 
fantasying is recognizable in the alien lessons in simultaneity. 
P.K. Dick offered another variation on this inheritance that turns 
around the sentencing of loss. The death of his twin sister Jane 
only a few weeks into his own survival also meant that he instead 
was dead, living on only in his twin’s memories. By this origin 
story, according to which each party to the loss was lost to the 
other, Dick began inscribing a science fiction of alternate realities 
that multiply and extend the finite recording surface/service of 
remembrance.60 Like Dick’s question or plaint – whose loss is it? 
– the categorical imperative from outer space forgoes the syntax 
of the death wish, the sentencing of the survivor. 
60  If there is a gist to the conclusion of I Think I Am: Philip K. Dick, 
then this is it.
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While in moments few and far between she sees it all, like a 
mandala, for the most part Banks goes, in Chiang’s story, back 
and forth to revisit the situations in which the other was and 
is no more. She thus follows out a lesson plan for overcoming 
grief – like the operation of reality testing in the opening season 
of grief according to Freud in Mourning and Melancholia –that 
neutralizes and preserves the countdown between first and sec-
ond deaths, between haunting and successful mourning.
The Specific Emotional Situation
In Reveries of the Solitary Walker, Rousseau demarcates the 
condemned site of fantasying: 
If I had possessed the ring of Gyges, it would have made me 
independent of men and made them dependent on me. I have 
often wondered, in my castles in the air, how I should have 
used this ring for in such a case power must indeed be closely 
followed by temptation to abuse it. Able to satisfy my desires, 
capable of doing anything without being deceived by anyone, 
what might I have desired at all consistently?”61 
But just when you thought this was the Invisible Man’s rhetori-
cal question leading him to crime, Rousseau does an about-face: 
“[T]he sight of general happiness is the only thing that could 
have given me lasting satisfaction” (102). 
When Rousseau composed his Reveries of the Solitary Walker 
in the last two years of his life, he saw himself an exile from a 
hostile society. If the sense of persecution to which we owe his 
escape-philosophizing was at the time of this work’s composition 
out of context, out of time, it still fits a post-traumatic sched-
ule. He chooses isolation to forgo external and internal contact 
with his enemies; in fact, he owes to them his discovery of a new 
resource for reflection and writing: “The moments of rapture 
and ecstasy which I sometimes experienced during these solitary 
61 Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Reveries of the Solitary Walker, trans. Peter 
France (London: Penguin Classics, 1979), 101–2. Subsequent page 
references are given in the text.
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walks were joys I owed to my persecutors; without them I should 
never have known or discovered the treasures that lay within me” 
(36). Rousseau reflects on the fantasying lost in transposition 
to his reflections on moral philosophy:. “As I tried to recall so 
many sweet reveries, I relived them instead of describing them. 
The memory of this state is enough to bring it back to life; if 
we completely ceased to experience it, we should soon lose all 
knowledge of it” (ibid.). The influence of its experience does not 
go into fantasying’s recollection or record. No matter how for-
gone its content, it is not repressed; if it is dropped it still counts 
as “to be continued.” 
Preliminary to his walking cure unto reverie, Rousseau suf-
fered a street accident, which shook loose the souvenirs of other 
bloody mishaps in youth and childhood that he confronts in 
the course of the book. This time around, however, the accident 
exposed him to the rumor of his demise (143). Setting the stage 
for this examination of the expansion and intensification of his 
inner moral life following upon his alienation and isolation, 
Rousseau projects his arrival on another planet: “I live here as 
in some strange planet on to which I have fallen from the one I 
knew” (21–22). He touches down on the Enlightenment staging 
area of the afterlife as science fiction. Whether by some kind of 
time paradox or the advancements in medical science, the protag-
onists of science fiction tend to attain biblical ages. Where death 
appears to have no dominion, it may have already happened. 
The implication of a transfer to the afterlife becomes 
Rousseau’s allegory of making over fantasying into the publish-
able record of his reveries.62 “Set free from all the earthly passions 
62 Rousseau’s Enlightenment equanimity can be contrasted with an 
earlier generation of reflection on fantasying. Michel de Montaigne 
bracketed out the force of fantasying in the first volume of his Essais 
(1580) by the relationship to memory, from the body memory that 
psychosomatically enacts what the impacted imagination must pass 
on like a curse to the faulty memory that makes it hard not to lie while 
conversing. Free-for-all fantasying, however, doesn’t sit still, nor is it 
useful like a field gone to seed in the time out taken to promote its 
greater arability. It’s more like a bolted horse. The author tried it out 
while retired in the closing chapter of his life and soon was studying 
all the disorderly oddities that ensued, registering them in the hope of 
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that are born of the tumult of social life, my soul would often soar 
out of this atmosphere and would converse before its time with 
the celestial spirits” (91). But visits there before his appointed 
time of departure are not enough to establish the continuity shot 
that moral philosophy alone can afford, namely the Before and 
After of a truly continued existence. And so, Rousseau turns his 
fantasying into a school of wishing well to amass for his soul the 
sole “goods it can carry with it:” “[P]atience, kindness, resigna-
tion, integrity, and impartial justice are goods that we can take 
with us and that we can accumulate continually without fear 
that death itself can rob us of their value” (61). The basic rule 
that Rousseau applies in pursuit of a happiness morally secured 
for transport to the other side must rule out the majority fare of 
our second nature as daydreamers: “Whatever our situation, it is 
only self-love that can make us constantly unhappy” (130). 
It is getting late in Hanns Sachs’s The Creative Unconscious, 
when we learn that music is “the art-form which comes nearest to 
being the pure embodiment of beauty.”63 Up to this point, Sachs, 
as we saw, was drawing on an eclectic spread of linguistic and 
visual works from ancient Greek sculpture and drama to Mickey 
Mouse cartoons, all the while testing high and low Freud’s thesis 
that art rescues the omnipotence of thoughts from the off-limits 
underworld of daydreaming. Sachs followed Freud in seeing the 
artistic process commence through renunciation of the drippy 
primary narcissism of wish fantasying. What Sachs adds is that 
beauty is the consolation prize, beauty conceived, that is, in 
accordance with secondary narcissism as a goal of perfectibility 
that, always just out of reach, draws the artist onward. 
The beauty of Sachs’s argument, as becomes clear when we 
hear the music, is that art leads in the eyes or ears of the receiver 
to an “experience of an emotional situation which has been 
his potentially, but which he never can hope to attain in such 
unmixed purity and fullness” (209–10): 
corralling them in time within the span of his calm contemplation.
63 Hanns Sachs, The Creative Unconscious: Studies in the Psychoanalysis 
of Art (Cambridge: Sci-Art Publishers, 1942), 208. Subsequent page 
references are given in the text.
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Music gives an emotional situation, or the change or sequence 
of emotional situations, in a more direct, immediate, and 
precise way than can be done by anything else in the world. 
Unhampered by contents, it can embody and convey emotion 
with a nicety and accuracy of nuance that is quite unattain-
able by any intellectual process or by any intrinsic connection 
with objective facts, be they real or imaginary. (209) 
Just the same, when Sachs gives the example of one of Beethoven’s 
listeners, we are in Fantasia: “The listener […] may, if the spirit 
moves him, be carried away to the fantasy of a gliding stream 
between mossy banks or a field of wheat undulating in the wind, 
or a deserted street in moonlight, or to nothing at all. It does 
not matter, since all and none of these are present in the music” 
(ibid.). 
Whenever we relate to beauty, “the highest form of psychic 
life” (239) that is most perfectly attained in music, we are brought 
“nearer to essentials”: “[A] thing of beauty […] represents and 
brings home a precise nuance of an emotional situation” (234). 
Beauty, in which “the presence of death makes itself felt in […] 
sadness” (240), realizes in the palette of fantasy nuance “the aim 
of every work of art”: “the representation – not the description 
– of a specific emotional situation” (229). That the emotional 
situation isn’t a description means that the influence of its expe-
rience has been isolated and preserved, like the princess in her 
glass coffin. 
The artwork is a kind of dream catcher with beauty as bait. 
It isn’t any old oceanic feeling from prehistory, however, but a 
specific situation, which bears the time stamp not so much of 
fantasy incentive as of lapse in the timing of affective response. 
Rousseau, we saw, associated the goods of morals with an extra-
terrestrial perspective on the afterlife. In his “Fourth Walk,” he 
addresses lying, the defective cornerstone of the moral philoso-
phy in which he trusts. There is the lie to which he confessed in 
print ten years earlier. 
In Reveries of the Solitary Walker, Rousseau claims that the 
ribbon episode is his method for never again telling a lie. But 
when he scours the impress of his conversations in the recent 
past he finds a mess of minor-league lying. “The profound 
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impression made on me by the memory of poor Marion may be 
capable of preventing any lies which might harm other people, 
but not the lies which can help me to save face when I alone am 
involved.”64 Isn’t only that which is useful true and therefore a 
grievous lie if withheld? “I have often made up stories, but very 
rarely told lies. In following these principles […] I have injured 
no one and I have not laid claim to more than was owing to me. 
In my opinion this is the only sort of truth that can be called 
a virtue. In all other respects it is no more than a metaphysical 
entity for us, and produces neither good nor evil.”65 But there 
is no excuse in morals if lies happen because of out-of-timing. 
A conversation can run on ahead of Rousseau such that he is 
forced to speak before thinking. Or if taken by surprise, shame 
and his basic timidity can impel him to tell lies independently of 
his will.66
The utilitarian adjustments to the moral judgment of lying 
might make room for fiction. But more importantly it is the slid-
ing scale of lying, which is unstoppable by the time-saving that 
the run of time in language requires, that extends the scenario 
of out-of-timing to fiction. What lags behind in sadness is the 
missed opportunity to tell the truth of what you felt in the emo-
tional situation. The demand for this completion is inexhaust-
ible. Benign lying or fiction gives to grievous lying a topography 
in which reparation and integration are possible. The beauty of 
Dichtung, Freud’s summary term for art, is that it allows us to 
mourn the missingness of the affective response in the lost emo-
tional situation. 
Affection deficit is suffered over the time of our own response. 
As grievous as the circumstances of departure is the scene of part-
ing. If it was a loss, it counted a failure to get one’s farewell across. 
We “feel” fiction as though we could catch up with the lapse. Is 
the specific emotional situation the place for the absence of what 
we wanted to say or show? Affect isn’t repressed but the out-of-
timing of its response haunts us. 
64 Rousseau, Reveries of the Solitary Walker, 74.
65 Ibid., 79.
66 Ibid., 73–74.
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The constellation in Adorno’s “Schubert” brings about the 
wrap of the music’s truth and history in the latter-day deprava-
tion of its medleys. The essay’s relay and rotation of reprisals 
of the opening theme of an enduring “landscape” in the music 
concludes when the object relation of grief enters upon this 
scene, which opens the other pathway through the music, the 
parallel universal alongside depravation’s track that can now 
be left behind. We begin to recognize the liberated music of a 
mankind transformed. How sad that we yet fall short of these 
utopian prospects. It doesn’t matter if mere sentimentality jerks 
them out; our tears let us see better “the ciphers of ultimate 
reconciliation.”67 
We are at the cusp of affect, which Tolkien’s eucatastrophe 
delivers in the absence of the true happy end, which the turning 
point welling up with tears intimates. In More Than Human, to 
evoke the impact on his protagonist, Lone, of first contact with 
the other, Theodore Sturgeon writes/rides this cusp of a feeling 
always only about to catch up with itself: “His mouth opened 
and a scratching sound emerged. He had never tried to speak 
before and could not now; the gesture was an end, not a means, 
like the starting of tears at a crescendo of music.”68 
The recall of the second death in the future, which is Banks’s 
gift in Arrival, elides what it would imply at closer range: the 
static of mixed feelings, the death-wish forecast. To recall goes 
back to or brings back finite life that is twice over unstoppable. 
While explaining that it wasn’t the girl’s fault, that her father left 
them and no longer looks at her in the same way, Banks almost 
lets slip her daughter’s verdict. She says that she told him some-
67 Theodor W. Adorno, “Schubert,” in Gesammelte Schriften, vol. 17, ed. 
Rolf Tiedemann (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, 2003), 33.
68 Theodore Sturgeon, More Than Human (London: Gollancz, 2000), 
10. I will be looking at Sturgeon’s novel closely in the third volume 
of Critique of Fantasy. In works by C.S. Lewis and Olaf Stapledon 
interpreted in the second volume, we can follow out the assignment 
of Tolkien’s tearful joy to music, the next best thing to the true happy 
ending. Music plays in Lewis’s empyrean spheres of outer space and in 
Stapledon’s cosmic vistas of space and time to convey what lies beyond 
the grasp of a novel’s main medium.
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thing from the future that she knows and that he just wasn’t 
ready to hear. Toward the end of the film, we get the snippet 
that was preliminary to her disclosure of their daughter’s early 
death. When she asks her scientist colleague and future estranged 
husband whether he thinks he would ever wish to change any-
thing in his life, he answers instead – because he’s not on the 
same page with her, but is rather prematurely and belatedly on 
his own – that he might find wanting the incidence of his having 
given expression in the momentary situation to his feelings. 
The Enlightenment subsumed mourning within the science-
fiction afterlife of continuing education. When the wish for 
contact (or arrival) is added to the acceptance of continuity 
between the living and the dead, the sum in the aftermath can 
be endless. While the orbit of arrival time replaces mourning and 
commemoration with acceptance, even affirmation, just when 
Banks thinks she can get her future husband to join her in saying 
yes to everything that happens and happened, in affirming that it 
is and was as he wished it, his main concern turns out to be that 
he has been delinquent and delayed in giving full attention to 
his feelings in the moment. If the loss in mourning is not only 
embodied but expressed, then the words he could have should 
have spoken signal the combo of lag and jump-cut linking day-
dreaming to incomplete mourning. 
What happens when mourning isn’t exclusively tied to the 
object of loss or to the defile of memory in which the object can 
again be lost? What if the traffic of thoughts and wishes irrevers-
ibly carries forward an affect that wasn’t imparted to the person 
you cared for and lost? If daydreaming is in large measure train-
ing for big ideas and big feelings – how else could the carrot and 
stick of beauty, in Sachs’s argument, transfer our second nature 
to art and the social relation – then the burden of preparedness 
lies heavy on our ability to express in good timing what we think 
and feel. The basic belatedness and prematurity of adolescent 
fantasying attend, then, even the most cosmic attempt to reverse 
loss. Resonating within our second nature as daydreamers, the 
scheduling conflict of affects unsaid, undead in the lost situa-
tions of their stirring, remains for the time being the unalterable 
flaw in the superhuman appointment with mourning. The run 
of fantasying behind the timing of expression in the moment 
between a crypt and a datemark
222





Afterword: Go to China
At the topical-allegorical level, Arrival belongs to a new mil-
lennial subgenre of SF films about the role of China on Earth 
as in outer space or heaven. On this new-milennial map, the 
datemark in The Martian turns on cooperation with China, 
the stable partner in outer space also in Gravity. This alliance 
must be formed prelimary to the onset of degeocentering life on 
Earth and advancing mankind into the start position for a new 
metaphyics of outer space. What was said to come from China, 
the 2020 pandemic, didn’t contradict this forecast but forced 
open the prospect of planetary unity and, through social distanc-
ing and self-isolation, of life on alien planets. The call from the 
future self to “go to China” in Looper (2012) appears rescinded 
by the suicide at the end. But the end carries forward a more 
fundamental requirement, namely that America be made good 
again. 
Upon its invention in the future, time travel is immediately 
outlawed and resolutely used by criminal organizations. The 
masterminds from fiction in Last Action Hero swept their 
unidentified victims under the rug of reality. In Looper, the dis-
posal service from the future hides by relocating to the past the 
executions it orders. Because the target is a body that doesn’t exist 
at the time, the crime is perfect. The deployment of time travel to 
make bodies unidentifiable – unidentified with – and thus dis-
posable goes back to the American science-ficitionalization of the 
malingering-on vampire as zombies to kill in our own defense. 
Sole survival of the epidemic, by time travel or mutation, as we 
saw, means that human mourning becomes the vampire. But the 
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times they are a changing for human mourning and at the count 
of two deaths the zombie fodder falls closer to the truth.
No trace of the illegal enterprise of taking out the future’s 
garbage can remain behind or outside the loop of non-existence. 
Therefore, the greatest infraction against an agent’s “contract” 
is to let the loop run, especially if it’s his own dangling loop. 
Retirement means, as written into the contract, that the loop 
closes on the looper. The organization zaps back the older self 
for his younger self to execute. Then the assassin has that span of 
time ahead of him before the loop closes (again). 
The run in the loop exceeds reversal of what already happened 
in time. The older self to the younger self: “My memories are no 
longer memories, now they are alternate potentialities.” When 
the loop runs, the looper is at odds with himself, that is, with 
older and current versions of himself orbiting his loop and each 
hailing from another possible timeline. His older self was target-
ing the child who in the future would create the conditions that 
claim his wife’s life. But before he fires, the child’s mother steps 
in front to take the hit, which the current self recognizes is the 
trauma that will make the child grow up gnarly and dangerous. 
Grown up, he will attain power and first thing close all the loops. 
So, the younger self kills himself, which means the older self goes 
with him. Yes, he protects the greater good for more people than 
one selfish mourner, but he also accomplishes what the older 
self wanted all along: the reversal of his Chinese wife’s murder in 
the future. The conclusion of Looper is a reverb of the maternal 
conceit in Terminator 2: Judgment Day (1991) and Last Action 
Hero. By closing his own loop, the time-travel agent preserves 
the telekinetic child’s maternal bond, which will grow stronger 
through this close call. According to his older self, the Chinese 
woman in the future would have been “a great mother” and in 
fact “saves” their “fucking worthless life.” 
To heed the call to make America good again, there has to 
be, in the first place, a shift of investment within the portfolio 
of identifications and projections that Star Wars capitalized. 
America cannot bear the inscrutable burden of psychopathiy, 
the failure of Dick’s empathy test. Consider the finite catharsis of 
slasher and splatter movies following Hitchcock’s reprisal of the 
German recent past, its Schauer scene, in the stall of American 
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eros. By the occupational therapy of reparation, the post-war 
world advances toward the onset of collective mourning. 
The ready positioning for the merger implicit in the science-
fantasy subgenre of datemark China came out of the work of 
integration, which can be followed in the B-genres, as I tried to 
demonstrate in Germany: A Science Fiction. As corollary to the 
collective mourning on the horizon of German reparation and 
integration is the withdrawal of the US investment in the good 
war and all the evil that hides out there. Can there be any import 
of Star Wars in the projected cooperation with China? 
In 2017, Wonder Woman updated the super-heroine’s World 
War Two setting, to which she is as indelibly tied as are Superman 
and Batman, by situating her opening struggle outside the island 
paradise that she calls home, ultimately her duel as “god killer” 
with Ares, within World War One. The displacement of the date-
mark is the hallmark of the deregulated fantasy genre’s agenda of 
global-latinization (the true fantasy of the digital relation looped 
through the residual charge of Christianization).1 
Germany is losing, but on the eve of Armistice a super gas 
weapon has been invented, massively produced, and can now 
be launched to turn it all around (a distinctive “final victory” 
structure that belongs more to the second war). When Wonder 
Woman kills Ludendorff, believing him to be the mask of Ares, 
she’s wrong. The divinity is condemning mankind from a British 
post of betrayal. This way the human foe is a mixed bag, not 
just another German, and she rallies on mankind’s behalf in the 
name of the love that Steve Trevor, this time a British spy with 
an American accent, offers her before he departs on a suicide 
mission. Wonder Woman’s love and our love for her are pure – 
uncompromised by the recent past of a woman’s subterfuge in 
second-class positions in order to stay by her man’s side. The fris-
son of her superpowers while Trevor guides her through Europe 
is more comparable to the exoticism of Tarzan, which meets with 
approval. 
1 On global-latinization, see Jacques Derrida, “Above All, No 
Journalists,” in Religion and Media, eds. Hent de Vries and Samuel 
Weber (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2001), 56–93.
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Hollywood interests do not readily relinquish the good war 
that keeps charging “Germany” with cornering the market on 
evil. That the lead actress was Israeli was subliminally key to 
acceptance of a post-war affirmation that gets around Death Star 
Germany, but only by jettisoning history back before National 
Socialism. The film premiered in Shanghai and broke box office 
records, scoring by the Chinese history-book view of the Great 
War as Europe’s civil war,2 which renders the Armistice not 
botched, but the onset of the European Union, a benign power 
on the global map according to China in 2017.
Fechner relied on a Chinese contrast to ratchet up the signifi-
cance of a European tendency to displace upwards: “As long as 
in China the corpses are only allowed to be buried next to one 
another, where will we find space for all the living and the dead? 
In our cemeteries, we overcome this difficulty by burying the 
dead always deep in the same place in the conviction that the bod-
ies in the grave will not make things difficult for one another.”3 
In The Great Wall (2016), we were invited to look upon with the 
pragmatic eyes of a new China this upward momentum of global 
fantasy. Its corollary opponent or opportunity, which Fechner’s 
“conviction” belies, is zombieism. Toward this end, the bomb 
planted in range of the all-important mother of the divisions of 
zomboid monsters could only be detonated from a distance. The 
suspense builds inside the tower from which the triggering arrow 
must be shot, while the creatures pile up to stop the archers on 
top. The interior is illuminated by stained glass windows, and 
in this light the monsters can be identified as gargoyle demons. 
The pagan life of these demons, in nuce fitting inside the body 
of the queen mother, can now be extinguished. The female war-
rior was free to become the father-general of China while the 
foreign-body Christians, mercenaries who were reconverted by 
their mission, could go back home to demonization central. The 
general didn’t require the happy end of marriage, because the 
2 Stanisław Lem cites this curio, which I used in Germany: A Science 
Fiction (Fort Wayne: Anti-Oedipus Press, 2014).
3 G.T. Fechner, Zend-Avesta: Gedanken über die Dinge des Himmels 




prehistoric/pre-Oedipal mother was gone. We steer with relics 
not only of Christianity but of Oedipus too. 
The tower stood for the movie theaters that the Chinese – dis-
enchanted, it was reported, by Hollywood fare – could re-enter 
en masse now as the stations of a global-latinizing influence that 
greater China can draw profit from and then subsume or discard. 
The narrator of Wilde’s novel, who often speaks with the lilt of 
Lord Henry’s wit, comments on the fantasy trajectory of medi-
evalism: “that vivid life that lurks in all grotesques and that lends 
to Gothic art its enduring vitality, this art being, one might fancy, 
especially the art of those whose minds have been troubled with 
the malady of reverie.”4 On Earth, the old metaphysics recycling 
through global Christianity or Mass media must be contained at 
the border to the fantasy genre.
Communist China, the Third World redeemed, plowed 
through the vertical contrast toward modification of the crypt 
of European influence. Americans have been working through 
the crypts of European history to enter the clearing that is 
underway. The sci-fi corpus of Cixin Liu washes/watches over 
the borderland of science fiction and fantasy, which it demarcates 
by the American Cold War canon of conquest with stopovers in 
the disavowal of contact on the other side. But what strikes the 
middle of this demarcated or inherited playing field is that the 
intergalactic expanse of an interminable course of ends of history 
is just about large enough to integrate the traumatic history of 
the Cultural Revolution. 
In Liu’s The Three-Body Problem, the members of the 
Frontiers of Science use the abbreviation “SF” to stand in lieu 
of “science fiction” for two fundamental axioms (“shooter” and 
“farmer”) about the nature of the laws of the universe. In the 
fable of the “farmer” hypothesis, one scientific turkey observes 
after almost a year that it must be a scientific law that food arrives 
every morning. It’s on the morning of Thanksgiving (which 
President Lincoln made a national holiday during the American 
Civil War) that the scientist announces to his fellow turkeys his 
discovery of the law of the arrival of the food. But on that day 
4 Oscar Wilde, The Picture of Dorian Gray (London: Penguin Books, 
1984), 145.
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their food doesn’t arrive and they’re the food. You wanted the 
food to arrive each day by law, then be the food on the table each 
year on the day consecrated by the law of the land.
The “shooter” axiom, at the same time, cites one hypothesis 
about the nature of the contact impressed upon the Earth as a 
series of enigmatic zones in the Strugatsky Brothers’ Roadside 
Picnic (the title bears the other inference, that the alien visitors 
were litter bugs): “[A] good marksman shoots at a target, cre-
ating a hole every ten centimeters. Now suppose the surface of 
the target is inhabited by intelligent, two-dimensional creatures. 
Their scientists, after observing the universe, discover a great law,” 
mistaking the result of the shooter’s “whim” for “an unalterable 
law of the universe.”5 While it circumvents the horror story of 
American SF, the hypothetical prospect of a shooter’s whim 
bounces off the East Block tendency to disavow any possible 
exchange with alien intelligence, which is tantamount, according 
to P.K. Dick, to denying that the other exists.6 
Tarkovsky carried the theme of fantasy in science fiction 
forward, in Stalker (1979) and Solaris (1971), unto mourning. In 
the final section of Roadside Picnic, when the protagonist Red 
reaches the wish-granting Golden Sphere, which was possible 
only by sacrificing his companion to the meat grinder so he alone 
could pass, he repeats the wish he knew his companion cherished, 
a wish for happiness on Earth not unlike the vow that almost 
handed Faust over to the Devil. The titular hero of Stalker, as 
Tarkovsky writes in his diaries, graduated in the course of revi-
sions to the screenplay from “drug dealer or poacher” “to be a 
slave, a believer, a pagan of the Zone.”7 The Stalker guides the 
5 Cixin Liu, The Three-Body Problem, trans. Ken Liu (London: Head 
of Zeus, 2016), 76. The SF movie Annihilation (2018) lifts the Zone 
and renames it the Shimmer. The remake of the Russian border zone 
between fantasy and science fiction is brought to a point by one of 
the scientists on the expedition who uses the analogue of optical 
manipulation, the palette we spun with Benjamin, Goethe, Scheerbart, 
and Wilde to describe the way the Shimmer acts on organisms: by 
distorting and refracting DNA like a prism refracts light.
6 See Rickels, Germany, 227. 
7 Diary entry of August 26, 1977. See Andrey Tarkovsky, Time within 
Time: The Diaries 1970–1986, trans. Kitty Hunter-Blair (London: 
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Writer and the Professor to the Room, where wishes are granted. 
But the novel’s sacrifice is displaced, when it looks like the 
Room’s prowess in fulfillment targets unconscious wishes. This 
conceit was the unacknowledged concession to psychoanalysis in 
Solaris, both novel and film. Be careful what you wish for. Not 
the wish you express but a secret wish is fulfilled. That’s why the 
Stalker’s mentor killed himself; he wished that his brother might 
return from the grave but was granted instead wealth, which like 
the free money of inheritance fulfilled a death wish. And that’s 
why at the end of the film the Stalker dissuades his wife from 
entering the Zone to wish upon the Room.
In Liu’s “The Wandering Earth,” the Earth as a whole must 
break orbit and travel toward life-sustaining proximity to a new 
sun (the old one was scheduled to blink out). Spaceship Earth 
is powered by a propulsion system that uses rock for fuel. Its 
main stations are in China and North America. In another story, 
“Mountains,” contact is made with a gargoyle cosmology of 
bubbles embedded in rock, as specialized and askew in regard to 
science since the age of discovery as a Medieval map of the stars. 
The global population in “The Wandering Earth” undergoes 
unio mystica (which is communist), while the alchemical trans-
formation of the earth’s bedrock into cosmic fuel exhausts the 
fantasy throwback and enters the science fiction of survival of 
the planet. The utilitarianism of sacrifice comes up, but as mat-
ter of fact, its pathos of well-being for the majority at the same 
time dismissed as beside the point. Up against extinction, it’s 
hard for the protagonist to imagine that anyone could hesitate in 
choosing the survival of a child over an oldster, of reproduction 
over sex. The Chinese protagonist meets his Japanese partner 
on a snowmobile rally across the frozen – endless but direct – 
connection between Shanghai and New York, where they set up 
house, marry, and win the highest prize when they draw the lot 
that bestows the right or duty to reproduce.
I daydream a study of Liu Cixin’s work. It is close to the 
source, the history of science fiction, and to the datemark, the 
future history of its fantasying. Consider how “Curse 5.0” spins 
its self-reflexive tale about the borderland of science fiction and 
Faber and Faber, 1994), 147. 
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fantasy out of Internet opinions and beliefs. A female program-
mer in 2009 creates the first version of the Curse to destroy the 
man who jilted her. The protagonists of the low-tech story of 
survival that lies outside the Internet battle of the sexes are first 
introduced at the time of the Curse’s upgrade. Liu Cixin and his 
writer colleague from the other corner of the genre contest, Pan 
Haitian, “who had started out writing science fiction, switched 
to fantasy and then finally settled somewhere in between.”8 
Rather than science fiction with or against fantasy, the border 
zone belongs to “the soft-hard divide in science fiction” (215), the 
ultimate user cliché. At their reunion they join forces to write 
one work twice over, once as science fiction, once as fantasy. 
Cixin chattered excitedly about his next grand endeavor. He 
planned to write a ten-volume […] sci-fi epic describing the 
two thousand deaths of two hundred civilizations in a uni-
verse repeatedly wiped clean by vacuum collapses. […] Pan 
was captivated, and he raised the possibility of collaboration: 
working from the same concept, Cixin would write the hard-
est possible science fiction edition for male readers, while Pan 
would write the softest possible fantasy edition for female 
readers. (ibid.) 
Just as Curse 1.0 was about to sink to the bottom of the end-
lessly upgraded Internet and disappear after a decade or so, the 
new fad and science of Internet archaeology intervened. In the 
language of fantasy reserved for the Curse plot and frame: The 
Primogenitor’s original Curse was discovered and tweaked by an 
8 Cixin Liu, “Curse 5.0,” in The Wandering Earth, trans. Ken Liu 
(London: Head of Zeus, 2017), 215. Subsequent page references are 
given in the text. That the story is a farce doesn’t exempt it from the 
author’s overall grasp of a topography of traumatic histories that must 
be worked through in the border zones of science fiction. The way 
that the programmer introduced the curse brings to mind lines from 
Heinrich Heine’s “The Silesian Weavers”: “Old Germany, we weave 
your funeral shroud; And into it we weave a three-fold curse – we 
weave; we weave” (212). That we are brought to two minds before this 
German introject would be the subject of yet another chapter of my 
daydream of a study.
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adept of the new science who adopted the moniker Upgrader 
and relaunched it as Curse 2.0 (216). In the low-tech story, the 
trend has been realized; the digital world/word has passed the 
authors by. Hardly any copies of the joint masterpiece, which 
they published privately, sold. But then counter-wave science 
fiction turns it all around into the hard-and-soft genre’s rejection 
of technology. The King of Science Fiction editorial department 
follows suit, going on horseback to meetings with authors who 
must submit handwritten manuscripts. 
With the exception of the editorial department’s dinner invi-
tations, the destitute authors have downgraded to psycho home-
less substance abusers. In the junkyard they inhabit, Cixin finds 
a laptop discarded by a hacker fleeing the Internet police. On it 
he discovers Curse 3.0 (which in the heroic saga was the work of 
the Weaponizer). 
He pushed the laptop away and joined Pan in reminiscing. 
Those were the days! His omniscient, virile epics of destruc-
tion had struck chords with so many young men. […] 
By now, Pan was sniveling alongside him. He thought of 
the colorful, profound works of his early years, like poems, like 
dreams. It was not so long ago that his prose had bewitched 
hordes of teenage girls. (224–25) 
Despairing over their abandonment by their respective reader-
ships, each author changes the parameters of the Curse back and 
forth, like the good fairies in Sleeping Beauty (1959), who change 
the color of the princess’s gown with their wands back and forth 
to suit their preferences (and thus give away her hiding place). 
The result of the digital magic duel is the new and destructive 
Curse 4.0. Their abjection is the cone of immunity to the Curse 
that destroys the city. In the language of the Curse’s digital 
upgrading, low-tech rescuers secure the authors’ happy survival:
Just then, they heard a silvery voice, like the touch of an 
ice crystal in the sea of flames: “Cixin, Pan, come quick!” 
Following the voice, they saw a pair of stallions emerge from 
the flames like spirits. Two beautiful young women from the 
SFK editorial department rode atop the horses, their long hair 
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trailing behind them. The riders pulled Cixin and Pan up 
onto the backs of the horses. Then, like lightning, they took 
off through the gaps in the blistering sea, vaulting the burning 
wreckage of cars. (231) 
A highpoint was reached for Schopenhauer with the prospect 
that more material on ghost sightings in China would make pos-
sible at last a truly universal understanding of the continuum of 
night dreaming and waking dreaming (and paranormal states): 
“It is to be wished and hoped that we will soon be in receipt of a 
collection of Chinese ghost stories, in order to see if they, too, are 
essentially of the same type and character as our own.”9 Kafka’s 
story “Great Wall of China” belongs to this trajectory of occulta-
tion that starts out in a Europe that is already a foregone conclu-
sion left behind by new goals set in “Amerika.” At the other end, 
there is China, the Heimat of regional civilizations hailing from 
the East transformed by White Man’s Burden. We witnessed 
Lord Henry in The Picture of Dorian Gray pull the afterlife 
through the portal in the new world to Third World China. 
This occultation traces in reverse the one-way trek of countless 
Chinese laborers who razed San Francisco’s inland back country 
to bottom out a Californian valley for growing the produce for a 
successful new world. 
According to Günther, “the attempt to include the only 
recently discovered American hemisphere as a colony in the 
epoch of regional civilizations of the eastern hemisphere failed. 
The process of spiritual or psychic emancipation which sci-
ence fiction so importantly reveals continues.”10 This draws the 
9 In his treatise on ghost-seeing, Schopenhauer crowns his definitive 
identification of episodes from The Clairvoyant of Prevorst now as 
invented, now based on optical illusion, now genuine by an aside trip 
to China. The cultural differences will add to the confirmation of a 
shared bottom line in the study of these phenomena. Schopenhauer 
expects confirmation because in a Chinese novella he did read the ghost 
appearances although fictional suggest that there are similar concep-
tions regarding “dreaming as true.”
10 Gotthard Günther, Science Fiction als neue Metaphysik? Dr. Gotthard 
Günthers Kommentare zu “Rauchs Weltraum-Büchern,” ed. Dieter von 
Reeken (Lüneburg: Verlag Dieter von Reeken, 2015), 30.
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divide between the American New World and the sorry state 
of colonization that constituted the Third World. China lifted 
out of there and through communism was as though redeemed. 
Filtered through Winnicott on acting out as signalling hope, 
we can understand Paul Mayersberg’s observation in his 1968 
study Hollywood: The Haunted House that “Los Angeles and 
Peking are the most hopeful cities on earth.”11 At the “Wall of 
the Pacific,” the frontier spirit that looked forward to outer space 
also came before the mirror that leads to China. The borderland 
between fantasy and science fiction, between the digital relation 
and history, is the place where the two renewal “religions” of 
global capitalism meet and cross over: Chinese communism and 
American political correctness.
On a class field trip during my stint of teaching at the art 
school in Karlsruhe, I asked the head of the Freiburg paranormal 
institute about what appeared to me to be a return of the com-
pact with the Devil in horror entertainment following the film-
therapeutic termination of secular slasher movies. He answered 
that while European culture never separated horror from the 
Devil, the distinctions I was making reflected the unique metab-
olism of US popular culture, in which striking changes seem to 
occur immediately upon each change in office. 
During the Obama presidency, a new digital sense of integra-
tion dominated the socius, in which every historical episode 
and figment was returning but outside the former context of 
its opposition. The Civil Rights movement was returning, the 
Christian Right was returning; every name and event in history 
was returning like an entry in the digital archive. This could 
be followed in a show like True Blood, in which every B-genre 
fantasy figure pressed for realization or inclusion. The undertow 
of the integration was a kind of fracking of undiscovered layers 
or deposits of consumption. Twilight was all about getting pre-
teens for the first time in history to buy books and movie theater 
tickets for and by themselves, summoning them like consumer 
ghosts to compensate for the uncountable Chinese adults only 
11 Paul Mayersberg, Hollywood: The Haunted House (New York: 
Ballantine Books, 1969), 13.
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awaiting further capitalization of communism to be animated as 
big spenders. 
The perfectibility of integration, in the social sense no less than 
in the sense of shoring up the psyche in mourning’s aftermath, 
pushes toward the ongoing approximation to a more perfect 
union in the United States (according to Obama’s Philadelphia 
speech on race), which can jump the divide between communism 
and capitalism. That it cannot be about reversing the historical 
inequities of the past, which amounts to an imperative of repro-
ducing them, is the most radical gist of Maoism. Passing through 
the vale of industrialization is not preliminary to a revolution 
that makes history. Back in the United States in 2018, I could 
observe college students preparing to be a workforce – a collec-
tive – of one, trying to capitalize on a politically correct agenda, 
and thus doubling up the ranks of a new order that we think we 
can share or pretend to share with an increasingly middle-class 
China. The Americans need a good history for entry upon the 
experiment of partnership with Chinese capitalists who still visit 
Lenin’s birthplace on holiday. Nitpicking about the totalitarian-
ism of communism in the past is out of the new order. Sitting 
before the screens of the digital relation, like the disconnected 
segments of Kafka’s “Great Wall of China,” we work at a continu-
ity between the renewal religions of capitalism and communism, 
which is tantamount to what the narrator of Kafka’s story must 
“imagine”: a central office in which “all human thoughts and 
wishes revolve in a circle, and all human aims and fulfillments in 
a circle going in the opposite direction.”12 
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